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ABSTRACT
Traynor and Surrey made proposals for judicial
reform in 1938*

They specifically included recommenda

tions that exclusive original jurisdiction in federal tax
cases he vested in a single Tax Court and that a single
Court of Tax Appeals he created to hear all tax appeals
with appeal from the latter court hy certiorari to the
Supreme Court.

Subsequently, other writers debated the

merits of these recommendations.
The purpose of the present study was to make an
evaluation of equity in the judicial administration of
the accumulated earnings tax cases.

This study examined

cases at the trial court level for conflicting decisions
on each one of three broad topics.

Analysis of these

conflicts proceeded from the trial courts up to the
Supreme Court.

The three topics researched were two

substantive rules of law, a procedural rule of law, and
applications of basic accounting concepts*
The two substantive rules of law investigated
were interpretations of the term “purpose** and interpre
tations of the relationship of "purpose” to the “reason
able needs of the business."

During a period of almost

four decades, four distinctly different interpretations

vii

v iii

of the prohibited purpose were used by the courts*

With

four different interpretations of purpose in use, in
equitable treatment of taxpayers is a highly probable re
sult.

An analysis of the relationship of "purpose*' to

the "reasonable needs of the business" revealed eight
paths were available to reach a final decision, assuming
only one definition of purpose.

A total of twenty-six

possible paths are available for a final decision when the
four interpretations of purpose are combined with the
eight paths presented.

Considering this large number of

possible paths to a final decision, the probability of
equity for past years is quite low.
The procedural rule of law investigated was the
operation of the burden of proof under section

In

equity has resulted from the Tax Court's failure to make
a determination of the section 53^ issue in all appro
priate cases.

However, the magnitude of the inequity

is substantially less than in the instance of the sub
stantive rules of law discussed above.
A determination of the reasonable needs of the
business requires the application of such basic account
ing concepts as earnings, depreciation, working capital,
and appropriation of earnings. The confusion over the
accounting relationships has been apparent in the cases
in which the courts have explained the application of

ix

accounting concepts.

Overall, the courts* treatment of

accounting concepts is considered to he an additional
indication of a lack of equity.
The investigation of final determinations enabled
the evaluation, based upon a comparison of identical
issues, to be placed in perspective.

The increasing per

centage of cases taken to the district courts by tax
payers indicates that taxpayers believe they will re
ceive more favorable treatment in the district courts
than in the Tax Court.

The final determinations of in

cidents decided by jury trials seems to support this
apparent difference in attitudes.

The pattern of appeals

suggests that both the Commissioner and taxpayers sense
the difference in attitudes among the forums.

The re

versals obtained corroborate the suggestion of bias.
Thus the conclusion is made that in the past, equity has
been mostly a matter of random chance, rather than the
inexorable process of justice.
No individual judge or court can be singled out
as being responsible for the lack of equity.

The judic

ial system for federal tax cases must bear the blame.
Therefore, the Traynor and Surrey recommendations, that
exclusive original jurisdiction in federal tax cases be
vested in a single Tax Court and that a single Court of
Tax Appeals be established, are endorsed.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
The income tax as it is known today developed
from the Sixteenth ..Amendment to the United States Consti
tution, which was adopted in 1913*

This amendment per

mitted the assessment and collection of taxes on incomes
without requiring apportionment between the stateB and
without regard to any census or enumeration*

For several

years any litigation arising in income tax cases was
handled within the existing federal judicial structure.
In 192^ a Board of Tax Appeals was established as an
independent agency within the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government.

At first, the decisions of the

Board were not binding upon the parties, and either party
could sue in the United States District Court.

Any ques

tions of fact determined by the Board were tried de novo
by the district court.
In 1926 the law was changed to permit appeals
directly from the Board to one of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals and to prevent the taxpayer from ob
taining a retrial in another court once he permitted the
case to come before the Board.

In 19^2 the Internal

Revenue Code was amended to change the name of the Board
of Tax Appeals to the Tax Court of the United States and

to give the title of "judge" to each of its members.

The

authority of the Board was expressly stated to remain the
same.1
Although the Tax Court was not a de .jure court, it
was a de facto court.

2

However, the Tax Court was not con

tent with being accepted merely as a de facto court and de
clared its independence from the Courts of Appeals in Ed3
monds.
Later the Tax Court exercised this independence
and refused to follow a contrary rule set out by a court
of appeals which had jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Tax Court.

In defense of its position the Tax

Court stated*
The Tax Court has always believed that Congress in
tended it to decide all cases uniformly, regardless
of where, in its nationwide jurisdiction, they may
arise, and that it could not perform its assigned
functions properly were it to decide one case one
way and another differently merely because appeals
in such cases might go to different Courts of Ap
peals. Congress, in the,case of the TaxrCourt,
•inverted the triangle' so that from a single .
national jurisdiction, the Tax Court appeals would
spread out among eleven Courts of Appeals, each
for a different circuit or portion of the United
States. Congress faced the problem in the begin
ning as to whether the Tax Court jurisdiction and
approach was to be local or nationwide and made it
nationwide.
Congress expected the Tax Court to
1
Lawrence F. Casey, Federal Tax Practice (Chicago*
Callagham & Company, 1955)* 295-297*
2
Kav v. Commissioner. 178 F. 2d 773 (3 cir. 1950).
Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett. I**? F. 2d 66 (1 Cir. 19^5).
Fairmont Aluminum Co.. 22 TC 1377 (19^8).
^William E. Edmonds. 16 TC 117 (1940).
^Arthur L. Lawrence. 27 TC 716 (1953).

set precedents for the uniform application of the^
tax laws, insofar as it would he able to do that.-*
Since appeals from the Tax Court go to the various circuit
courts, the Tax Court does have a problem with conflicting
decisions of the circuit courts.

However, the solution

of the Tax Court left much to be desired since this solu
tion forced a taxpayer to expend additional effort and
money in orde*' to win his case.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969^ changed the status of
the Tax Court from an "independent agency in the Executive
Branch of the Government" to a court of record "under
Article I of the United States Constitution."^

Further

more, the name of the court was changed from "Tax Court
of the United States" to "United States Tax C o u r t . A l 
though one can only speculate as to whether these changes
had any influence in the recent change from the indepen
dent position discussed above in the Lawrence case, the
Tax Court explained the shift as follows:
In thus concluding that we must follow Goldman, we
recognize the contrary thrust of the oft-criticized
case of Arthur L. Lawrence. 2? T.C. 713. Notwith
standing a number of the considerations which ori
ginally led us to that decision, it is our best
judgment that better judicial administration re
quires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision

^Ibid.. p. 718.
683 Stat. ^87 (1969).
7Int. Rev. Code of 195^* Sec. 7 ^ 1
of 1969. Sec. 951).
8Ibid.

(Tax Reform Act

which is squarely in point where appeal from our
decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that
court alone. . . . Moreover the practice we are
adopting does not jeopardize the Federal interest
in uniform application of the internal revenue
laws which we emphasized in Lawrence. We shall
remain able to foster uniformity by giving effect
to our own views in cases appealable to courts
whose views have not yet been expressed, and,
even where the relevant Court of Appeals has al
ready made its views known, by explaining why we
agree or disagree withQthe precedent that we feel
constrained to follow.“
This change should result in some reduction of the
number of conflicting cases.

However, the United States

Tax Court, the United States District Courts and the United
States Court of Claims all share original jurisdiction in
federal income tax cases.

The difference is that in the

Tax Court the taxpayer has not paid the deficiency, while
in the other courts he has paid the deficiency and brings
suit for a refund.

Furthermore, appeals from the Tax Court

and the District Courts go to the eleven different United
States Courts of Appeals, while appeal from the Court of
10
Claims is to the United States Supreme Court.
From all
of the foregoing one should not be surprised to discover
that conflicting decisions occur in federal tax cases.

9Jack E. Golsen.
TC 756-57 (1970).
10
Stanley S. Surrey and William C. Warren, Federal
Income Taxation, Cases and Materials (Brooklyn: Foundation
Press, Inc., 19537> PP* 51-53.
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THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
The overall purpose of this study is to relate
the above discussion of conflicting decisions to one area
of the federal tax law— the accumulated earnings tax cases.
Specific objectives are*
1.

to determine the characteristics of conflicting
decisions as they exist in accumulated earnings
tax cases?

2.

to analyze the conflicting cases in order to de
termine the basis for the court's decisions;

3*

to evaluate the equity of the judicial administra
tion in such cases; and
to analyze the cases in order to evaluate the
future prospects for equity in the accumulated
earnings tax cases.

Importance of the Study
There are constant pressures for changes in the tax
system.

Critics are constantly calling for reforms in the
11
legislative, administrative, and judicial systems.
if
changes are deemed desirable, then evidence to support these
changes must be accumulated; if a change is believed to be
detrimental, then evidence must be accumulated to oppose it.
Litigation is expensive in terms of time as well

as in money.

Accountants and attorneys have a formidable

task when the law is clear and only the facts are to be
argued and proved.

11

V/hen the potential element of conflicts

These criticisms are summarized in the review of
the literature presented later in this chapter.

in the law is added to an already difficult situation,
the situation becomes much more difficult and more
hazardous for the client as well as for the accountant
or attorney advising him.

Unfortunately, the existence

of conflicts in the law probably encourages litigation
because any party has excellent legal authority to support
whichever position is to his advantage.
The accumulated earnings tax cases were selected
for study for two reasons.

First, this tax area is of

great concern to corporations and their financial officers
and directors as well as to accountants and attorneys.
Second, there are numerous cases available which can be
analyzed for conflicts.
Scope of the Study
Since this study is concerned with the equity of
the judicial administration in the accumulated earnings
tax cases, a definition of equity must be developed that
applies to the judicial administration of cases in general
Accumulated earnings tax cases will be evaluated to de
termine if equity does exist in these cases.
The provisions covering the accumulated earnings
tax in the 195^ Internal Revenue Code are sections 531
through 537*
the tax rates.

Section 531 provides for the tax and gives
Section 532 provides that the tax shall

fall upon every corporation, "formed or availed of for

7
for the purpose of avoiding the income tax . . . t«12
Section 533 states that for operating companies the pro
hibited purpose exists if the earnings are accumulated
“beyond the reasonable needs of the business."3--^ Another
lit
subsection applies to holding companies.
Section
53^ provides for a shift of the burden of proof to the
Commissioner in certain instances.

Section 535 sets out

the adjustments necessary in making a calculation of
"accumulated taxable income" including a minimum credit
and a general credit for earnings that " . . .

are retained

for the reasonable needs of the business."3'-*

Section 536

merely provides for the inapplicability of section *j43(b)
to Section 531.

Section 537 modifies the section 533(a)

phrase, "reasonable needs" to include "the reasonably
anticipated needs of the business."
The salient points of the Code provisions have
been presented to show that there are three broad elements
to be considered in evaluating the accumulated earnings
tax cases.

First, sections 532 and 533 present two rules

of substantive law which could be subject to conflicting

12

Internal Revenue Code of 195^* section 532(a).

1^Ibid., section 533(a),
•
^ I b i d .. section 533(b).
^ Ibid.. section 535(c).
^ Ibid., section 537*

interpretation by the courts.

Second, section 53^- pre

sents a procedural rule of law which could have some
effect upon equity in these cases.

Third, a determina

tion of the reasonable needs of the business, as incor
porated into sections 533* 53^* 535* and 537 requires an
application of accounting concepts.

While these three

elements are substantially different, they are pervasive
and must be considered in an evaluation of equity in the
judicial administration of the accumulated earnings tax
cases.
This study is limited to a case analysis of these
three broad topics.

In addition, an investigation based

upon the final decisions of all the cases is presented.
This study will not attempt to evaluate the equity of other
judicial areas of either a tax or nontax nature.

Neither

is this study a research of the legislative history of
the accumulated earnings tax or any other topic.

However,

if some portion of the legislative history of this subject
becomes relevant to the case at hand, then it may be dis
cussed.

Finally, it is assumed that the reader possesses

a knowledge of the accumulated earnings tax as provided
for in sections 531 through 537 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 195^ and related Regulations.

Also, the reader

is expected to be well versed in the basic legal and ac
counting concepts required of a competent tax practitioner.
However, this level is presumed to be somewhat below the

9
level of knowledge expected of an attorney or CPA for
their respective fields.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
The terms below are defined as they are used in
the context of this study.
Equity
Ideally, changes in the tax law should enhance
equity to taxpayers and promote stability at less expense
in achieving political objectives.

Sometimes all of these

elements cannot be satisfied, and sometimes they may even
be at odds.

In the latter event, common sense would indi

cate that the merits and disadvantages of those in oppo
sition be weighed and the element with the most sound
support would take precedence in that instance.

Equity

is recommended as the most important element to be dis
tinguished from the others although it also relates to the
others In varying degrees.
Equity takes on different meanings in different
situations*
Webster,

One definition of equity, according to

is:

A free and reasonable conformity to accepted stan
dards of natural right, law, and justice without
prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor
entailing undue hardship.^

17
fWebster's Third New International Dictionary
(Springfield, Mass.i
G. & C. Merriam Company, 1969),
p. 769.

10
He lists fairness and, impartiality as two synonyms for
equity.^-8

In defining "fair" Webster says, "EQUITABLE im

plies a fair and equal treatment of all concerned, sug
gesting often a less rigid standard than JUST • . . .
The federal system for collecting income taxes is
unique in that the taxpayer assesses himself for his in
come tax liability.
it is unfair?

How long can such a system endure if

Is it not unfair for similar transactions

to be taxed differently throughout the country?

One writer

believes that the success of this system is due to "the gen
eral attitude of most taxpayers that they do not mind pay20
ing taxes so long as everyone else is similarly taxed."
Senator Russell B. Long has called for both greater
21
equity and simplification of the federal tax system.
Secretary Barr has stated:
The middle classes are likely to revolt against in
come taxes not because of the level or amount of the
taxes they must pay but because certain provisions
of the tax laws unfairly lighten the burden of others
who can afford to pay. People are concerned and in
deed angered about the high-income recipients who
pay little or no Federal taxes.22

*8Ibid.
19Ibid.. p. 815.
20
Peter K. Nevitt, "Achieving Uniformity Among the
11 Courts of Last Resort," Taxes. 34:312, 1956.
21
Russell B. Long, "The Federal Tax Structure, Sim
plification and Equity: Consistent Goals," Taxes, 47:194.

.

1969

22

Statement by the Honorable Joseph W. Barr, Secre
tary of the Treasury, before the Joint Economic Committee,
January 17, 1969.

11

Such statements indicate a concern toy responsible govern
ment officials that fairness should permeate the tax system.
Another dictionary makes the following comment
about equity.
In a more limited application, it denotes equal justice
between contending parties. This is its moral signi
fication, in reference to the rights of parties
having conflicting claims . . .
But what does "equal" mean?
of equality.

There are various concepts

2 it

In a formal sense equality means that men
?<
in similar circumstances should be treated the same. J

This thought is a common thread woven throughout the
preceding discussion.

It is simply stated, easily per

ceived, and hardly arguable in the abstract.

The diffi

culty arises in a concrete application to the cases.
Consider two high school graduates who desire a
college education.

One wants to become an engineer and

the other an accountant.

If both are given scholarships

in accounting, then they are treated alike in terms of
what they received, but not in terms of what they desired.
Suppose that one student has blue eyes, but the other does
not.

If the one with blue eyes receives a scholarship, but

the other does not, then they are treated equally under a

23
^John Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary (St. Paul*
West Publishing Company, 191*0, p. 1057*
oh
For an excellent discussion of equality in social
and political theory see, "Equal Protection," Harvard Law
Review. 82*1159-1173, 1969*
25Ibid., p. 1163.

12

rule that says only persons with blue eyes receive scholar
ships, but they are treated unequally with respect to
26
what each one receives.
Reasonable Classification
These examples illustrate that the concept of
equality is without meaning unless relevant differences
are considered.

Thus,

in granting scholarships one must

determine whether or not the academic preference of a
student and the color of his eyes are relevant differ
ences in making a decision.

Once the concept of relevant

differences is wedded to the concept of equality, then
the application of this new concept demands an evaluation
of the empirical realities and the development of a value
system.

This system must weigh differences and simi

larities between alternatives and determine " . . .

the

relevance thereof with references to the nature and purpose
of the treatment it is proposed that each receive."27
Adam Smith was also concerned with equality and
listed it first among the canons that he set forth.

His

use of the term equity referred to reasonable classifi-

28

cation.

Thus, if the classification does not violate

26Ibid.. p. 116**.
27Ibid.

28

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (TJew Yorki I'he Modern Library,
ftandom House,
£nc., 1957)» PP* 777-778.

13
the principle of equity then taxpayers may be classified
in tax cases.

Furthermore, the principle of equity is

upheld so long as the classifications are reasonable.
Schultz and Harriss have considered the matter and
expressed their thoughts as follows:
Equity— relates differences in treatment to reason
able or relevant bases or sources. Equal treatment
is not always equitable— and neither is unequal
treatment. The crucial factor in deciding whether
inequity is equitable is the adequacy or relevancgg
of the element which accounts for the difference. y
A reasonable classification derived from relevant differ
ences forms the basis for an evaluation of the judicial
administration of income tax cases.
Incident
In order to classify the final decisions in the
accumulated earnings tax cases the meaning of the word
"case" must be considered.

The term "case" is probably

most frequently used to denote the citation for a single
judicial determination.

However, in the accumulated

earnings tax cases, a single judicial determination often
represents the consolidation for trial of several cases
on the docket.

Each docketed case usually involves more

than one taxable year.

Since the accumulated earnings tax

is to be determined separately for each taxable year,
then the final determination for a given case citation

29
7William J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American
Public Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
PrenticeHall, Inc., 1959) p. 85*

could be in favor of the taxpayer for one or more years
and also in favor of the Commissioner for one or more years.
Thus a cited case cannot necessarily be classified as
being in favor of only one of the parties.

On the other

hand, some cited cases involve several taxable years, while
others involve only one taxable year.

A classification

system which classifies the determination for each taxable
year would give undue weight to the cases involving several
years in which no significant change occurred.

Therefore,

for the purposes of this study an incident is defined as
a decision in a cited case in favor of one party for one
or more taxable years.

Consequently, a cited case could

contain two incidents.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The investigation of the subject at hand is a
very small subset of a vast whole.

The whole can be

described in general terms as a concern over the degree
of equity inherent in the entire judicial structure for
federal tax cases.

Although a concern over equity in

federal tax matters is not limited to the judicial admin
istration of those matters, the following discussion is
a very brief summary of the major contributions arising
out of a concern for equity in the judicial administration
of cases in the federal tax area.

15

The Traynor and Surrey Proposal
The shot that was heard 'round the tax world was
fired by R. J. Traynor and Stanley Surrey in 1938.30

In

a comprehensive examination of both the administrative
and judicial procedures in federal tax cases, Traynor out
lined existing deficiencies, the causes of the deficiencies,
and set forth propositions to remedy the deficiencies.
Traynor was particularly disturbed by the long delays and
uncertainty that is costly to all parties.

He found that

a typical case in 193^ spent three years with the Internal
Revenue Service and another three years in the Board of Tax
Appeals— a six year period from the date the return was
filed until the first judicial decision was rendered.

An

appeal to the Circuit Courts of Appeals would add another
two years, and a further appeal to the United States
Supreme Court would add another year.

With the potential

requirement of a nine year period in order to ultimately
settle tax disputes, one can easily see the virtual certainty of the impairment of tax administration.

31

Traynor observed that an average of 68.9 percent
of the cases closed by the Board of Tax Appeals for three
consecutive fiscal years beginning in 1935 were settled

3°R. J. Traynor, "Administrative and Judicial Pro
cedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes— A Crit
icism and a Proposal," Columbia Law Review, 38:1392, 1938.
31Ibid.
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administratively without ever coming to trial.

The re

sult was unnecessary delay due to the appeal to the Board,
and expensive duplication of the administrative functions
of the Internal Revenue Service within the judiciary.-^2
Furthermore, the delay in reaching a final determination
resulted in a substantial loss due to the inability of
the government to collect deficiencies finally determined.
Many taxpayers became insolvent during the time the matter
was before the Board. '
The Commissioner should look to the decisions ren
dered by the Board for guidance in administering the In
ternal Revenue Code.

However, the delay means that he

must exercise his initiative during the years he is waiting
for a determination.

Taxpayers must also institute actions

in order to safeguard themselves.

The delay also hinders

Congress in its attempts to strengthen those areas determined by the judges to be weak.
Traynor found the defects in administrative pro
cedure to be due to overly elaborate provisions for re
view of decisions made by revenue department personnel
and the inability of the Commissioner to obtain necessary
factual information which the taxpayer could more easily
provide.

He pointed out that one cause of inefficiency

32Ibid., pp. 1394-1395*
33Ibid,. pp. 1396-1397*
3ZfIbid.. pp. 1397-1398.

in the judicial system was the result of having exclusive
original jurisdiction in cases in which taxpayers wish to
litigate without payment of the deficiency in the Board of
Tax Appeals, while original jurisdiction in taxpayer
suits for a refund rests jointly in the district courts
and the Court of Claims.

Whether or not the claimed de

ficiency has been paid is irrelevant in determining the
issues as to whether or not a deficiency actually exists.
Thus, multi-forums for such affairs are unnecessary, and
the forum most skilled in such matters should be the only
forum.

The several forums for original jurisdiction rertc

suit in a lack of uniformity in tax cases. ^

Traynor

concluded:
Instead of being a tribunal to whom both taxpayers
and the Commissioner could look for authoritative
guidance, the Board is merely one of 8? tax tribu
nals of original jurisdiction whose decisions have
equal rank as precedents.3®
He believed that the high degree of centralization of the
Board of Tax Appeals was another factor leading to judicial
inefficiency.

Finally, he thought the method of appellate

review in income, estate, and gift tax cases was a great
contributor to the problem.
In support of the latter point Traynor noted that
normal judicial theory was analogous to a pyramid.

3 ^Ibid.. pp. 1398-1^03.
36Ibid., p. 1^03.
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Original jurisdiction should constitute a broad base with
such jurisdiction among many courts.

Appeal from these

courts would be to a smaller number of courts, and appel
late review of these appeals courts limited to one final
court.

However, in tax cases the pyramid had been inverted

with appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals going to eleven
Courts of Appeals.

Thus, the Board is faced with a dilemma

when there is a disagreement, among these courts. ^
Traynor made several suggestions to correct the
administrative and judicial deficiencies.

His most sig

nificant suggestions in the judicial area were*
(1)

To transfer the original jurisdiction of the
district courts and the Court of Claims to the
Board of Tax Appeals, thus giving the Board ex
clusive original jurisdiction in all income,
estate, and gift tax cases;

(2)

To decentralize the Board of Tax Appeals; and

(3)

To create a single Court of Tax Appeals and limit
appeals to this Court with appeal from the Court
of Tax Appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.3°
He explained the benefits of his suggestions as

follows:
Under the proposed system as an issue could reach
the Supreme Court only through the Court of Tax
Appeals, both the Commissioner and all taxpayers
would be forced to acquiese in a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals if certiorari were denied,
so that denial of certiorari would settle a ques
tion instead of being an invitation to litigation.
The consequent reduction in the number of decisions

37Ibid., pp. 1404-1407.
38Ibid.. pp. 1425-1428.
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and hence of precedents, should do much to strengthen
the uniformity achieved "by consolidation of original
jurisdiction in the Board. As Board decisions would
no longer be jeopardized by the prospect of running
the gauntlet of eleven tribunals, the disruptive
factor of legal uncertainty in the administrative
state would largely disappear, and controversies
between taxpayer and Commissioner would be fewer
in number and more readily settled. ^
Criticisms of the Traynor Proposal
E. B. Prettyman presented a contrary view to the
Traynor suggestions.

He agreed with Traynor and Surrey as

to the existence of the problem, but disagreed as to the
solution.

In support of the existing provision for judi

cial review he argued against the consolidation of juris
diction in the Board for several reasons and against
the establishment of a Court of Tax Appeals on the basis
that conflicting opinions acted as a deterrent to arbiLq
trary or hasty judgment.
The reason Prettyman agreed
with Traynor as to the problem, but not as to the solution,
was because he also disagreed with Traynor as to the causes
of the problem.

Prettyman believed that three elements—

personnel, policy, and procedure— were essential to solve
disputes administratively.
Prettyman concluded that since there was a high
quality of personnel, the fault must lie in one of the
other elements.

However, he thought the fault was in the

39Ibid., pp. 1^28-1^29*
^0

E. B. Prettyman, "The Traynor Proposals— Come
Considerations," Taxes, l?t397, 1939*

policy, while Traynor felt that it was in the procedure.
In particular the Treasury Department should urge its em
ployees to find the "right answer" in every case regard
less of whether or not any tax would be collected.

The

cause is that the men are required, or think they are
required, to collect a tax in every case, according to
Prettyman.

he believes that subsequent to the adoption

of such a policy, a spirit of co-operation would descend
upon the land and taxpayers would stop at only perceived
abuses of power in submitting to government determination
h,-}
of deficiencies.
Other critics

h,2

quickly spoke out on the subject.

Although some of the defects pointed out by Traynor and
Surrey were acknowledged, several writers disagreed with
the causes and many disagreed with more than one of the
suggestions.

Angell expressed a fear that the suggested

remedies of Traynor would so shatter the confidence of the
American taxpayer in his government that the collapse of
the tax collection system could be a likely result.
Youngquist believed that cases were being heard with suffi
cient rapidity and that if undue tax litigation did exist

^Ibid.,

p. 398*

^2See Traynor, p. 1184.
-'Montgomery G. Angell, "Procedural Reform in the
Judicial Review of Controversies Under the Internal Revenue
Statutesi An Answer to a Proposal," Illinois Law Review,

34-1151, 1939.
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the fault was a result of the frequent changes made by
liL\,
Congress m the Revenue Acts.
The Griswold Proposal
The furor over Professor Traynor*s Proposal had
mostly subsided when Professor Erwin Griswold of the Harkc.

vard Law School renewed the controversy. J

Six years had

elapsed since the Traynor proposal and changes had taken
place.

First, a decentralization of the Bureau had oc

curred somewhat along the lines Traynor and Surrey had
recommended and some noticeable improvement had been
effected.

Second, revenues from the federal income tax

were expected to increase suddenly to ten times the aver
age of the preceding decade.

Such a great increase was

expected to bring a large increase in the number and
complexity of tax cases.
Griswold had studied both the Traynor proposal
and the criticisms of it.

He avoided much of the same

criticism by omitting several recommendations made by
Traynor and Surrey.

Instead, he settled upon the single

element in their proposal which could bring about a sub
stantial improvement in light of the changes discussed
Zf,k
G. A. Youngquist, "Proposed Radical Changes in
the Federal Tax Machinery," American Bar Association Journal, 25:353, 1939*
4-5
-\Erwin N . Griswold, "The Need for a Court of Tax
Appeals," Harvard Law Review, 57:1153* 1944,
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above— a Court of Tax Appeals.

Of course, Griswold pro

posed refinements to the suggestion based upon the cri
ticisms that the proposed single court for tax appeals had
drawn earlier.
Professor Griswold eloquently covered every facet
of the problem in building support for his position.

One

interesting rebuttal which he made was against the argu
ment for the status quo.

The status quo argument was that

delays and conflicts are not necessarily undesirable
because,

"a second consideration by a second tribunal of46
ten corrects an initial error."
Griswold found the

assumption of a "right answer" in tax questions interesting
and joined with Surrey in. the position that many tax
questions were no closer to a "right" decision after four
or five circuit courts of appeal had fought over them, than
Il o

when the first court had rendered judgment. '
Criticisms of the Griswold Proposal
Criticism of Griswold's proposal centered around
two main points.

First, Robert Miller explained how the

existing process for settling a tax dispute could be dided into five stages.

He noted that Griswold based his

position heavily upon the potential total time delay of
nine years,

and Miller argued that Griswold's suggestion

^Prettyman, p. 440.
47
Griswold, pp. 1190-1191 *
^ 8Ibid., p. 1162.
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would only save substantial time in the fourth stage while
ignoring the longest delays which were in other stages.
The other major point made by Miller was that about 96
percent of the cases reaching the circuit courts were dis
posed of without undue delay.

Miller relied upon a study
Ilq
made by Remmlein for this statistic. 7
Madeline Remmlein conducted a study-' in an effort
to evaluate Professor Griswold's charges.

Her study

covered a five-year period (October, 1939. to September,
194/f) 0f civil tax litigation of both the Supreme Court
and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Remmlein*s

method of study was to review the Supreme Court decisions
for those cases involving civil tax issues and categorize
them so as to isolate the conflict cases from the others.'*1’
Then she traced both sets of cases back to their origin
to develop a comparison of the time required in the various
stages for each class of cases.
One finding of her study was that there were long
delays only in unusual c a s e s . R e m m l e i n interpreted
the data to indicate a fallacy in the charge that
l±Q
^Robert N. Miller, "Can Tax Appeals be Central
ized?" Taxes. 23 j303-305# 1945* See also Robert N. Miller,
"The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases* A Specialized
Court of Tax Appeals," American Bar Association Journal.
40*563, 1945.
-*°Madeline Remmlein, "Tax Controversies," George
Washington Law Review, 13*416, 1944-45.
51Ibid., p. 419.
52Ibid., p. 431.

conflicting circuit court decisions delayed settlement
of tax controversies. ^

She also took exception to the

charge that there is a lack of certainty in circuit court
decisions.

To support her contention she points out that

only 3*8 percent of the circuit court decisions were re
viewed "by the Supreme Court because of a conflict and 1.5
percent for other reasons.

From this she concluded that

almost 95 percent of all circuit court decisions are final
<Il
and thereby certainty reigns.
Although her figures are
undoubtedly accurate, she seems to have missed the issue
in the lack-of-certainty charge.

Obviously, the Supreme

Court can only review a small percentage of all cases—
either a vain attempt, or a successful one, in reviewing
a substantial percentage of cases would frustrate the
objectives of the judicial system.

The matter is not a

lack of certainty in those particular cases, but a lack of
certainty in those cases subsequently arising that contain
the same issues.

Remmlein conducted another study for a

three year period immediately following the period of the
first study.

This latter study merely supported the for

mer, but it did indicate a possible trend toward a greater
total elapsed time until final settlement of a case.-^

53Ibid.
54Ibid.
-^Madeline Remmlein, "A Time Study of Certain Tax
Controversies," George Washington Law Review. 16:238, 19^7i*8.
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New Comments in the Fifties
One article published in 1953 is interesting be
cause it was written by a judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

After careful consideration Judge

Walter Pope concluded that the objections to the Court of
Tax Appeals by the American Bar Association could be re
duced to one substantial objection— a fear that the creation
of a new court with seven or nine members to be appointed
at one time by a single appointing authority would result
in the appointment of judges of doubtful judicial quali
fications and ability because of political considerations.
However, he noted that the great weakness shown to exist
by Traynor and Griswold at the circuit court level was
still in existence.

Judge Pope then set forth a plan for

appointing members to a Tax Court of Appeals which would
avoid the above objections, and he called upon others to
improve his recommendations.

After expressing the belief

that for prospective use a "right" rule does not exist and
that one answer is as good as any other for future guidance,
he, too, adopted the words of Justice Brandeis in tax
matters:

"It is more important that the applicable rule

of law be settled than that it be settled right.

^ W a l t e r L. Pope, "A Court of Tax Appeals: A Call
for Reexamination," American Bar Association Journal. 39:
275-276, 1953------------------- ------------57Ibid., pp. 275, 27?.
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Peter Nevitt conducted a cursory examination of
the results of the appeals from the Tax Court for the four
years 1952 through 1955 "to all of the courts of appeals.
While he acknowledged the danger in making conclusions from
a comparison of the number of cases affirmed with the
number reversed without particular knowledge of each case,
he suggested that taxpayers had a good chance of obtaining
a reversal of an adverse Tax Court case (33>7%) and that
some circuit courts had a tendency to favor taxpayers,
while others favored the government.

Such a high percen

tage of reversals indicated the lack of uniformity in tax
decisions.

Nevitt recommended increased review of circuit

court decisions by the Supreme Court as the most practical
way of achieving uniformity.
Comments in the Sixties
The early 1960's found several writers again dis
cussing a Court of Tax Appeals. All were in favor of
59
such a court. x One study was made by Professor Lowndes.
Lowndes* thesis was simple:

"It is time to rescue the

Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time to rescue

-^Nevitt, pp. 311-316.
59
-^Philip E. Heckerling, "The Quest for Tax Certain
ty: A Court of Tax Appeals," Taxes. ^0*37, 1962. Earnest
J. Brown, "The Growing ’Common Law* of Taxation," Southern
California Law Review, 3^ 1235* 1960-61. Charles L. B.
Lowndes, "Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court," Supreme
Court Review, p. 222, i960. Louis A. Del Cotto, "The Need
for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and A Study,"
Buffalo Law Review, 12:5, 1962-63.

federal -taxation from the Supreme Court.u^°

In support

of his contention Professor Lowndes first reviewed all of
the federal income, estate, and gift tax cases going to
the Supreme Court since ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment through the 1959 term.

He classified the 618

cases into the three categories of criminal cases, con
stitutional cases, and construction cases.

The purpose

of this classification was to evaluate whether or not the
61
Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction in tax cases.
Professor Lowndes found that only 22 of the cases
were criminal cases involving income tax evasion.

He be

lieved that since these cases generally involved elements
of criminal law rather than technical interpretation of
tax laws, the Supreme Court should continue jurisdiction
in order to protect the rights of defendents.

Twenty-two

cases over approximately fifty years should not be con
sidered a heavy burden for the Court.

Furthermore, the

constitutional cases upholding the tax laws have served
to substantially reduce the probability of a significant
number of constitutional issues.

Since the Supreme Court

already has the power to make final determinations in con
stitutional cases, it should continue to do so regardless
of whether they come up through the present system or

6o

Lowndes, p. 222.

6lIbid., p. 223*
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/p
through a Court of Tax Appeals.
The cases involving the construction of statutes
constitute a preponderance of the cases reaching the
Supreme Court.

An examination of the class prompted

Lowndes to comment that such cases are characterized by
triviality and futility.

Part of the problem was explained

as follows:
Apart from exposure to the constant changes of
Congressional nullification, Supreme Court cases
construing the federal income tax make poor pre
cedents because they frequently involve the appli
cation of a statutory standard to a specific
factual situation rather than the formulation of
a legal rule of general application.
His final conclusion was that no reason could be found
to have the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction in these
64
cases instead of a Court of Tax Appeals.
Louis Del Cotto conducted a study similar to the
one undertaken by Remmlein.

Professor Del Cotto*s study

covered a five year term beginning in October, 1955— 16
years after the beginning of the period investigated by
Remmlein.

This latter study is interesting because

the passage of time affords a better answer to some ques
tions raised by the earlier one.

A specific example is

the question as to whether or not a trend for increasing

62Ibid., p. 224.
63Ibid.. p. 226.
6^Ibid.. p. 257.
6^
JDel Cotto, p. 12.
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the total required time until final settlement of tax
cases had developed at the end of the Remmlein study, or
whether the increase was the result of a random aberration.
Del Cotto found that the median time for a tax case
until final disposition by the Supreme Court had increased
by about one year over the earlier study.

In the later

study the median time was eight years, four months, and
ninteen days.

He classified all these cases into either

the conflict group or the non-conflict group and found a
median time of eight years, ten months, and thirteen days
for the conflict cases and seven years, eight months, and
seventeen days for the others.

In comparison to the Remm

lein study, the time for the conflict cases has increased
considerably (from 7.6 years) while the time required for
the others has decreased slightly (from 8.25 year s ) . ^
Professor Del Cotto was quite interested in time
67
periods which he called the "conflict-developing period" '
ZQ
and the "conflict-resolving period"
as well as the total

66Ibid.. p. 16.
67
'ibid.. p. 2^. This period was defined ast
". . . the time between the first decision of a circuit
court of appeals deciding a particular issue and a later de
cision of another circuit which is reviewed by the Supreme
Court, because it conflicts either with that first decision
or some intervening court of appeals decision on that
issue."

68

Ibid., p. 25* This period is defined asi
". . .
the total time an issue remains unsettled because of the
possibility of review by the Supreme Court upon the develop
ment of a conflict."
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time until the final determination of a case.

Jn his

study the conflict-resolving time had increased to
years from the 2 3/^ years of the earlier study.

l/l
His

awareness of the need for rapid, final answers on questions
that affect planning by taxpayers and the daily administra
tion of revenue laws led him to make the value judgment
that even 2 3/^ years was too long for a tax question to
remain in doubt.

He commented:

The evidence clearly demonstrates that conflicts
do not discriminate as to whether they will de
velop slowly or rapidly depending on the complex
ity of the issue, or the number of taxpayers it
affects.
Conflicts involving the simplest issues,
with the most widespread effect, can develop very
slowly . . . or very rapidly . . . .
And issues
involved in slow-developing conflicts are generally
decided many times in the courts of appeals before
resolution by the Supreme Court. This is not an
encouraging situation, expecially since conflictdeveloping periods are becoming substantially
longer.
Present Status
The study by Professor Del Cotto is the latest sig
nificant work on the judicial system in tax cases.

The

relatively recent comments by Senator Long and the publi
city given by the various new agencies in regard to fair
ness in tax matters, as the Tax Reform Act of 1969 became
part of the law, indicate dissatisfaction still exists.

69Ibid., p. 31.

In

a similar vein another circuit court of appeals judge
has spoken out on the judicial system in g e n e r a l . H e
notes that increasing legislation on civil rights and
social welfare is also constantly increasing litigation
and the burden upon the courts.

Rather than calling for

more judges, he calls for advanced techniques to produce
more and shorter opinions and new methods that simplify
and expedite the process of resolving issues because,
"Justice delayed, amounts in many cases, to no justice at
all— the parties are dead, conditions have changed, oppor
tunities are lost, and time, our most valuable asset, is
71
wasted."
Collectively, all of these writers reflect the con
cern of American society for equity in the federal tax
system.

More particularly, the controversy over the pro

posal for a single Court of Tax Appeals represents this
concern in an important subset of the tax system— the judi
cial administration of cases.

The present study reflects

this writer's concern for equity in an even smaller subset
of the latter one— the accumulated earnings tax cases.

How

ever, it is expected that this study will bear directly
upon the issue concerning a Court of Tax Appeals.

70

Floyd R. Gibson, "Some Observations on Our United
States Court of Appeals," University of Missouri at Kansas
City Law Review. 35:261, 1967.
71Ibid., p. 31.

32

THE METHODOLOGY
All of the aforementioned research on conflicting
cases was done vertically from the top to the bottom.
an approach serves two purposes*

(1)

Such

It substantially re

duces the number of cases that must be reviewed due to
the inherent filtering of cases that takes place before
a case can reach the Supreme Court* and (2)

the problem

of classification is solved because the Supreme Court
generally states whether or not the case is being reviewed
due to a conflict.

A particular advantage of this approach

is that all of the areas of taxation that contain a con
flict have a possibility of being reviewed by the Supreme
Court.

Thus, one is somewhat assured that his study will

cover a broad range of tax issues.

Unfortunately, this

approach has some severe inadequacies.

Due to the manner

in which cases are selected for review by the Supreme Court,
one has no way of knowing whether or not the cases selected
are actually representative of all the types of conflicts
that exist.

One can only assume that they are.

More im

portantly, one has no idea as to the extent of the exis-r*
tence of conflict cases at the trial court level.
This study is predominantly one involving a hori
zontal analysis at the level of original jurisdiction in
tax cases— the Tax Court, the United States District
Courts, and the Court of Claims.

Vertical analysis is
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is made from this level to the Supreme Court in contrast
to the earlier studies.

The court decisions constitute

the original data for the study.
the whole universe.

The sample size will be

This study has been limited as ex

plained previously.
All of the issues in any lawsuit can be classified
as either questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed
questions of law and fact.

The heterogeneous nature of

the cases presents a considerable obstacle to a comparison
based upon the final decisions.

This type of comparison

would' be the best one possible for an evaluation of equity,
but the constraint of reasonable classification is extreme
ly difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in accumulated
earnings tax cases.

However, cases may be examined for

the existence of a given issue.

Cases having a common

issue may be compared for the judicial treatment of that
issue and satisfy the criteria of equity and reasonable
classification as to that issue.

This method of comparison

could be expected to result in a comparison of issues out
side of the context of the entire case.

Consequently, an

evaluation of equity in specific cases based upon a com
parison of the judicial treatments of a single issue would
be as questionable as a similar evaluation based upon a
comparison of cases having heterogeneous issues and facts
in violation of the principle of reasonable classification.
Yet, a comparison of the judicial treatments of a specific
issue in conformity to equity and reasonable classification

under an assumption of ceteris paribus does have a sig
nificant advantage.

The advantage is that an objective

comparison may be made.

By deduction from this type of

comparison within a framework of the acknowledged significance of the specified issues by the courts, a general
evaluation of equity may be made for the past and for the
future, too.

Perhaps the validity of this general evalu

ation is somewhat based upon this reasoning:

If cases

could be found that were compatible with the requirements
of reasonable classification, but with contrary results,
the logical explanation would be that the judicial atti
tudes toward the given issues and facts were different.
The objective comparison described above permits judicial
attitudes to be ascertained for an evaluation of equity,
and it is utilized in this study.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
CHAPTER I has presented an introduction to the
study, the problem, definitions of some terms, a review
of the literature and the methodology to be utilized.
The presentation of the problem included a statement
thereof and an explanation of the importance and scope
of the study,

The terms equity, reasonable classification.

incident have been defined specifically for this
study.

The review of the literature noted various propo

sals and criticism^ relevant to the present study.

CHAPTER TT presents the development of two sub
stantive rules of law*

The legislative history is briefly

reviewed for applicable provisions and potentially signi
ficant changes.

This chapter investigates the two rules

of law that involve "purpose" and its relationships to
the "reasonable needs of the business."
CHAPTER III investigates the development of sec
tions 53^ and 535*

Particular attention is given to the

early controversy that surrounded the judicial treatment
of section 53^*

This chapter traces the development of

section 53^ through the cases litigated since the early
controversy.

Also, the chapter presents the courts' in

creasing awareness of section 535*

Finally, a proposal

is presented for the interaction of the two sections.
CHAPTER IV examines the application of accounting
concepts in the determination of the reasonable needs
of the business.

Particular attention is given to the

judicial misunderstanding of basic accounting concepts.
The specific accounting concepts which are analyzed are
accumulated earnings, depreciation, working capital, and
appropriation of retained earnings.

In addition to the

examination of these concepts, an accounting rationale
to support the courts’ approach to analyze the reasonable
ness of accumulations is presented.
CHAPTER V is an investigation of the final deter
minations in the accumulated earnings tax cases.

Tables

are presented with the decisions classified by various

jurisdictions.

Although such tabulations violate the

principle of reasonable classification, the results still
provide limited insight into judicial attitudes.
CHAPTER VI contains the summary and conclusions
for this study.

The conclusions Include an evaluation

of past equity, an evaluation of future equity, and recom
mendations.

The recommendations are based upon previous

recommendations and criticisms examined with regard
to the results of the present study.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO RULES OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The ultimate step in evaluating equity would be to
compare cases in which the facts conform to the constraint
of reasonable classification.

If one assumes that the

facts in all of the accumulated earnings tax cases are
exactly alike, one would expect the same outcome in all
cases because every case arising ■ during a specified time
interval would be governed by the same Internal Revenue
Code provisions.

This expectation is contingent upon the

Code being interpreted exactly the same in each case.

If

the Code is not interpreted exactly the same, the results
in the cases might not be the same— a potentially inequi
table result.
In accumulated earnings tax cases the applicable
Code sections have not been interpreted the same, and the
different constructions have been noted."

A presentation

Robert M. Britton, "Corporate Taxation— Accumulated
Earnings--Section 531 Accumulated Earnings Tax is Levied
If Any Purpose For The Accumulation Is Tax Avoidance,"
Villanova Law Review, 1^:5^. 19&9* Van Wert, "Donruss and
the Accumulated Earnings Tax," Tax Law Review. 26:171.
1970i Donald J. Holzman, "Burden of Proof in Accumulated
Earnings Tax Cases and Its Development on the Second Cir
cuit Court of Appeals," Buffalo Law Review, 11:328, 1962.
37

of the different interpretations is sufficient to estab
lish the fact of their existence.

However, such pre

sentations do not reveal the interplay between the trial
courts and the appeliate courts.

Also, they do not reveal

the extent of their adoption by the trial courts.

This

chapter traces the full development of two rules of law
that are essential to an evaluation of equity in accumu
lated earnings tax cases.
sidered ares

The two rules of law to be con

(1) the definition of “purpose," and (2) the

effect of a determination of the "reasonable needs of the
business" upon "purpose,"
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The first personal income tax statute passed after
the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified contained the ori
ginal accumulated earnings tax provision.

However, instead

of imposing the tax upon the corporation, Section 11(A)(2),
33 Stat. 166 imposed the tax upon the shareholders of any
corporation "formed or fraudulently availed of for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through
the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accu
mulate instead of being divided or distributed . . . ."

One should note that the word "fraudently" modifies
"availed of."

A provision was made that accumulations be

yond the reasonable needs of the business "shall be prima
facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape

39
such tax . . .

p

In the 1918 Act the modifier "fraudently" was
3
omitted.
The Revenue Act of 1921 shifted the burden of
the accumulated earnings tax from the taxpayer to the
corporation, and the accumulated tax rate was 25 percent
as seen belowi
Sec. 220. That if any corporation, however created
or organized, is formed or availed of for the purpose
of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its
stockholders or members through the medium of permit
ting its gains and profits to accumulate instead of
being divided or distributed, there shall be levied,
collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the
net income of such corporation a tax equal to 25
per centum of the amount thereof, which shall be in
addition to the tax imposed by section 230 of this
title . . . .
The fact that any corporation is a
mere holding company, or that the gains and profits
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business, shall be prima facie evidence
of a purpose to escape the surtax} but the fact that
the gains and profits are in any case permitted to
accumulate and become surplus shall not be construed
as evidence of a purpose to escape the tax in such
case unless the Commissioner certifies that in his
opinion such accumulation is unreasonable for the
purposes of the business . . .
Section 220 of the Revenue Acts of 1924- and 1926 and Sec
tion lOif- of the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932 are essen
tially identical.

Although the arrangement of the wording

in this series of. acts differs somewhat from the Revenue
Act of 1921, the most significant change appears to be an

^Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 167.
note "a” preceding "fraudulent purpose."

One should

^Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 220, *K) Stat. 1072.
l±
Revenue Act of 1921, Sec. 220, k2 Stat. 2^7.

40

increase in the accumulated tax rate to 50 percent beginning with the Revenue Act of 1924.
The 1934 Act excluded personal holding companies
from the accumulated earnings tax, but they became subject
to a tax on undistributed income regardless of the pur
pose for the accumulation.

Another change was a decline

in the 50 percent rate to graduated rates of 25 and 35
percent.

Finally, the word "escape" was changed to "avoid"

in the provision for the prima facie evidence clause.^
The 1936 Act was essentially similar to the 1934
Act.

However, the Revenue Act of 1938 made a change in

the prima facie evidence rule,

A review of the 1921 Act

quoted above shows that the prima facie evidence provision
applied to both holding companies and operating companies
that accumulated earnings beyond the reasonable needs of
the business.

The 1938 Act removed the latter group from

the clause and provided for it as follows:
Sec. 102(c) Evidence Determinative of Purpose.
The fact that the earnings or profits of a corpo
ration are permitted to accumulate beyond the rea
sonable needs of the business shall be determinative
of the purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders
unless the corporation by the clear preponderance
of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
In this evidentiary clause "purpose" is preceded by "the,"
while in the prima facie evidence clause "purpose" is still
preceded by "a" as in the 1921 Act.

This is the second

^Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 220, 43 Stat. 277.
^Revenue Act of 1934, Sec. 102, 358, 48 Stat. 680,
751*

4-1

time that this difference in the articles used before
purpose has been pointed out.

A general reading of the

statutes seems to indicate that the change was most likely
inadvertent.

However, one may argue that the difference
7
was intentional.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 con
tained provisions similar ta those in the Revenue Act
of 1938.

The next substantial changes came in the

Internal Revenue Code of 195^»
The significant changes in the 195^ Code included
a new burden of proof provision for Tax Court cases, a
minimum and general credit against the tax, and the ex
press extension of the reasonable needs of business to
Q

include the reasonably anticipated needs of the business.
Thus one can see that there has been no significant change
to indicate a congressional intent to alter the original
meaning of purpose.

Instead, the changes have been to

affect the application of purpose indirectly through
changes in the "reasonable needs of business" and burden
of proof provisions.
The brief legislative history above reveals the
close relationship of "purpose" and "reasonable needs of
the business."
section.

This relationship is examined In a later

Since this writer believes that the relationship

^U. S. v. The Donruss Co;, 89 S.Ct. 501 (I969),
393 U.S. 297.
Internal Revenue Code of 195^» sections 531-537.
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can be best understood after one has a full, understanding
of the various views of "purpose," the next section
examines the development of "purpose" in detail.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PURPOLK
An extrication of a judicial view of purpose from
the greater relationship is not always feasible.

Ln

those instances, the reader should concentrate his atten
tion on the definition of purpose.
below illustrate this problem.

The two early cases

In United Business Corpo

ration. which was promulgated in 1930, the calendar year
1921, governed by Section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921,
was under scrutiny.

The Board of Tax Appeals grappled

with the statute and expressed this opinion:
The emphasis in the statute is place.d upon the
purpose, and if this purpose clearly appears,
the corporation is subject to the tax, whether
the accumulation be large or small. Accumulations
in excess of the needs of the business are evi
dence of the purpose but are not necessary to
subject the corporation to the tax.9
Taxes were collected in R.C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. U.D.
for the years 1922 and 1923 under the 1921 Act.

However,

this District Court viewed the matter as follows:
Even if it should clearly appear that the accumu
lations were in excess of the reasonable needs
of the corporate business, section 220 would not
apply unless it further appears that the accu
mulations were intentionally permitted for the

0

United Business Corp. of America,
828 (1930).

19 BTA 809,

^3
express purpose of enabling; the stockholders
to evade the surtax.
One may find it difficult to blot out the "reasonable
needs of the business" and concentrate on "purpose."

If

one is able to do so, then in the former quote the idi.-a
is that the tax applies if the purpose "clearly appears,"
and in the Hatter quote it appHies if the accumulations
were for the "express purpose."
Certainly an express purpose would be the one that
clearly appears.

Yet "express" can also have a meaning

that goes beyond "clear" to indicate limitation.
can meani

"Of a special sort; . . *

tended for a particular purpose."

11

Express

Adapted to or inIf this shade of

difference in meaning seems to be too fine, then another
reading in the full context of the quotes shows the ob
vious attitude of the district court to be more reluctant
in applying the accumulated earnings tax than the Board,
Thus, inferentially, the Board would be apt to find a
clear purpose existing with other legitimate business
purposes, while the district court would be disposed to
conlcude that the prohibited purpose did not exist if
other legitimate business purposes were present.

This

latter construction would be most favorable to taxpayers.

688

.

1012 AFTR 1073, 1076 (DC, K y . ; 1933)# 3 F. Supp.
11

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Spring
field, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co.', 1970), p. 29^.
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One should note that in the former case the Board held
for the government and that in the latter case the district
court held for the taxpayer.
both decisions were affirmed.

Furthermore, upon appeal
12

Another early district court decision implied that
the prohibited purpose could exist with legitimate busi
ness purposes and that if there was "a" purpose or "any"
purpose the tax would be applicable.

This deduction was

required because the court did not deal directly with
any of the possible constructions of purpose.

In contrast

to the cases above, the district court stated in referring
to the taxpayer:
It took no action whatsoever for the purpose of
preventing the imposition of surtaxes upon its
shareholders . . . .
Neither the plaintiff nor
its officers or directors entertained at any time
a purpose to avoid the.imposition of surtaxes
upon its shareholders. J
Any Illegal purpose is further refuted by the
fact . . . .
I am of the opinion . . . that neither the petitioner
nor its officers entertained a purpose to avoid
the imposition of surtaxes upon its shareholders.
Accordingly, it follows that the petitioner was
not formed or available of . . . for the purpose
of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon
its shareholders. . . . ^

1211 AFTR 1373 (2 cir. 1933)i 15 AFTR 189 (6 Cir.
1935).
13
^Charleston Lumber Co._v. U.S., 20 AFTR 54-, 5758 (DC W. V a . ; 1937. 20 F. Supp. 83, dismissed 93 F. 2d
1018 (4- Cir. 1937), 20 AFTR 64*2.
1^Ibid., p. 6 0 .
^ Ibid.i p. 6l.
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A direct, positive adoption of the "a*' or "any"
purpose construction for the purpose would normally lead
one to conclude that the court's position was the most
unfavorable one possible for the taxpayer.

Should an

indirect adoption of the same interpretation usually
lead to the same conclusion?

One would think so.

Yet

the approach evidenced here resulted in a district court
decision just as favorable to the taxpayer as the pre
ceding district court decision by negating this unfavor
able construction of purpose.

However, not all district

court decisions are favorable to taxpayers in either legal
interpretation or factual determination.
The Beim Company was found to be a holding com
pany, and the tax was assessed for the years 1932 and
1933.

District Court Justice Nordbye took the position

that the evidence indicated the primary purpose of the
corporation was to keep dividends from going to the share16
holder, Mr. Beim.
In another case a district court
acknowledged the Board’s view in United Business while
holding against the taxpayer.

17

In National Grocery Company

18

the Board found as

x Beim Co. v. Landy, 26 AFTR 1189, 1195 (DC,
Minn, j 193YH
^ W o r l d Pub. Co. v. United States, 35 AFTR I671
(DC, Okla. 'T7^7)~
1835 BTA 163. 167 (1936).

a fact that earnings had been accumulated far beyond
a corporation’s reasonable business needs.

The Board

formed the opinion that the prima facie evidence of
purpose resulting from this fact and the statute had
not been rebutted.

19

Upon appeal 7 the Third Circuit sub

stituted its judgment for that of the Board in handing
down a reversa.1.

On the matter of purpose this appellate

court frtnnd proof that the dominant nurpose for the accurn'ilntion was to expand the size of an already large gro
cery store chain.

The dissenting opinion pointed out that

such purpose could exist with the proscribed purpose.

The

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Third Circuit for exceeding its limited power of review in substituting its judgment for that of the Board.

20

However, the contrary views of the majority and dissenting
opinions on purpose were ignored.
Slightly more than a year before Beim, the Board
had a holding company case before it.

The R. L. Blaffer

and Company case was promulgated in 1938 for fiscal years
ending in 1932, 1933. and 193^*

On this occasion the

Board took an especially strong position in evaluating the
prima facie evidence rule with the purpose as follows:
Drastic as the tax may be, the statute clearly

19

^National Grocery Co. v. Helvering, 20 AFTR 3^7,
3^8, 350 (3 Cir.; 1937).
20
Helvering v. National Grocery Co.. 20 AFTR 1269,
1275 (1938), 304 U.S. 282.
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expresses the legislative intent to apply it to a
mere holding or investment corporation unless the
corporation succeeds in establishing its purpose
to be wholly other than that of preventing sur
tax upon its shareholders— not only that there
was another, purpose, but that there was a com
plete absence of the disapproved purpose.
Obbiously, a holding or investment corporation may
be formed or availed of for several purposes, but
it cannot escape this tax unless it proves that 21
it had no purpose to enable the escape of surtax.
The First Circuit examined the Board's position
Blaffer and commented in Chicago Stock Yards,
Perhaps this is too strong a statement! but at least
it is clear that section 104 would apply if in the
totality of reasons which induced the continuing
of the accumulation the forbidden motive of surtax
avoidance played a substantial part. 2
This case also went to the Supreme Court after the Cir
cuit reversed the Board.

Again, the Supreme Court rein

stated the Board's decision.

Without taking a positive

position on the correct interpretation of purpose the
Supreme Court did say:
A corporate practice adopted for mere convenience
or other reasons, and without tax significance when
adopted, may have been continued with the addi
tional motive of avoiding surtax on the stockholders.‘
The Board's conclusion may justifiably have been
reached in the view that, whatever the motive when
the practice of accumulation was adopted, the pur
pose of avoiding surtax induced or aided in inducing
the continuance of the practice. ^
This passage was also quoted by the Second Circuit as it

2137 BTA 851, 856 (1938).
22
ChJoago Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 29 AFTR
1013, 1014 (1 Cir. 1942).
23
•^Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co*. 30 AFTR
1091, 1094 11934), 318 U.S. 693*
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rejected the dominant purpose definition in 1934.
Five years later the Tenth Circuit adopted a test which
seems slightly different in effect than this view.

The

Court said, "Such purpose need not be the sole purpose
behind the accumulation.

It is sufficient if it is one

of the determining purposes." J

The Eighth Circuit

adopted the same test as did several district courts.2^
The word "determining" creates a test that requires more
than just the one or any purpose-test, but less than is
required by the primary or dominant purpose test.

In

other district court cases the jury has been charged with
28
the one purpose test.
The Blaffer case apparently represents a crystalli
zation of the Board's position on the subject as that view

24

Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner. 31 AFTR
394, 396 (2 Cir. 1943).
2-^World Publishing Co. v. U.S.. 37 AFTR 150, 153
(10 Cir. 1948).

26

Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 AFTR 2d
1109 (8 Cir. 1958).
2^Koma. Inc. v. Jones. 44 AFTR 1267, 1270 (DC
Okla.; 1953)t Hattiesburg Compress Co. v. U.S.. 6 AFTR 2d
5012, 5017 (DC, M i s s . 1960/i Whitfield King"& Co.. Inc. v.
U.S., 7 AFTR 2d 1339> 1340 (DC, Tenn.1 19^1){ Mobile Stove
and Pulley Manufacturing Co. v. U.S., 11 AFTR 21 944, 951
(DC, Ala. ; “1962J.
28

Fischer Lime & Cement Co. v. U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d
5540, 5541 (DC, Tenn.; 1963); American Lawn Mower Co. v.
U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d 6l62, 6l66, 6172 (DC, Ind.1 1963);
Harrison Bolt & Nut Co. v. U.S.. 14 AFTR 2d 5360, 5361,
5465 (DC, Md.; 1964).
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was cited approvingly in several subsequent decisions.29
However, almost fifteen years later the 'fax Court made
some digression from the above view in Gazette Telegraph
30

Company.

In Gazette the Tax Court saidi

bona fide business reasons . . . .

"There were

We cannot find on

the facts that the dominant motive in formation of peti
tioner was to avoid s u r t a x . T h i s

departure seems to

be limited to this particular case.

Yet it was another

six years in Young Motor Company before this Court ex
pressly reaffirmed its former position.-*2
In remanding the Young Motor Company case, the
First Circuit Court observed comments in the Tax Court's
ouinion that preventing the imposition of the surtax up
on stockholders was "one" of the taxpayer's purposes and
that the accumulated earnings tax would apply even though
legitimate business purposes could justify an accumu
lation of earnings.

In finding the prohibited purpose the

Tax Court seemingly attributed heavy weight to the tax
payer's knowledge of the tax results of accumulating ear
nings.

The First Circuit then concluded!

29Mead Corporation, 38 BTA 68?, 69? (1938); Trico
Products Corporation, 46 BTA 346, 3?4 (1942); Whitney
Chain & Manufacturing Co.. 3 TC 1109, 1120.
3°19 TC 692 (1935).
31Ibid., p. 707,
3232 TC 1336, 1344-45 (1959).
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The statute does not say "a" purpose, but "the"
purpose. The issue is not what are the necessary,
and to that extent contemplated consequences of
the accumulation, but what was the primary or dom
inant prupose which lead to the decision . . . .
The Tax Court's test was altogether too favorable
to the government.33
Thus this Court changed the wording that it used pre
viously in Chicago Stock Yards.

An interesting contrast

to this value .judgment was given by the Fifth Circuit
in Barrow Manufacturing Company.

There the Court found

no error in a failure of the Tax Court to apply the
primary or dominant purpose test and said,
The utility of the badly needed presumption arising
from the accumulation of earnings or profits beyond
the reasonable needs of the business is well nigh
destroyed if that presumption in turn is saddled with
requirement of proof of the primary or dominant
purpose of the accumulation.^
This issue was presented in Donruss Co. v.
to the Sixth Circuit.

U . S . 35

in that case the District Judge

had refused to clarify the interpretation of purpose.
Instead, he insisted upon giving only the exact statutory
wording in his charge to the jury.

The Circuit Court

believed that the charge in its entirety might have induced
the jury to think- that tax pvoidance would have to he the
only purpose in order to assess the accumulated earnings
tax.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that "tax avoidance must

33Young Motor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner 6 AFTR 2d
5350 (1 CirT 1960)7 281 F. 2d 488.
^Ba r r o w Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Commissioner
8 AFTR 2d 5330V 5333” (5 Cir. 1961), 29^ F. 2d 74.
3520 AFTR 2d 5505 (6 Cir. 196?).
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be the dominant, controlling, or impelling motive behind
an accumulation in order to impose the accumulated earnings
tax."
The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari
by the Government due to the conflict among the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.

In reaching a decision the Supreme

Court examined the legislative history in detail including
various committee reports in an attempt to discern the
intent of Congress.
adopted.

The "one of the purposes" test was

A part of the Court’s analysis followst

Respondent would have us adopt a test that requires
that tax avoidance purpose heed be dominant, impelling,
or controlling.
It seems to us that such a test would
exacerbate the problems that Congress was trying to
avoid. Rarely is there one motive, or even one domi
nant motive, for corporate decisions.
Numerous factors
contribute to the action ultimately decided upon.
Respondent’s test would allow taxpayers to escape the
tax when it is proved that at least one other motive
was equal to tax avoidance. We doubt that such a
determination can be made with any accuracy, and it
is certainly one which will depend almost exclusively
on the interested testimony of corporate management.
Respondent’s test would thus go a long way toward
destroying the presumption that Congress created to
meet this very problem, , . ,
Finally, we cannot subscribe to respondent’s
suggestion that our holding would make purpose totally
irrelevant.
It still serves to isolate those cases in
which tax avoidance motives did not contribute to the

^ 6 I b i d , . n.

5500.
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decision to accumulate. Obviously in such a case
imposition of the tax would be futile.
In addition,
"purpose" means more than mere knowledge, undoubtedly
present in nearly every case. It is still open for
the taxpayer to show that even though knowledge of the
tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not
contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings.37
Although this 1969 decision finally laid the matter to rest,
the case contained one final touch of irony in the dissent.
The surprising thing is not that Justices Harlan, Douglas,
and Stewart dissented from the construction of purpose by
the majority, but that they suggested yet another test as
follows*
. . . the jury should be instructed to impose the tax
if it finds that the taxpayer would not have accumulated
earnings but for Its knowledge that a tax saving would
result. This "but for cause" test would be consistent
with the statutory language. . . .38
Thus, after almost four decades, a clear interpretation
of purpose became the settled law of the land.
In spite of the various interpretations of "purpose"
presented in the preceding cases, a view represented by a
significant proportion of the cases has not been mentioned.
That view is the lack of any stated construction of purpose.
These cases merely use the language of the statutes in
finding that the purpose did or did not exist.

Typically,

the opinions in these decisions devoted a substantial
amount of attention to the matter of the reasonable needs

3723 AFTR 2d 69-418, 423 (1969).

38lbl<i., p. 69-425.
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of the business.

One may now consider the effect of the

"reasonable needs of the business" upon the "purpose."
This relationship will be considered without regard to any
specific interpretation of "purpose."
THIS RELATIONSHIP OP THE REASONABLE
NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS
TO THE PURPOSE
As a prelude to the investigation of this relation
ship, one might consider the ways that these two factors
may be jointly or severally utilized in reaching a decision
in an accumulated earnings tax case.
eight paths in diagram form.

Table 1 sets out the

Although there are eight

possibilities in an abstract consideration of the matter,
once an interpretation of the relationship is made only
some of the paths are available to reach a decision.

Each

time a different interpretation of the relationship is
introduced by a court opinion the appropriate paths
required will be noted.
Returning to the early cases, one can see that
this relationship was the focal point of controversy.

One

will recall this part of an earlier quote from the Board
of Tax Appeals in United Business Corporation, "Accumula
tions in excess of the needs of the business are evidence
of the purpose but are not necessary to subject the corporation to the t a x . " T h e

-^19 BTA 809. 828.

Court also said, "Although the

TABLE 1
The Joint and Several Ways that the Issues of the "Reasonable Reeds
of the Business" and the "Purpose" Kay Be Related

WERE ACCUMULATIONS BEYOND
THE REASONABLE NEEDS
OF THE BUSINESS?

)
)
)

)
WERE ACCUMULATIONS BEYOND
THE REASONABLE NEEDS
OF THE BUSINESS?

Yes.

. Yes (2

No

)No •
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR )
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE? )Yes

Yes.

)No.
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR )
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE? )Yes

)
)
)

THE REASONABLE NEEDS
OF THE BUSINESS
ARE IGNORED,

No <

Does the Accumulated
Earnings Tax Apply?
. . No (1

)No.
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR )
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE? )Yes

• NO- <3
. Yes

•

(5

. Yes (6

. No. (7
. Yes (8
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statute provides that certain facts shall be prima facie
evidence of the purpose, the same purpose may appear from
40

other facts.”

The Board found the purpose without

malting a determination of the reasonable needs of the
business*

Thus, this decision indicates paths seven and

eight are to be followed.
This position on the reasonable needs of the
business was the chief subject of the dissenting opinion.
■Judge Trammell pointed out that this interpretation would
anply the accumulated earnings tax, not only without con
sideration of reasonable business needs, but also to small
accumulations.

He believed that the issue of purpose did

not become important until accumulations surpassed reasonable business needs.

41

He stated:

The real question for consideration, in my opinion,
is whether or not the corporation was formed or availed
of for the purpose of preventing the imoositior; of
the surtex upon the stockholders through the medium
of nerm.itting the profits to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business. In my opinion both
intent or purpose and an overt act are necessary to
bring a eornoration within the penal provisions, and
the overt act is the accumulation beyond business needs,
not simply an accumulation, except in a case where it
is shown that a corporation is formed for the pro
hibited p u r p o s e . ^2
This view of the relationship would require paths one,

40

Ibid.

41 Ibid. ,
4?

p. 833-

Ibid.. p. 837*
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five, and six to be taken.

The District Court in R .C . Tway did not have as
much difficulty with this matter as the Board did, but the
District Court still c l a i m e d to have given the matter
adequate attention in this statement*
A careful study of section 220 discloses that
before there can be an assessment under its provisions,
. . . there must be not only an accumulation of gains
and profits beyond the reasonable business needs of
the corporation, but such accumulation must have been
. . . for the purpose . . . to evade the payment of
surtaxes . . . .
Upon the appeal of United Business Corporation the
Second Circuit explicitly considered both constructions
of the relationship and

concluded that such accumulations

were not necessary in order to find the purpose.

They

were deemed to be presumptive evidence of the purpose.
The Court commented upon the relationship in this manner:
A statute which stands on the footing of the parti
cipants' state of mind may need the support of pre
sumption, indeed be practically unenforceable with
out it, but the test remains the state of mind
itself, and the presumption does no more than make
the taxpayer show his h a n d . ^
When R .C . Tway was appealed, the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged the soundness of the Second Circuit's view
and said:
The practical application of the interpretation may,
however, in most circumstances be of little importance.

^ 1 2 AFTR 1073, 1076.
^11

AFTR 1373. 137^.
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The condemned purpose in the forming or utilization
of corporations described in the section is the
avoidance by stockholders of surtaxes* This purpose
may be proved unaided by presumption, but the fact
that the surplus is not unreasonably large in respect
to the needs of the corporation's business is repug
nant to the existence of such purpose, and, while
not conclusive, must be accepted as substantial evi
dence in denial of proofs or inferences that it
exists.^5
This appeal indicates that paths three, four, five, and
six should be followed.
In fairness to the rejected construction it should
be noted that Article 352, Regulations 45, adopted for
section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1918 presented the test
and the presumption as though both were required.

Justice

Trammell presented this and other support for his own
position.

46

At this point the two constructions seem to

be mutually exclusive.

That is, the reasonableness issue

is a condition that must be met before the purpose becomes
an issue, or purpose is an issue, even though accumulations
are reasonable.

The two views are not compatible.

When this matter came before the Third Circuit in
National Grocery Company appeal, that Court's position
was difficult to reconcile with one or the other of the
preceding views.

The Court said:

The taxes here involved are for the year 1930, and
from th» above-quoted terms of the law it is clear that
Congress did not force the distribution with nenaliza-

AFTR 189,

46

190.

19 i»mn 80°. 833-39.
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t-ion of all corporate profits but only where the profits
'are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business.*
Such being the conditions
warranting taxation, it follows that the basic question
is whether the profits here involved were accumulated
beyond the reasonable needs of its business.
If this
basic fact is established, then, and then only, is
such accumulation by the statute made 'prima facie
evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax.’^7
Until the last sentence above, the distinct impression is
given that both elements are required before the tax can
be levied.

Then, as if there was no way around the pre

sumptive evidence aspect of the statute, the Court recog
nized it as such.

Did this Court deliberately combine the

two views discussed above?

That is, did the Third Circuit

in bend to make accumulations beyond the reasonable needs
of the business a condition precedent to a finding of the
purpose, and then, upon an affirmative showing of this
element, also make this element presumptive evidence of
the purpose?

The apparent inconsistency is an illusion.

The two views are incompatible when the accumulations do
not exceed the reasonable needs of the business, but are
compatible once accumulations become excessive.
In the original decision eight members of the
Board of Tax Appeals united to render a decision in favor
of the government while seven members joined in a dissent.
The disagreement was in weighing the evidence.

The dis

senters agreed with the majority and the Second Circuit

^ 2 0 AFTR 34?, 3^8.
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view in United Business Corporation on this relationship.

ha

Upon appeal the majority of the Third Circuit agreed with
the dissent below as to the result, but not as to the law.
Thus the Third Circuit adopted an interpretation of law
at odds with that of the Second and Sixth Circuits.

A

dissent on appeal was in favor of the pure presumption
construction.

The Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir

cuit in this case without discussion of this issue although
the evidentiary provision, section lO^-(b), was referred
to as a "presumption."^
In the Chicago Stock Yards case the First Circuit
adopted the presumption construction of the Second Circuit,
but reversed the Board on other grounds.^0

The Supreme

Court reversed the First Circuit to reinstate the Board's
judgment in favor of the government.

This time the Supreme

Court expressly acknowledged the existence of the issue,
but said:

"We find it unnecessary to consider this con

tention, since we think the Board's decision may be
supported apart from any presumption arising under the
Act.”^1
In some subsequent cases the views of the courts

^ 835 BTA 163» 167-72.
^920 AFTR 1269, 1275*
5°29 AFTR 1003, 1016-19.
5130 AFTR 1090, 1093.

6o
on this relationship are much more difficult to determine.
For example, if phraseology is used in a case in one place
to indicate only the presumption construction, hut in
another place phraseology is used to indicate the reason
able needs of the business is determinative of the matter,
what does one conclude?
One explanation could be that this development of
a shift in emphasis is due to the change in statutory
language in the Revenue Act of 1938*

Previously, section

102(b) of the 1936 Act provided that the fact that accu
mulations were beyond the reasonable needs of the business
was prima facie evidence of the prohibited purpose.
Section 102(c) of the 1938 Act made the same fact deter
minative of the purpose unless the contrary could be
proven by the clear preponderence of the evidence.

In

United Business the Second Circuit said that the prima
facie rule only made the taxpayer "show his hand."^
Given this interpretation, the later rule seemingly
requires the corporation to go beyond a showing of its
hand and bear the burden of persuasion upon the factual
showing required.

The First Circuit has twice analyzed

the difference in the statutory language of the two rules
and has concluded that the only effect of either provision
is to increase the taxpayer's burden of proof by an

5211 AFTR 1373. 137^*
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insignificant amount.

c3

Although this difference in language may seem
great, its practical significance diminishes greatly in
the face of a finding on reasonableness.

One must remem

ber the part of the comment in R.C. Tway, under the prima
facie rule, that reasonableness "must be accepted as substantial evidence . . . .

<lL

This comment sounds similar

to this statement under the determinative rule in Young
Motor Company:
While the ultimate question here is not the reason
able needs of the business, the answer to that ques
tion may well be the single most important considera
tion in concluding whether taxpayer acted with a
proper purpose in mind, or the proscribed one. 55
However one views this matter, it is still a significant
step from either of these positions to an assumption that
the reasonable needs of the business disposes of the pur
pose issue.
In a memorandum opinion of the Board of Tax
Appeals the Court used appropriate statutory language in
the findings of fact, but in the last paragraph of the
opinion the Court seems to have disposed of the purpose
automatically in deciding the issue of the reasonable
needs of the business.

The Court said:

o
-^Chicago Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 29 AFTR
1003, lOl^fi Commissioner v. Young Motor Company, Inc., 11
AFTR 2d 1361, 1364 (1 CirT 1963).
5^15 AFTR 189* 190.
556 AFTR 2d 5350, 5353*
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The evidence does not overcome the determination
of respondent that petitioner was availed of for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of surtax upon
its shareholders by permitting gains and profits to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
instead of being distributed.56
The reader can easily see the distinct difference in mean
ing by rereading this quote and omitting the phrase,
"beyond the reasonable needs of the business."

The Ninth

Circuit vacated and remanded this case^^ upon a misinter
pretation of the significance of the Commissioner's
determination.

The fact that two of the appellate judges

concentrated their attention upon this relationship of the
burden of proof to the reasonable needs of the business
is significant.

The third judge wrote a brief concurring

opinion in order to emphasize that a determination of
purpose must be made after the reasonable needs issue has
been decided.
In Universal Steel Company the Board claimed to
have considered the "whole picture" in concluding that
the petitioner
. . . has proven by a clear preponderance of the
evidence that it did not permit its earnings or
profits to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs

^ Hemuhill Schools. Inc.. 1^2,285 P-H Memo TC.
*57
•^Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 AFTR
610 (9 Cir. 19^3)•
58Ibid.
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of the business*
It follows Cemphasis supplied^ that
it has justified the nonpayment of dividends . • . and
that petitioner is not subject to the provisions of
section 102.
Yet, in the next paragraph the Board found some confirma
tion of the absence of the purpose due to a lack of evi
dence that the purpose existed.

In Wilson & Greene

Lumber Co. the District Court adequately explained the
relationship in part of the charge to the jury, but only
submitted one issue to the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, in order to keep it as
simple as possible, your verdict will take this form:
You will find a verdict for the plaintiff if you find
that the plaintiff has established that the accumula
tion of profits for the year 19^6 was reasonably
necessary for the transaction of this company's busi
ness according to the circumstances existing.
If you find it.was not, then your verdict will be
for the defendant. 0
For a view that contains a hedge on the matter, one may
£1
turn to World Publishing Co. v. United States.
There
the District Court said:
When it has been determined that the failure of
a corporation to distribute earnings to shareholders
does not result in an accumulation in excess of the
reasonable business needs of the corporation, it is
not necessary to inquire into the motive and purpose
of such accumulation. Upon the theory, however,
that this view of the court may not be accepted, a
finding has been made upon consideratidn of all of

■^Universal Steel Company. 5 TC 627, 638-39 (1945).
60

Wilson &' Greene Lumber Co.. Inc. v. Shaughnessy.
AFTR 1259, 1265 (DC, N. Y. * 1953) .
6l*f-2 AFTR 67 {DC, Okla.; 1952).
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the evidence in the case that the retention by the
World in its treasury of its net earnings for 1944
was not for the purpose of avoiding the imposition
of a surtax on its sole shareholder.6*
Of course this view is also compatible with the condition
interpretation since the accumulations are reasonable.
Other cases seem to treat the reasonable needs of business
as determinative of purpose without elaboration.^

Thus,

some courts seem to indicate that paths one and two are
to be followed.

view.

Some cases provide limited insight for taking that
64
In Smcot Sand & Gravel Corp.
the Tax Court noted

the lack of any proof by the petitioner to contravert the
presumption of purpose if accumulations should be found
to be beyond reasonable business needs.

The comment on

the respondent was of greater interest:
. . . respondent apparently concedes that if petitioner
has shown that the surplus was not in excess of the
reasonable needs of the business, nothing further is
required.65
The use of the word "apparently" indicates that such
position was not expressly taken, but that the Court
inferred the position from something that the respondent
did or said.

In a later opinion the same judge expressed

62Ibid., p. 70.
^ Crawford County Printing & Publishing C o . , 1?
TC 1404, 1413 [1952) t R.C. Tway Company v. U.s7. 23 AFTR
2d 69-596 (DC, Ky. 1 1 9 ^ 7 ;
56,082 P-H Memo TC.
6^Ibid., p. 56-341.
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a belief that both parties had litigated the case as
though a determination of reasonable needs would settle
the matter.

66

A court could become confused on the rela

tionship by looking too closely at the wording in the
Commissioner's notice of deficiency to the taxpayer.
Such notices have been known to associate the two issues
67
as though they were one. f But in a footnote in Smith.
68
Inc. v. Commissioner
the Ninth Circuit explained that
the Commissioner's answer to the taxpayer's petition,
rather than the notice of deficiency, led it to conclude
that the Commissioner had based his determination of
purpose upon unreasonable accumulations.
In Donruss the Sixth Circuit was faced with
evaluating contradictory statements made by the trial
court as to the law on the relationship.

In part of the

charge to the jury, the trial court stated the law to be
that a determination of the reasonable needs of the
business would settle the matter.

However, that court

also correctly explained that an accumulation beyond the
reasonable needs of the business would be determinative
of the purpose, unless the taxpayer proved the contrary

66Breitfeller Sales. Inc.. 28 TC 1164, II69 (1957).
6?Young Motor Co.. Inc., 32 TC 1336, 13^3 (1959).
68
8 AFTR 2d 5119, 5122 (9 Cir. I96I).
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by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Circuit Court

did not believe that the charge had misled the jury on the
issue.

However, two important factors mitigate the Cir

cuit Court's stand.

First, the government’s counsel

failed to object and thus was deemed to have waived the
objection.

Second, the Court reversed based on the
69

District Court's failure to interpret purpose. 7
Although the language in some cases was confusing,
clear statements making only the presumption construction
were handed down in others.

70

In still others positive

statements were made making accumulations beyond reason
able business needs a condition precedent to a consideration of the purpose issue.

71

There is one other event that must be considered
for its impact upon this relationship.

That event was

the adoption of the 195^ Code because it contained sec
tion 535*

Section 535(c) provides for a general credit

in computing the accumulated earnings tax.

The gen-:

eral credit is "equal to such part of the earnings
and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the

6920 AFTR 2d 5505, 5506-7, 5510.
7°Pelton Steel Casting Co.. 28 TC 153 (1957)?
American
Lawn Mower Co. v. U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d 6162 (DC,
_____
^ Hattiesburg Compress Co. v. U.S., 6 AFTR 2d 5012
(DC, Miss.; 1960)? Harrison Bolt & Nut CoT v. U.S., 14
AFTR 2d 5360 (DC, MdTV 19 64^ 1 "Times Publishing Co.. Inc.
v. U.S.. 11 AFTR 2d 1228 (DC, Penn.; 1963).

reasonable needs of the business . . . ."72

strictly-

construed, this provision has no direct effect upon the
relationship.

As set forth in the Code, it Should only

come into play after a determination has been made that
the accumulated earnings tax is to applied.

Then this

credit would be considered in calculating the actual tax
due.

However, the indirect result of the provision is

to give effect to the dissenting Board opinion in United
Business Corporation and makes the majority position a
rather moot view.

The relevant paths for decision now

seem to be one, five, and six.
Some of the cases cited previously in footnotes
for the various interpretations were tried after the 195^
Code took effect.

The section 535 credit was not mentioned

in any of them, so one can only wonder whether it had any
effect upon the positions taken.

In others cases the

credit definitely played a part.
71

In Fotocrafters. Inc.. J a memorandum decision,
the judge concluded that earnings had not been accumulated
beyond the reasonable needs of the business.

He acknow

ledged that the taxpayer still had the burden of proving
an absence of the purpose and that the reasonableness of
the accumulation would be a strong indication the purpose

"^Internal Revenue Code of 195^. Sec. 535(c).
73U60,254 P-H Memo TC.
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was not present.

He stated further that the problem had

been ’•simplified" due to the. credit, which made the
accumulated taxable income "zero."7**

In other cases no

consideration was given to the purpose issue due to the
section 535 credit.7-* This issue, however, is just
beginning to reach full development.

The entire matter

has been clouded by the addition of section 53** &t ‘the
same time.

The effect of the section 535(c) credit upon

the relationship of the reasonable needs of the business
to the purpose is uncertain, and therefore the effect of
section 53** upon all of this is also uncertain.
SUMMARY
The legislative history shows that there has been
no significant change in the statutory language as to
"purpose" since the first application of the accumulated
earnings tax to corporations in the Revenue Act of 1921.
However, there have been notable attempts to influence
the operation of "purpose."
altered several times.

The taxation rates have been

Personal holding companies were

separately provided for in the 193*1- Act.

A questionable

attempt was made in the 1938 Act to increase the taxpayer's

7**Ibid.. pp. 60-1562-63.
7^John P. Serious Newspapers, **** TC **53 (1965)1
Faber Cement Block Co., Inc.. 50 TC 3171 Magic Mart. Inc..
51 TC 775 (1969)1 Dielectric Materials Company, 57 TO
No. 61 (19?2). Also, see 1 Sorgel v. U.S.. 29 AFTR 2d 701035 (SC, Wis.j 1972).
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burden of proof as to "purpose."

Previously, accumulations

beyond the reasonable needs of the business were prima
facie evidence of the "purpose," but such a showing
became determinative of the "purpose" in that Act.

The

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 made extensive changes in
the operation of the tax.

All were aimed at shifting

the emphasis from the subjective test of "purpose" to the
more objective test of the "reasonable needs of the
business."
During a period of approximately four decades,
several different interpretations of purpose were in
vogue.

They are, in the order of decreasing favorableness

to the taxpayer, as follows:
1.

The "sole" or "express" purpose test,

2.

The "primary" or "dominant" purpose test,

3«

The "one of the determining purposes" test, and

4.

The "a," "any," or "one of the purposes" test,
compatible with the "complete absence of purpose"
test.
i

The Supreme Court settled the issue in favor of the fourth
construction in 19&9 in Donruss.
The development of eight possible paths for a
final determination of the accumulated earnings tax has
been presented.

The relationship of the "reasonable

needs of the business" to the "purpose" has been partially
settled.

However, the burden of proof under section 534

and the general credit provided under section 535(c) have

70

raised new questions,

The influence of these two sections

are considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 53^ AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SECTION 535
The adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ signaled the beginning of a new era in the accumu
lated earnings tax cases.

This chapter investigates the

development of sections 53^ and 535 of the Internal Rev
enue Code in an attempt to determine their effect upon
equity as defined in CHAPTER I.

Section 53^ governs the

operation of the burden of proof in accumulated earnings
tax cases before the Tax Court.

Since the burden of

proof is a procedural rule of law, its effect upon equity
differs from substantive rules of law and offers a con
trast to the preceding chapter.
Section 53^ became controversial rather quickly.
This chapter presents the controversy, the case development
of section 53^» and an inquiry into the relationship of
section 53^ to section 535*

The criticism leveled at the

Tax Court and the Commissioner is considered in the light
of pertinent cases.

A critical analysis will be made of

this controversy and relevant cases as a basis for the
development of a proposal for settling the controversy
through the interaction of section 53^ and section 5 35 *

71

72
THE CONTROVERSY

The First Level
The burden of proof in cases before *the Tax Court
is normally upon the taxpayer.

Section 53^ of the In

ternal Revenue Code of 195^ contains provisions whereby
the burden of proving the reasonableness of accumulations
for the needs of the business may be shifted from the
taxpayer to the Commissioner.

The conditions apply only

to cases coming before the Tax Court.

However, in such

cases the burden of proof shifts automatically to the
Commissioner unless he takes action to prevent it.

The

action required of the Commissioner is that he must

give

notice of his intent to render an assessment under section
531 before he sends a notice of deficiency.

If the Com

missioner takes such action, then the .taxpayer is given
an opportunity to shift the burden to the Commissioner in
spite of the notice.

In order to do so, however, the

taxpayer must timely answer the Commissioner's notice with
a statement of the grounds upon which he is relying to
establish that earnings and profits have not been allowed
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business.
This statement must include sufficient facts to show the

^Rule 32, Rules of Practice of the Tax Court of
the United States.
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basis for the grounds upon which the taxpayer

relies.

2

Thus.it is possible that some grounds (and/or facts)
might be inadequate to shift the burden of proof to the
Commissioner, while others would adequate, and only a
partial shift in the burden of proof would result.
When compared to the basic provision that the
taxpayer bear the burden of proof, the complexity of
section 534 causes one to wonder why such an involved
statute was enacted.

The answer is that Congress was

thereby attempting to eliminate the cause of various com
plaints.

The reasons were summarized in a Senate report

which agreed with the House as follows:
The poor record of the Government in the litigated
cases in this area indicates that deficiencies have
been asserted in many cases which were not adequate
ly screened or analyzed. At the same time taxpayers
were put to substantial expense and effort in proving
that the accumulation was for the reasonable needs
of the business. Moreover, the complaints of tax
payers that the tax is used as a threat by revenue
agents to induce settlement on other issues appear
to have a connection with the burden of proof which
the taxpayer is required to assume. It also appears
probable that many small taxpayers may have yielded
to a proposed deficiency because of the expense and
difficulty of litigating their case under the present
rules.3
The controversy arose over the effect given to section 534
by the Commissioner and the Tax Court.

The typical pat

tern that developed was a refusal by the Tax Court to
2

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 534(a),
(b), and (c).
%.

Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2 Sess. 70 (1954).
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rule positively on whether or not the hurden of proof
had shifted to the Commissioner*

This refusal was ef

fected in several ways.
In Pelton Steel Casting Co*

k

the Tax Court found

that it was not necessary to determine whether or not
accumulated earnings were beyond the reasonable needs of
the business as other evidence was sufficient to show the
presence of the prohibited purpose.

The Court further

stated that even If the matter (section 534) were impor
tant and if the burden had shifted, the evidence affir
matively proved that the accumulations were quite exces<
sive.
In Breitfeller Sales. Inc.*' the decision was for
the taxpayer, but the Tax Court found it unnecessary
to determine where the section 534 burden of proof rested
as the decision was based "on the record as a whole."^
The taxpayer did not seem to fare much better on this
Issue when the Tax Court made a decision in the matter.
The taxpayer found the hedge coming after a conclusion
that his statement was inadequate to shift the burden of
proof in J. Gordon Turnbull, Inc*7

The Court explained

that regardless of the burden of proof the record

**28 TC 153 (1957).
528 TC 1164 (1957).
^Ibid., p. 1168.
74l TC 358, 371 (1963).
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demonstrated that the accumulations were unreasonable
and that the purpose existed.

Taxpayers have had diffi

culty in drafting adequate statements to effectuate a
Q
shift both as to the grounds and the facts.
These approaches show only one aspect of the
problem.

They reveal the methods of disposing of the

issue upon a trial of the case.

This is a corollary of

the practice of refusing to dispose of the matter before
trial.

Kppperud and Donaldson have pointed out that the

Commissioner had followed the practice of opposing pre
liminary motions to settle this issue.

They have found

that the Tax Court supports the Commissioner.^

Other

critics have also strongly opposed the behavior of the
Tax Court and the Commissioner on the section 53^ issue.
The general tenor of the complaint is that Congressional
intent has been thwarted.by the failure of the Tax Court
lo
to determine this issue.
The best way to interpret
section 53^ to give effect to that intent is subject

8Pixie. Inc.. 31 TC
(1958); I. A. Dress C o . .
32 TC 93 (1959)1 American Metal Products Corn.. 3ft TC 89

(I960).
o
^Kopperud and Donaldson# "The Burden of Proof in
Accumulated Surplus Cases," Taxes. 35*82?, 8?6 (1957).
10
Holzman, "Burden of Proof in Accumulated Earn
ings Tax Cases and its Development in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals," Buffalo Law Review. 11:328, 1962; Bar
ker, "Penalty Tax bn Corporation Improperly Accumulating
Surplus," Taxes. 35*9^9 (1957); Forman, "The Burden of
Proof." Taxes. 39:737 (1961); Hall, "The Accumulated
Earnings Tax," Taxes. 38:8^9 (i960); Wagman, "Taxation
of Accumulated Earnings and Profits: A Procedural
Wrangle," Taxes 35*573 (1959).

to significant disagreement, and the confusing nature of
the burden of proof provides a basis for the opposing
views.
In essence there are actually two conceptually
distinct aspects of the burden of proof.

One element

is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden
of producing evidence, or going forward with the evidence.
Often, as in section 53^» no distinction is made in these
two elements.

In most tax cases the distinction is not
11
required because one party must bear the whole burden.
However, the position of the Tax Court had made it de
finitely clear that the burden of producing evidence had
not shifted to the Commissioner.

And it is questionable

that the burden of persuasion passed when a determination
that it had passed was made after hearing all the
evidence.
Percentages may be used to explain the burden of
persuasion.

If a party bearing the burden of proof is

able to present evidence in support of his position that
is only worth 25% of all the evidence, then he will fail.
Even though the same party is able to show that 50% of
the evidence is in favor of his position, he must still
fail because he must go beyond 50% in order to carry the

■^Holzman, pp. 330-31*
12Barker, p. 952*
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burden of proof.

Thus in a 50-50 case the burden of proof

determines the outcome.

Since the taxpayer normally must

carry the. burden, one can understand the reluctance of
the Commissioner to have the burden placed upon hims e l f . ^
Kipperman analyzed the statutes and the cases and de
veloped a strategy for taxpayers.

He believed that in

strong cases the result would be the same, regardless of
whether or not either party took any action required by
section 53^»

Also, in weak cases he would expect the

same result.

However, in close cases the burden of

proof becomes important, and he believed the taxpayer
would benefit by meeting; the conditions required by section 53^.

A subsequent analysis in this chapter shows

that the taxpayer benefits only if the tribunal making
the final determination recognizes that the case is a
close case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has also
spoken out on the subject of close cases and the section
53^ issue.

In R. Gsell & Co.. Inc..1-* the Tax Court had

found that the accumulations were beyond reasonable
business needs.

However, in So doing the Tax Court

^Holzman, p. 332.
iZi

Kipperman, "Accumulated Earnings Tax: Burdens
of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose," California Law
Review 5^:1050, 1068 (1966): Holzman, p. 355.
i53lf TC H

(i960).
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refused to make a determination as to the adequacy of
the taxpayer's statement to shift the burden of proof.
The Second Circuit reversed and reprimanded the Tax Court
for its position and said:
Although in some cases where the proof is convincing
that there is no justification in a taxpayer's busi
ness for the alleged accumulations it may be un
necessary to determine whether the Commissioner
or the taxpayer has the burden of proof on the
question, . . . in close cases the determination
of who has the burden of proof on the unreasonable
accumulations issue must be resolved. The party
having the burden of proof does not merely have the
burden of coming forward with evidence; it has the
burden of persuasion and once fixed that burden
does not shift , ♦ . .10
An observation may be made concerning this appeal.

Al

though the Court has acknowledged that the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion shift
together, the emphasis seems to be placed upon the latter
burden.

The case gave some hope to those who thought

that the Congressional intent had been frustrated.
Although the critics were concerned that both
burdens pass under the appropriate conditions, the
greater concern was that the burden of producing evidence
should pass.

The weight of this burden was the one pri

marily believed to put the taxpayer to substantial
expense and effort.

Furthermore, this burden provided

a powerful weapon in the hands of revenue agents to

l68 AFTR 2d 5507, 5511 (2 Cir. 1961), 294 F. 2d 321.
*^Holzman, p. 352.
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induce settlement on other issues.

There seems to he

some suggestion that the expense and effort of preparing
for a trial in which one must produce the evidence is
substantially greater than if one merely has to negate
i8
the evidence produced by the other side.
If it is
difficult for a taxpayer to develop an affirmative case
with the information at his disposal, how much more diffi■cult'iwould it be for the Commissioner to'acquire that in
formation to.build a comparable case?

Nevertheless, the

critics were not unanimous in their views on this point.
Wagman made a case for the view that Congressional
intent is best served by interpreting section 534 so that
only the burden of persuasion could be passed to the
Commissioner, while the taxpayer would always have the
burden of going forward with the evidence.
that:

Wagman noted

(1 ) the section 53*Kb) notice would not consti

tute the first awareness of the taxpayer to the danger
of a section 531 penalty, and (2 ) a significant amount
of expense and effort would have to be incurred before
the receipt of the section 534 notice in order to meet
the time and quality requirements of section 534(c) for
I Q

a statement. 7

He said:

'Ift
Hall, p. 849t Kopperud and Donaldson, p. 827*
Barker, p , 949.
■^Wagman, p. 578.
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All the equities are not on the side of the taxpayer.
Critical purpose is really only within the taxpayers
ken (or those responsible for its actions) . . . .
It is not to be realistically expected that Congress
would enact legislation that would negate the penalty
aspects of the accumulated earnings tax. All
Congress must have sought was that justice be done
in accumulated earnings tax cases . . . .20
Wagman recognized the taxpayer’s need for some bargaining
leverage at the conference stages.

He believed that the

section 535 credit along with section 53^ would provide
21
that leverage.
The Gsell case roughly marks the dividing line
between two eras.

Most of the controversy discussed

above arose in the light of cases in which section 53^
was evaluated with respect to the 1939 Code, rather than
to the 195^ Code.

Gsell was one of the last of such

cases, yet the Second Circuit's opinion indicated how
decisions on cases involving 195^ Code years might be
treated.

The section 535 credit could logically be ex

pected to make a significant difference from the prior
law that levied the tax upon all the earnings accumu
lated during the year if even a small part was accumulated
for the forbidden purpose.

The stage was set for the next

level in the burden of proof controversy.
The Second Level
At this level attention was focused upon the rela-

20Ibid., p. 579.
21Ibid.
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tionahip of section 534 to section 535*
was:

The question

Does section 534 determine who must hear the

burden of proof as to the extent that earnings accumulated
were for the reasonable needs of the business in order
to compute the credit allowed under section 535(c)?
Berger believes that Regulation 1.534-1 was a concession
that the Commissioner must bear the burden of proving
the extent of the credit if the burden of proof shifts
22
to him under section 534.
More specifically, the ques
tion is an extension of the “burden of producing evidence/
burden of persuasion** considerations to the section 535
credit.2-^

Gbldfein believes that the burden of producing

evidence is significant only if the Commissioner must
bear the burden of persuasion as to the credit.

He has

explained how a trial would probably proceed depending
upon where the burden of proof lies with respect to the
oh,
section 535 credit.
More than a decade has elapsed since the Second
Circuit’s decision in Gsell.

In the intervening years

the vast majority of cases coming before the Tax Court

22

Berger, “How to Litigate the 531 Casei Choice
of Forum and Procedural Problems," Journal of Taxation.
20:139. 140 (1964).
23
"Tye, "Section 534 statements* how they can be
used to blunt the IRS* 531 attacks," Journal of Taxation..
25*148 (1966).
24
Goldfein, "Tax Court in Chatham Corp. clarifies
timing of shift of burden in 531 cases," Journal of Taxa
tion. 2?»2, 4 (1969).
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have involved taxable years governed by the 195^ Code.
Such cases provide an opportunity to evaluate the effect
that section 53^ and the Gsell case have had.

The fol

lowing two sections are devoted to an investigation and
evalutaion of these cases and the appeals resulting from
these cases.
CASE DEVELOPMENT SINCE GSELL
The Classification
After screening all of the cases decided by the
Tax Court (including memorandum decisions), those having
two characteristics were collected.
were:

The two requirements

(1 ) that taxable years in issue be governed by

the 195^ Internal Revenue Code, and (2) that taxpayers
had made an apparently bona fide attempt to shift the
burden of proof to the Commissioner with the required
statement.2-’ This process produced 29 cases.

Since the

Tax Court had been heavily criticized for not making a
determination on this issue, one objective in this study
was to evaluate the Court on this point.

As noted earlier,

there were several ways of refusing to give effect to
the statute.

Thus, three categories were chosen for fur

ther classification.

They are:

(1) undecided,

2^Thus Charles TurneE H 65.100 P-H Memo TC was omitted. Taxpayer had submitted a statement, but on brief
expressly stated a lack of contention that it was adequate
to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner.

(2 ) decided-but, and (3 ) decided.
The undecided cases are those in which the Issue
was not determined, regardless of the reasons given.
Perhaps a statement peculiar to none, but representative
of all would bei

"It is unnecessary to decide whether

the statement was adequate to shift the burden of proof
for assuming that it was, the respondent has successfully
carried his burden."

The decided-but cases are those

in which a determination was made, but some type of
qualifying statement was made that seemed to detract from
the significance of the determination.
could be expressed as follows*

This position

"Petitioner’s statement

was adequate to shift the burden of proof.

However, we

need not rely upon the burden of proof because the record
as a whole is sufficient to determine that petitioner’s
accumulations were reasonable."

27

The decided cases are

those in which the Court appeared to consider the burden
of proof as an issue to be determined separately from the
weighing of the evidence.
A problem with this classification scheme was that
some parts of a statement were adequate to shift the
burden as to some of the grounds, but not as to others.
Consequently, one was faced with cases in which the Court

26See Sandy Estate Co., 43 TC 361, 374 (1964).
2^See Vuono-Lione. Inc.. 1165,096 P-H Memo TC.

had decided the shift issue on some grounds, but had not
made a determination on others.

Rather than attempt a

fractional measurement which would imply an unfounded
accuracy, the procedure used was to evaluate the entire
case to determine which of the alleged grounds (and facts)
pO
that the Court seemed to emphasize the most.
The case
was then classified based upon the Court*s treatment of
those grounds.
The results revealed that eight cases were classi
fied as undecided, seven cases were classified as
decided-but, and fourteen cases were classified as
decided.

In this last class there are six cases in which

the decision was that the burden of proof did not shift.
In seven cases the burden did shift, and one case held
that section 53^ did not apply to holding companies.^
The 29 cases were also examined to see if the final outcome
of the decision was in favor of the taxpayer or the
Commissioner.

The result was then checked against the

holding on the section 53^ issue to see if any discernible
pattern existed.
was found.

In the undecided and decided cases none

However, in the seven decided-but cases there

was perfect correlation between the resolution of this
proof issue and the outcome.

That is, in the four cases

28
Ted Bates & Co., Inc.. *865,251 P-H Memo TC, was
particularly difficult, but was classed as decided since
the burden did not shift on the two items requiring most
of the accumulations.
^ Rhombar Co.. Inc.. 47 TC 75*
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in which the burden shifted to the Commissioner, the tax
payer won.

In the three cases In which the burden did not

shift, the Commissioner won.

The appeals taken upon the

29 cases provide additional insight.
Eight appeals were taken upon the 29 cases.

Of

the eight appeals one was from the undecided group, one
was from the decided-but group, and six were from the
decided group.

Of the eight appeals four were to the

Second Circuit, three to the Sixth Circuit, and one to the
Tenth Circuit.
The Second Circuit
Apparently the position of the Second Circuit on
section 534 as set out in Gsell was well noted by the Tax
Court.

All four of the cases going to the Second Circuit

were from the decided group.
three of the decisions.

The Second Circuit affirmed

In two^° of those affirmed by

the Second Circuit, the Court noted that the Tax Court
had determined that the section 534 statements were ade
quate to shift the burden to the Commissioner and that he
had carried his burden.
In the third affirmed case, Rhombar Co.. Inc. v.
Comm.~^ the Tax Court did not decide whether the statement

^Factories Investment Corn, v. Comm.. 13 AFTR £d
880 (2 Cir. 1964), 32§ F. 2d 781; Youngs Rubber Corp. v.
Comm.. 13 AFTR 2d 1251 (2 Cir. 1964}, 331 F. 2d 12.
3120 AFTR 2d 5764 (2 Cir. 1967).
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was adequate to shift the burden as to the reasonable needs
of the business.

Instead it found that Rhombar Company

was a holding company and that section 53^ could not be
used by the petitioner to prove that it was not a mere
holding or investment company.

Therefore* the proper pre

sumption to be determined was under section 533(b), rather
than under 533(a)*

The Second Circuit approved the Tax

Court's determination of this matter.

Also, it focused

attention on the taxpayer's contention as to the relation
ship between section 53^ and the section 535 general
credit.

The Second Circuit saidi

It is conceded that if a proper seetion 53^ state
ment had been submitted, the Commissioner had the
burden of proving the amount of the credit to which
the taxpayer was entitled, i.e., the amount of the
accumulation retained for reasonable business needs.
Rhombar argues from this that if the credit is to be
limited because a taxpayer is a mere holding or invest
ment company, the burden of proving this must be on
the Commissioner 'since it is a necessary part of the
. . . admitted burden of proving the amount of the
credit to which a taxpayer is entitled under section
535(c)(1).*32
Primary attention was upon the section 53^_535 relationship
as it applied to a holding company.

Yet the first sentence

quoted affirmatively answered the query presented earlier
as to the extension of the section 53^ burden of proof to
section 535*

A further comment in this case provides

additional insight into the Court's view in the matter.
The Court commented that Code provisions could seldom be

32Ibid., p. 5767.
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interpreted as if they were in a vacuum and saidi
In any event, it is hardly likely that Congress in
tended that section 53^ and section 535» enacted at
the same time, would work at cross purposes.
Indeed,
to permit the credit section to overpower.or submerge
and dilute the burden of proof section would be to
permit the tail to wag the dog.33
These comments give a clear indication that in an appro
priate operating company case the Commissioner will have
to carry the burden of proof as to the extent of the
reasonableness of the accumulations.
Electric Regulator Corp. v. Comm.-^ is the case
reversed by the Second Circuit.

The Tax Court had deter

mined that the petitioner's statement was adequate to
shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner on the
stated grounds.

However, the Tax Court found that the

Commissioner had discharged that burden and that the
statutory presumption of purpose arose.

The Tax Court

held the petitioner had failed to meet his burden on the
ultimate question of purpose.

This determination was

buttressed by finding factors indicating the existence
of the prohibited purpose.
The Second Circuit held that the Tax Court had
erred in concluding that the Commissioner had carried his
burden of proof and in concluding that the petitioner was

33Ibid.
AFTR 2d 5447 (2 Cir. 196*0, 232 F. .Supp. 5^3.
•^^Electric Regulator Corp..

TC 757 (1953).
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availed of for the proscribed purpose.

The facts found

to support the first finding of error can be described
broadly as having been derived from*

(1) a determination

of the elements that qualified as reasonable business needs,
and (2) the interpretation of the accounting concepts used
to determine the value of those elements.

Of course this

holding removed the support of the section 533(a) presump
tion from the Tax Court*s decision, but left untouched
the regular burden of the petitioner to prove lack of pur
pose.

The Second Circuit's finding of error on the issue

of purpose was supported by noting that the absence of
unreasonable accumulations is the most persuasive fact
that could show a lack of the purpose.

Furthermore,

other factors were present that indicated a lack of the
purpose. 36
Some significance must attach to the Court’s use
of this traditional manner of disposing of purpose.
section 535 general credit was ignored.

The

The year was 1964,

and adding another potentially controversial element to
the case would not have been wise.

The risk in developing

the boundaries of the reasonable needs of the business
and in applying accounting concepts is great.

A reversal

predicated in part by criticism of the trial court’s use
of accounting might be justified.

However, the Second

Circuit’s use of an erroneous calculation of "net cash

36l4 AFTR 2d 544?.

89
available" in order to partially support its reversal of
the Tax Court is at least mildly disturbing.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits
Three appeals were taken to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

Two were from the decided category

and one was from the decided-but category.
were affirmed.

The former two

One case affirmed was The Kirlin Company.

The Tax Court noted that the petitioner’s statement con
tained no dollar amounts to indicate the extent of the
business needs, but concluded that the statement was ade
quate to shift the burden to the Commissioner.

The section

535 credit was noted, too. .The Tax Court then methodically
evaluated each ground alleged and determined the amount
of the need thereof.

An analysis of the company’s liquid

ity in the light of its reasonable business needs revealed
that accumulations were unreasonable.

Finally, the Court

found that the petitioner had failed to carry his burden
of proof on the ultimate issue of purpose.

The Sixth

39
Circuit-'7 held that the decision was supported by substan
tial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.
/L0
Mfg. Co. v. Comm.
was similarly affirmed.

Novelart

37Ibid., p. 5^51.
F-H Memo TC.
-^ T h e Kirlin Corp. v. Comm.. 17 AFTR 2d 1266 (6
Cir. 1966).
^ 2 6 AFTR 2d 70-5837 (6 Cir. 1970), affirming
52 TC 79^ (1969).
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The only case appealed in the decided-but group
£l1
was the Shaw-Walker Company case.
The taxpayer's state
ment contained five grounds attempting to justify the
accumulations.

The Tax Court found that the alleged facts

were deficient in specificity and definiteness and that
the .burden did not shift.

Then came the hedge, "However,

regardless of where the burden of proof lies, the affirma
tive evidence of record is sufficient to determine this
ho
case on its merits."
That evidence showed the accumula
tions to be excessive, and it failed to negate the pro
hibited purpose.
The Sixth Circuit evaluated the case under these
four headingsi

(1) burden of proof,

(2) determination of

working capital, (3) intent, and (40 accumulated earnings
credit.

Under the burden of proof heading, the Court

analyzed the taxpayer’s statement.

The Tax Court was

sustained as to four of the grounds, but the Circuit Court
found that the ground claiming a need for working capital
was adequate to shift the burden of proof to the Commis
sioner.

This rejection of the Tax Court's finding led

into an evaluation of the Tax Court's failure to make a
detailed study of the working capital as it had done on
the four other grounds.
for this failure.

The result was a holding of error

In turning to the matter of intent, the

4i
5165,309 P-H Memo TC.
^2Ibid., p. 1896.
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Sixth Circuit was unable to determine which purpose test
had been applied and held the Tax Court had not made ade, quate findings of fact on this issue.
535(c) credit was considered.

Finally, the section

The Tax Court was upheld

on the credit determined for three items, but some
bewilderment was expressed over the manner in which the
credits were applied.

The case was remanded to the Tax

Court to make further findings of fact consistent with
LL'i

the appellate opinion.
The single appeal from the undecided category went
to the Tenth Circuit.

That decision^ was affirmed with

out discussion of the section 534 statement and the Tax
Court's treatment thereof.
Other Relevant Appeals
Motor Fuel Carriers. Inc..v. U.S.^
from a nonjury district court decision.

was an appeal

The taxpayer had

tried the case as though the entire accumulation was
reasonable.

The taxpayer made no effort to prove that it

was entitled to accumulate some part of the earnings if
not entitled to all of them.

The claim for a section 535

ll'J

-'This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court
and was remanded to the Sixth Circuit on the issue of the
purpose test. See Comm, v. Shaw-Walker Co.. 23 AFTR 2d
69-523, 393 U.S. 197^
Henry Van Hummell. Inc. v. Comm.. 18 AFTR 2d
5500 (10 Cir. 1966)7 364" F. 2d 746, affirming $64,290
P-H Memo TC.
^512 AFTR 2d 5554 (5 Cir. 1963), 322 F. 2d 576.

credit was raised for the first time in the appeal.

The

Fifth Circuit forgave the lateness of the claim and
remanded in part because the Court felt the case might be
a pilot case on that issue.

Although section 53^ was not

applicable to the case, the Fifth Circuit*s comment on
the burden of proof and section 535 is interesting.

The

Court said, "The burden is no less as to a part than as
to the whole."

LA

In spite of the substantial difference

in the burden of proof in the district courts and the
burden of proof under section 53^* this comment could
apply just as well to a section 53^ case.

Thus, if the

burden of proof on the reasonableness of the accumulations
shifts to the Commissioner, then it would appear that he
should also bear the burden of proving the extent of the
reasonableness•
McNally Pittsburg Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S.
was a district court trial by jury.

The taxpayer

presented an exhibit that included the annual figure for
cost of goods sold as a part of the current operating
needs for a year.

This computation showed that funds

were not available to pay dividends.

The government

introduced a similar exhibit except that cost of goods
sold was excluded from current operating needs.

This

approach showed a substantial amount of funds available

^ Ibid.. p. 5558.
^ 1 5 AFTR 2d W
1578 (DC, Kans. 1963)*

(10 Cir. 1965). reversing 11 AFTR
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•to pay dividends.

The instructions to the jury approved

the taxpayer's approach*

The jury decided in favor of the
JlO

taxpayer.

The Tenth Circuit

recognized that the inven

tory turnover and collection period for accounts receivable
did not support the taxpayer's method of calculation.

The

Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the
erroneous instructions to the jury.
Apollo Industries. Inc.
was appealed to the First Circuit.

was a Tax Court case that
A significant part of

the appeal opinion was devoted to the development of an
operating cycle approach to analyze working capital needs,
which was merely suggested to the Tax Court in the remand.
The last paragraph is an excellent summary of the basis
for the remand.
The case must be remanded for answers, for each
of the two taxable years, to the following questions:
(1 ) was the reconstituted tobacco project a reasonably
anticipated business need of Alles?
(2) if so, what
were its reasonable dimensions?
(3 ) what were the
practical needs of Alles for working capital? and
(4-) even if accumulated earnings did not exceed
reasonably anticipated business needs in one or both
years, was avoidance of taxes on shareholders never
theless a dominant purpose? In the meantime, we will
retain jurisdiction.50
Item one evidences a concern in determining an element of
the reasonable needs of business.

Items two and three

reflect a concern over the application of section 535 and

^ 8rbid., p. 486.
TC 1 (1965).
^°Apollo industries. Inc. v. Comm., 17 AFTR 2d
518, 525 (1 Cir. 1966).

9^
the necessity for using accounting concepts therefore.
Item four must be taken as an indication that section 535
will not apply to shield earnings accumulated for the
reasonable needs of the business if the prohibited purpose
also exists.
The approach in item four would be contrary to
the Tax Court cases which have disposed of the purpose
issue by applying section 535

Obviously,

if purpose

can be ignored when accumulations are made for reasonable
business needs, then section 53 ^ becomes significantly
more important.

A related question would bet

If the

reasonable needs of the business are greater than the
earnings accumulated, but a part of those earnings are
used for something other than the reasonable needs of
the business, how does section 535 apply?

This problem

confronted the Fifth Circuit in Mead’s Bakery.
The Tax Court had utilized the taxpayer's normal
burden of proof in a roundabout approach to the decision.
The Tax Court said, "Petitioner has failed to prove that
its reasonable business needs . . . exceeded the amount
of earnings retained . . . minus the amounts advanced
Angus . . . ."52

a

logical extension of this expression

would be that upon a shov/ing of reasonable needs in
excess of accumulated earnings, the earnings could be

5-^John P. Scripps Newspapers, W

TC ^53 (1965 ).

52Mead's Bakery, Inc., *064-, lOh P-H Memo TC,
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put to any use without incurring the tax.

Perhaps the

Fifth Circuit recognized this possible construction for
the Court saidt
This holding is not supported by the Court's finding
of needs which, added, exceed $^,000,000.00 and of
retained earnings of only $550,000.00. The Tax Court
didn’t question the bona fides of these needs.
Instead,
the gist of the Court's opinion . . . is that regard
less of the extent of taxpayer’s needs (or the fact
that they mathematically exceed retained earnings),
that part of its earnings advanced to Angus was not
retained for the purpose of meeting those needs.53
The Fifth Circuit reversed for the taxpayer with
out resolving this issue and held that its reasonable
needs were greater than its accumulations.

The Tax Court's

finding that Angus was not actively engaged in a business
was approved, but the Court nothd that similar cases had
been determined by whether the accumulations were being
held for business needs or the prohibited purpose.

Here

t h e 'expenditures were believed to be a manner of holding
Zh,
funds for future business needs.^
Sears Oil Co., Inc.

was remanded to the Tax

Court by the Second Circuit "with particular attention
to the question of reasonable needs."-^

This mandate

required an evaluation of the extent of the reasonableness.

^ Mead's Bakery, Inc. v. Comm.. 18 AFTR 2d 5205,
5209 (5 Cir. 1966 ).
^ I b i d .. pp. 5209-10.
65,039 P-H Memo TC.
ears Oil Co., Inc. v* Comm., 1? AFTR 2d 833,
838 (2 Cir.*-1966).
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EVALUATION OF THE CASES
The largest number (1*0 of the Tax Court cases
investigated fell into the decided category.

This repre

sents a substantial overt attempt to give some effect to
the congressional intent of section 534.

The interpreta

tion of the other two categories is not as clear.

The

eight undecided cases could be taken as an indication
that there is still a significant reluctance to permit
the operation of section 534.

The seven decided-but cases

are the most difficult to interpret.

The semantics used

indicate a hedge or qualification of the section 534
determination.

This view would place the decided-but

cases next to the undecided cases in terms of the attitude
expressed.

The perfect correlation between the 534

determination and the final decision prompts another
possible explanation.

Perhaps the evidence in these cases

was so one-sided that it was reflected in the section 534statement.

The Tax Court determined the section 534 issue,

weighed the evidence, and was thereby moved to make some
comment in passing.

This explanation would place these

cases next to the decided cases in terms of the attitude
expressed.
Several suggestions may be made from the appeals
taken in these cases.

By tracing the appeals taken be

tween the circuit courts and these three categories, one
senses that the Second Circuit's position in Gsell has
been a strong influence in causing the Tax Court to make
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a finding on the section 534 issue.

An objective in

reviewing the appeals was to acquire some feeling
for the significance placed upon the Tax Court’s treatment
of this issue.

The reversals are generally more suitable

for this task because of the greater discussion given to
explain the decision.
The reversals have presented some difficult prob
lems.

One problem is to determine whether or not a given

factor is a reasonable need of the business.

Another

problem is to choose the proper accounting concepts to be
applied in determining the extent of those needs.

The

solution of the former problem is essential to a proper
weighing of the evidence.

Both problems must be solved

in order to correctly apply the section 535 credit.
Arguably, these matters have had a greater influence in
effecting a reversal than the burden of persuasion has
had.

Support for this conclusion is found in the survey

of the other appellate cases.

Although the section 534

statement was not an issue, reversals were predicated upon
the same types of problems.

Indeed, the overwhelming

concern was with these problems and the section 535(c)
credit.

As these two types of problems are solved, the

next logical step would be to devote attention to defining
the relationship between sections 53b and 535*

The weight

of opinion examined above indicates that an adequate
section 534 statement should shift the burden of deter
mining the extent of the credit to the Commissioner.
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However, a clear indication of how the dual burdens will
operate upon section 535(c) is not even upon the horizon.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis
as to how these burdens should operate so as to best give
effect

to the Congressional intent. To this end,the

close

case language of Gsell must be carefully analyzed inthe
light of Holzman's conceptual explanation of the burden of
persuasion.
THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION IN CLOSE CASES
The theory of the operation of the burden of
persuasion in close cases is easy to understand.
pragmatic application is another matter.

Its

Two cases have

specifically adopted the "close case" concept in making
a determination under section 53^*
<7
Gsell & Co., Inc. v. Comm* 1 was the first case

in which the close case concept was wedded to the section
53^ burden of proof.
questions:

This case raises some perplexing

Was Gsell a close case?

If it was, then why

did the Tax Court fail to recognize it as such?

Why did

the Second Circuit fail to expressly say that Gsell was
a close case?
The quote from Gsell presented earlier leaves
little room to doubt that it is a close case:

& 8 AFTR 2d 5507.

The Second

Circuit's findings that the taxpayer's statement was suf
ficient to shift the burden and that the Commissioner had
not met his burden support the inference.

Also, the

Court relied in part upon the Commissioner's failure to
meet his burden to support its finding that the taxpayer
was not availed of for the proscribed purpose.-*®

Yet,

there are contrary indications.
The Second Circuit criticized the Tax Court fori
(1 ) basing its determination of unreasonable accumulations
upon inadequate evidence,

(2 ) overly emphasizing the sur

taxes saved by the stockholders, and (3 ) relying upon
the taxpayer to arrange financing from a sister corpora
tion.-*^

If the evidence were truly weighted 50-50* there

would be no need for these criticisms for the shift in
the burden of persuasion to the Commissioner would
effectively determine the issue of reasonableness for the
taxpayer.

Of course the determination of this issue in

favor of the taxpayer fails to raise the section 533(a)
presumption of purpose in the Commissioner's favor, and
the taxpayer must meet only his regular burden of proving
the lack of the prohibited purpose.

Furthermore, in Gsell

the Second Circuit restated the view that "a determination
that accumulations were not unreasonable . . . amounts to

-*®Ibid., pp. 5511-13.
59Ibid.
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a finding favorable to the taxpayer on the most persuasive
fact which would show that the corporation was not availed
of for the purpose . . . .

However, the first criticism

noted above appears to be addressed to a new weighing of
the evidence to show clearly that the accumulations are
reasonable.

The last two criticisms appear to be addressed

to a new weighing of the evidence to show clearly that the
proscribed purpose is absent.

Thus the criticisms are

an indication that Gsell is not a close case, but that
the evidence had been incorrectly weighed.

If the taxable

years in Gsell had been under the 195^ Code and its pro
vision for the section 535 credit, would the decision
have been different?

Shaw-Walker provides some insight

for an answer to this question.
The earlier discussion of the Shaw-Walker case
showed that section 535(c) was a factor to be considered.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion seems to strongly indicate
that a remand would have been in order regardless of the
Tax Court's determination on the 53^ issue.

Yet, the

Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's language in
Gsell on close cases.

Is this an indication that Shaw-

Walker was a close case?

What else does Shaw-Walker have

in common with Gsell?
In Gsell the Tax Court had failed to determine
the section 53^ issue.

In Shaw-Walker the Tax Court ruled

6o8 ajftr 2d 5507, 5512.
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that the statement did not shift the burden and then
added the familiar qualifying statement.

Thus in both

cases the Tax Court’s position weakened the effectiveness
of section 53^*

However, in Shaw-Walker the determination

of section 53^- was necessary to fix the burden of persu
asion upon the Commissioner on the working capital issue
upon the remand.
Can a rational theory be developed to help explain
the apparent contradiction in Gsell, the significance
of the Tax Court’s three basic positions as seen since
Gsell, and other related problems?

To this end, the con

ceptual relationship of the burden of persuasion to close
cases is developed beyond the state presented above.
Further development requires a definition of a close case.
Holzman's comments make

it clear than an example of a

close case would be one

in which the evidence is split

50-50 between the parties.

Likewise, he indicates that

a split of 25-75 in the

evidence would mean that a case

is not close,

in which the evidence is split

A case

^9-51 between the parties would be close in the sense that
there is very little difference in the evidence in favor
of each party.

Although it would be difficult to measure

evidence that precisely in practice, a determination of
any difference, however small, would be adequate to render

61

Holzman, p. 332.
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a decision

in favor of one party without calling upon

the burden of persuasion.
The confusion in this matter seems to arise at
the appellate level.

It seems to involve the difference

between a review by a circuit court as to whether there
is "substantial evidence" to sustain the trial court’s
findings of fact, and a review by a circuit court as to
whether the trial court's findings are "blearly errone
ous."

"Substantial evidence" is evidence of such quality

and weight that a reasonable person would be justified
in making the same conclusions of fact that the trial
court made.

The Supreme Court has explained "clearly

erroneous" as follows:
A finding is 'clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Reasonable men might differ as to whether the evidence in
a case is weighted 49-51* or 51-49, between the respective
parties.

In such a case, there is substantial evidence

to support either decision.

However, an appellate court

could reverse a trial court decision under the clearly
erroneous rule, if the trial court weighed the evidence
between the parties as being 49-51* while the review court

/T p

Federal Sec. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259 F. 2 d 294
(10 Cir. 19^8)'.
^ U.S. v. United States Gysum Co.. 333 U.S. 364,
394.
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weighed the evidence as being 51-^9 . between the re
spective parties.

Considering the preceding analysis and

the fact that the clearly erroneous rule g o v e r n s ^ the
scope of review of Tax Court cases, the following defi
nition of a close case is adopted for the remainder of
this chapteri

A close case is one in which the evidence

is weighted exactly 50-50 between the parties.
Conceptually, there are two distinct steps in
weighing evidence.

The first step is to assign some

amount of weight to each element of the evidence.

The

second step requires a simple addition of the weights of
the elements in favor of each party.

A comparison of

the weights will dictate a decision in favor of the party
with the greatest weight of evidence.

If there is no

difference in the weights, then the burden of persuasion
is called into play to reach a decision.

An incorrect

determination can result from an error made in weighing
the evidence in the first step, the second step, or both
steps.

The relationship of possible errors in weighing

evidence, the burden of persuasion in close cases, and
the clearly erroneous rule seems to be shrouded in mis
understanding.

The following hypothetical case should

help clarify the matter.

6k

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of civil
Procedure.
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The taxpayer, T, had filed a section 534 statement.
The Tax Court had failed to determine whether T's state
ment was adequate to shift the burden of proof to the
Commissioner, C.

The Tax Court erroneously weighed the

evidence in favor of T as 30$ and in favor of C as 70?.
Consequently, the decision was in favor of C.

T appealed

knowing that a circuit court will reverse only if the Tax
Court decision is clearly erroneous.

Given the situation,

one of three basic situations would occur upon a weighing
of the evidence by an appellate court.
Case 1.

Perhaps the evidence in favor of T is

45$ and the evidence in favor of C is 55$*

Since the

error did not alter the outcome of the decision, there
would be no reason to reverse.

There would still be

substantial evidence in support of the decision, and
it would not be clearly erroneous.
If T's section 534 statement were to be deemed
adequate by either court to shift the burden to C, then
by either weighting C carried his burden and the out
come would not be changed.

If T's statement were to be

deemed inadequate by either court, then by either weighing
T failed to carry his burden, and the final result would
be the

same.

Therefore, a determination by the Tax

on the

section 534 issue in this case is irrelevant

Court
to a

decision upon appeal.
Case 2.

Perhaps the evidence in favor of T is

60$ and the evidence in favor of C is 40$.

This means

105
the decision was in favor of the wrong party.

Such a

situation would leave the appellate court "with the defi
nite and firm conviction" that the Tax Court had erred.
The clearly erroneous rule would be used to reverse the
decision and insure a just result.
Once again assumptions could be made about speci
fic determinations of the 53^ issue, but the weight of
the evidence would work to insure a just result.

Thus,

in this case a determination on the section 53^ issue by
the Tax Court would be irrelevant to a decision upon
appeal.
Case 3.

Perhaps the evidence is split 50-50.

In this instance the burden of persuasion must be deter
mined.

If the Tax Court should determine the section 53^

issue in favor of either party, its erroneous weighting
of the evidence would work to determine the outcome in
favor of C.

The appellate court would have to examine

the section 53^ statement to see whether the burden of
persuasion had been properly placed because it will de
termine the outcome of the case.
had correctly

Even if the Tax Court

weighed the evidence, the appellate court

would have to examine the section 53^ statement for the
same purpose and reason.

Therefore,

if the Tax Court were

to correctly determine the section 53^ issue and correctly
weigh the evidence, its decision would be sustained, but
if the Tax Court were to incorrectly determine the
section 53^ issue while correctly weighing the evidence
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its decision must be reversed in order to give the correct
result.

Thus the Tax Court’s determination of the section

53^ issue in this case would be irrelevant to an appellate
decision.
A Restricted Theory
A theory can be developed from this examples

Re

gardless of whether the Tax Court makes a correct deter
mination, an incorrect determination, or fails to make
a determination of the adequacy of a section 53^ state
ment, the final result of an appellate decision will
be unaffected.
There is support for this theory.
the third case situation rather well.

Gsell fits

Also, a comment

by the Ninth Circuit in Smith. Inc. v. Comm.^
tent with the above analysis.

is consis

The Court stated*

But if we should assume that the Tax Court in
correctly determined that the burden of proof here
rested with the taxpayer, no prejudice would have
resulted unless a finding of fact adverse to peti
tioner was predicated only on petitioner's failure
to sustain the burden of proof . . . .
Perhaps the strongest support comes from the Second Cir
cuit in a pre-Gsell case, Casey v. Comm.^
Both Gsell and Casey strongly indicate the Second

658 AFTR 2d 5119 (9 Cir. 1961), 292 F. 2d 4-90.
66Ibid., pp. 5122-23.
673 AFTR 2d 1 ^ 0 (2 Cir. 1959).

Circuit's concern over the Congressional intent expressed
in section 53^*

However, immediately after the expres

sion of that concern in Casey, the Court analysed the
clearly erroneous rule in detail.

The Court supported

its belief that reviewing courts have used language
indicating a restricted scope of review only when they
agreed with the trial court decision.

The conclusion is

that the "definite and firm conviction" subjective test
makes the clearly erroneous rule a powerful tool for re
versal.

One must realize that a close case is in the

eye of the beholder.

An exhortation for the Tax Court to

make a determination of the section 53^ issue is meaning
less, if the Tax Court is unable to see that a specific
case is close.
There are two things that this theory does not
suggest.

There is no suggestion that the burden of per

suasion is totally irrelevant.

This burden is a very

necessary instrument for the orderly and just disposition
of close cases.

It must be determined by the Tax Court

when a close case is recognized.

It must also be inde

pendently determined by a reviewing court when that court
recognizes a close case.

Nor is there a suggestion that

the Tax Court may ignore this burden in non-close cases.
The importance of the theory and the attendant analysis
is in clearly understanding the conceptual operation of
the burden in order to make a better evaluation of its
significance in practice.
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Standing alone, the burden of persuasion appears
useless as a practical matter because, in spite of the
rhetoric, no obviously close case can be found in this
area.

The pragmatic explanation might be that no court

has had the courage to base its decision solely upon the
burden of persuasion due to the difficulty in weighing
the evidence— particularly the assignment of weights to
the elements.

The probability that a true close case

would ever occur is infinitesimal due to the infinite
number of possible variables.

Therefore one may be

reasonably certain that in any given case the evidence
does preponderate in favor of one party or the other.
However, in a case weighted, perhaps 4-5"55» one may be
unable to determine which party should be assigned which
proportion.

Thus the measurement problem blurs a sub

stantial number of cases such that the practical dilemma
is the same as if the case could be exactly weighed as
50-50.

The burden of persuasion may be secretly called

upon to remove the blur.

Then one can see clearly how

the weights should be assigned to the parties,

Subse

quently, one may announce that since the case was not a
close case there was no need to determine who had the
burden of persuasion.
Perhaps the biggest problem is in determining
whether the burden of producing evidence should be drawn
to the burden of persuasion.

Given the wide margin for

error in assigning weights to the evidence the presence
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or absence of a single piece of evidence can completely
alter the final decision in a case.

The high cost to the

taxpayer of producing evidence and the substantially
greater difficulty to the Commissioner of producing evi
dence was set out earlier.

Thus it becomes extremely

important to determine who has the burden of persuasion
before trial if the burden of producing evidence shifts
with it.
A Proposal
One may agree that Congress intended to correct
abuses, and that the purpose of section 53^- was to give
effect to that intent.

The part of the Senate report

quoted previously indicates two distinctly different
causes for the complaints.

They were:

(1) the Commis

sioner's failure to carefully evalute the cases, and
(2) the Commissioner's use of the tax as a weapon.

One

will notice that the former results from passive behavior
while the latter results from active behavior.
one will make the taxpayer incur heavy costs.

Either
A solution

designed to correct one type of behavior will not neces
sarily correct the other type.

If this duality had been

recognised, perhaps the controversy would have led to an
effective solution.
Most of the critics have focused upon the second
cause.

They have correctly recognized that the burden

of producing evidence must be allowed to pass to the
Commissioner in order to deprive him of a powerful weapon.
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Wagman and the courts seem to have concentrated upon the
first cause.

A knowledge that one must carry only the

burden of persuasion should be adequate to make him care
fully review his case.

Furthermore, the burden of pro

ducing evidence becomes a more powerful weapon in the
hands of the taxpayer than it is when it is in the hands
of the Commissioner— a result not likely intended by
Congress.

Finally, as guardians of justice, the courts

are interested in weighing all of the evidence.

All of

the evidence is more likely to be presented if the tax
payer has the burden of producing it.
The key to the solution appears to be in the
"weapon” aspect of the burden of producing evidence.

That

is, if this burden could be neutralized as a weapon in
the hands of the taxpayer, there would seem to be no sub
stantial reason to prevent the burden of producing evi
dence from shifting with the burden of persuasion to the
Commissioner.

Such a method should eliminate both causes

of the abuses mentioned in the Senate report.

Hopefully,

with little to be gained through maneuvering for a weapon,
both parties would seriously evaluate the case and reach
a settlement without resort to litigation.
The Tax Court took a cautious step forward in
Chatham Corp.

68

and held that the taxpayer's section 534

6848 TC 145 (1967).

statement had shifted the burden of proof to the Commis
sioner.

The significance of this step was that this

holding was made prior to trial.
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been denied in Shaw-WAlker Co. 7

A similar motion had
The difference was that

in Chatham the motion was heard by the judge who was to
try the case while in Shaw-Walker the motion judge was
not to be the trial judge.

Regardless of the soundness

in the reasoning for making the differentiation, the
change was a significant one.
Goldfein has reasoned that little benefit will
accrue to the taxpayer unless the burden under section
53^ extends to section 535(c).

7G

The cases reviewed indi

cate that a specific determination of this relationship
m a y be expected at any time.

If a satisfactory solution

is not found new criticism will probably be forthcoming.
Therefore the following proposal is submitted for consi
deration:

Although the weight of authority is not con

clusive, it does indicate that the section 53^ burden of
proof should extend to section 535(c).

The reasoning of

that authority is sound and this extension of the burden
is recommended.

The practice of ruling on motions for

a determination under section 53^ prior to trial should
be expanded to all appropriate cases.

Specifically, this

burden of proof must be interpreted as including the two

6939 TC 293 (1962).
^Goldfein, p.

burdens in order to take the weapon from the Commissioner.
The weapon can be negated in the hands of the taxpayer
by permitting a full interplay between sections 53^ and
535■

If the two sections are to work together because

"The burden is no less as to a part than as to the
whole . •

then it follows that the "facts supporting

the grounds" should be interpreted to require an estimate
of the dollar amount for each need claimed.

Arguably,

this interpretation of the section 53^~535 relationship
substantially reduces the burden placed on the Commis
sioner from affirmatively proving the dollar amount of
the need to disproving the dollar amount of the need
as claimed bv the taxpayer.

The idea is that the section

53^ statement displays the taxpayer's hand to the Commis
sioner and that the burden of proof makes the Commissioner
carefully analyze that hand.

As noted, others have urged

that the Commissioner be saddled with the full load— the
burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence
as to the extent of the needs.

A simple standard of fair

ness requires that the taxpayer at least display his full
hand.

The taxpayer must always be required to disclose

the dollar amounts for every business need upon which he
relies.
This system should work for several reasons.

?112 AFTR 2d 5554, 5558.
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When the taxpayer knows that he must state specific amounts in his statement, he must carefully analyze his
needs for he faces the possibility of having to subse
quently prove the extent of those needs.

When the Com

missioner is confronted with having to disprove a speci
fic amount, he must carefully analyze the case to deter
mine his odds.

If the statement is subsequently deemed

adequate to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner,
he must produce the first evidence.

Once he comes for

ward with sufficient evidence to controvert the claimed
amount, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the
taxpayer.

The taxpayer must then go forward with evidence

for the claimed amount.

The Tax Court will then weigh

the evidence with the burden of persuasion in mind.
The critical feature of this proposal is that
the Tax Court take an unequivocal position on fixing the
burden of persuasion and shifting the burden of producing
evidence.

The conditional certainty of facing the burden

of producing evidence is necessary to make both parties
bargain in good faith.

The degree of difficulty for the

Commissioner to shift the burden of producing evidence
back to the taxpayer is viewed as being roughly propor
tional to the reasonableness of the taxpayer's claim.
The system has advantages for the Tax Court.

If

the Court supports the shifting nature of the burden of
producing evidence, maximum opportunity for the presenta
tion of all the evidence is maintained.

By fully using

»
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the 535(c) credit( the magnitude of any error made in
weighing the evidence is reduced because of the oppor
tunity to secretly make an adjustment in the amount of
the crdditt commensurate with the difficulty in weighing
the evidence.

This advantage should tend to reduce the

possibility of being reversed because it should be less
clear and definite that a mistake had been committed.
Most importantly, the system offers an opportunity to
give full effect to the intent of Congress.
The Tax Court has acknowledged the significance
of dollar amounts in a section 534 statement, but has
72
refused to make them a necessary requirement.
As early
as i960, the Tax Court noted that the dollar amounts al
leged in the section 534 statement as needed for inven
tory were completely out of proportion to the largest
inventory held.7-^

In Kirlin Co.,7**- presented above, the

Tax Court noted the absence of dollar amounts, but deter
mined that the statement was adequate to shift the bur
den*

Hopefully, these various acknowledgements are a

prelude to an appreciation of the impact a full interplay
between section 534 and section 535(c) might have.

72Ted Bates & Co., Inc., 1165,251 P-H Memo TC.
^ American Metal Products Corn.. 34 TC 89, 100

(I960).
7Nl64,260 P-H Memo TC.
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SUMMARY
Section 53^ was enacted by Congress in response
to numerous complaints by taxpayers.

It provides for

a shift in the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the
Commissioner under certain conditions.

However> critics

have charged that the Tax Court's treatment of this sec
tion has frustrated the intent of Congress.

The contro

versy that developed involved the two elements of the
burden of proof— the burden of persuasion and the burden
of producing evidence.
Often the Tax Court made no determination of the
section 53^ issue.

At times the Tax Court refused to rule

on the shift in the burden of proof until after the trial
of the case.

This practice insured that the burden of

producing evidence did not shift to the Commissioner, and
it was questionable that the practice permitted the bur
den of persuasion to pass.
The Second Circuit duly noted the Congressional
intent for adopting the provision and the Tax Court's
treatment in Gsell.

This Court of Appeals admonished

the Tax Court of the necessity for making a determination
of the 53^ issue, especially in close cases.
Several years after the first round of criticism
the critics became aware of the potential impact of the
relationship between section 53^ and section 535*

The
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significant difference in the two elements of the burden
of proof was again noted.

The writers suggested that the

burden of proof should extend to section 535 so that the
Commissioner would have the burden of proving the extent
of the reasonableness of accumulations in appropriate
cases.
The cases since Gsell reveal a substantial change
in the attitude of the Tax Court.

The primary result has

been a trend in determining the burden of persuasion aspect
of the burden of proof.

The burden of producing evidence

has received relatively less attention.

Arguably, the

cases appealed since Gsell provide a suggestion that further
development has been impeded by the preoccupation of the
courts in determining the boundaries for the reasonable
needs of the business and the proper application of ac
counting concepts.

These factors are essential for a

determination under section 535*
The disparity between the comments of the critics
and the opinions of the courts led to a critical analysis
of the positions taken.
theory was developed:

From that analysis this restricted
Hegardless of whether the Tax Court

makes a correct determination, an incorrect determination,
or fails to make a determination of the adequacy of a sec
tion 53^ statement, the final result of an appellate de
cision will be unaffected.

This theory enhances an aware

ness of the importance of the burden of producing evidence,
but does not negate the reasons for the Tax Court to deter
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mine the section 53^ issue.

An examination of the Senate

Report on the complaints leading to the enactment of section
53^ revealed that the Commissioner's passive behavior as
well as his active behavior was responsible for the com
plaints.

Arguably, a failure to recognize this difference

helps explain judicial solutions which emphasize the burden
of persuasion, while critics emphasize the burden of pro
ducing evidence.
A proposal was tendered to accomodate the various
factions.

The proposal calls for a full interplay between

sections 53^ and 535*

The essential features require that

an adequate section 53^ statement include a dollar amount
for estimated needs, that such a statement will shift both
elements of the burden of proof to the Commissioner, and
that the burden of producing evidence will shift back to
the taxpayer upon the Commissioner’s presentation of
evidence disproving the amount of the need claimed in the
section 53^ statement.

CHAPTER IV
THE APPLICATION OF ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS IN THE
DETERMINATION OF THE REASONABLE NEEDS
OF THE BUSINESS
The proper application of accounting concepts in
the determination of the reasonable needs of the business
requires a comprehensive understanding of those concepts.
An understanding of accounting concepts requires knowledge
as well as intelligence.

While the intelligence and legal

acumen of judges may be presumed by virtue of the position
they have attained, a similar presumption of accounting
knowledge may not be made.

The judicial treatment of ac

counting concepts, which is presented herein, is limited
to the most basic ones.

Although the concepts of earnings,

depreciation, working capital, and appropriation of earn
ings are basic, they are not necessarily easy to under
stand*

The definitions of these terras may appear simple,

but the difficulty in understanding seems to involve the
development of an awareness of the relationship of each
account to all other accounts.

This chapter presents an

examinationoof the apparent judicial understanding of the
nature of earnings, depreciation, working capital, and
appropriation of retained earnings.

A rationale, based

upon accounting, is presented to support the court’s
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assumption of the relationship between liquidity and
retained earnings*
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS
A thorough understanding of economic and ac
counting concepts of income is essential for an under
standing of the various definitions of income in the tax
law area.

An integral part of the law providing for the

accumulated earnings tax is a matter of accounting.

The

following excerpts show the pervasiveness of income con
cepts in this tax.

Section 531 imposes the tax "for each

taxable year on the accumulated taxable income," as
presently defined in section 535•

Section 535(a ) provides

for various adjustments to "taxable income" in arriving
at "accumulated taxable income."

The adjustment provided

by subsection (c)(1) is a general credit for operating
corporations equal to the portion of the "earnings and
profits for the taxable year as are retained for the
reasonable needs of the business."

In addition to the

emphasis on income or earnings, one should notice that
although several taxable years may be subject to the tax,
the tax is calculated upon the earnings of a particular
year without inclusion of the earnings of any prior
years.

However, the significance of accumulations from

prior years has not been overlooked.

The Regulations

expressly acknowledge the importance of prior accumula
tions as follows:

120
In determining whether any amount of the earnings
and profits of the taxable year has been retained
for the reasonable needs of the business, the accu
mulated earnings and profits of prior years will be
•taken into consideration.
Thus, for example, if
such accumulated earnings and profits of prior years
are sufficient for the reasonable needs of the busi
ness, then any earnings and profits of the current
taxable year which are retained will not be consi
dered to be retained for the reasonable needs of
the business . . . A
The Nature of Earnings
The most basic misunderstanding of the nature
of earnings stems from an assumption that "earnings" is
a synonym for "cash."

Even though a taxpayer elects to

account for income on a cash basis, he may be required
to reflect certain accrual adjustments in computing
taxable income.

A notable example is the accrual adjust

ment required for depreciation.

Therefore care must be

taken to avoid confusing the term "earnings" with the
term "cash."
Once the distinction between these two terms is
overlooked, a number of erroneous statements appear plaus
ible.

Perhaps the most common expression alludes to

paying dividends "out of earnings."
dends must be paid in cash.

Of course, cash divi

The cash is provided by oper

ations which also result in earnings.

From this observa

tion one may make the erroneous assumption that the terms

■^Income Tax Regulations, Section 1.535~3(b)(1)(ii).
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are synonymous.

An example of this error is found in the

memorandum decision, Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co.
as followsi
Of the net income of $94-, 976 *4-7, $21,600 was
paid out in dividends to stockholders and $10,605.09
was paid for income taxes which were not deductible
from gross income. The addition to surplus was
only $62,725*39*
Of this amount $4-2,218.82 served
only to restore the surplus as it stood at December
31. 1929*2
A logical extension of this type of reasoning is
to erroneously assume that earnings can "pay for" other
needs as well as dividends.

For example, in Battlestein

Investment Co. v. U.S.^ the taxpayer sought to justify an
accumulation of earnings by claiming a need for long-term
debt retirement.

As a partial answer, the court said:

These annual payments of $50,000 were made without
impeding the steady growth of the plaintiff’s net
earnings . . . . plaintiff . . . could easily pay
off its long-term obligations^out of current earnings
as each installment came due.4.
If one assumes that earnings may be used to pay off debts,
then earnings may be used to make loans.

The Tax Court

has said:
Even if we assume that Princeton did require
funds from petitioner, such loans as would have
been required could easily have been made out of
petitioner’s accumulated earnings and profits of
$289,054-. 15» as they existed at July 1, 1957. the
beginning of the taxable years here involved . . . .

2<n4-3, ^35 P-H Memo TC.
323 AFTR 2d 69-784- (DC, Tax. i 1969).

W

,

p. 69-788.
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The evidence convinces us that petitioners earnings
of such years were not required for loans to
Princeton.5
The part of the quotation from Battlestein which suggests
that there is a direct connection between the annual pay
ments on debt and the company*s annual income is an addi
tional indication of misunderstanding.

The words "with

out impeding" lead this writer to suspect that the Court
was under the false impression that the annual payment
on the principal of $50*000 was a deduction from revenues
on the firm*s annual statement of income.

Thus, in spite

of this "impediment, ■ the annual income continued to
increase.
The Tax Court made a similar error in Gazette
Telegraph Co.

The difference was that in this case the

Tax Court was comparing the total payments to the total
accumulations instead of comparing annual payments to
annual earnings.

The Court said:

. . . petitioner accumulated a surplus of
$97*633*03
fiscal 19^7 which had increased to
$236,266.08 by the end of fiscal 19^8 despite the 7
payments on principal of the Bank of America noteX
In this quotation the use of the word "despite" is con

strued to indicate a belief by the Tax Court that the
principal payments constitute a charge against the

^The Factories Investment Corporation. 39 TC 908,
918 (1963T:

619 TC 692 (1953)*
7Ibid.. p. 707*
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surplus, or retained earnings account.

This mistake could

result from incorrect reasoning that does not directly in
volve the statement of income.

For example, the payment of

a cash dividend does result in a reduction of the balances
in the cash account and the retained earnings account.

This

knowledge could improperly be taken as support for the no
tion that earnings are equal to cash.

Therefore, since

the payment of a cash dividend reduces the retained earn
ings, one might erroneously deduce that the cash payment of
a debt would reduce the amount of retained earnings.
Of course words may be subject to more than one
interpretation.

The following quote from Southland In-

Q

dustries, Inc.

is an example.

When petitioner carried $86,925*^6 of its
earnings for the taxable year (19^-0 ) to surplus,
it then had a surplus theretofore acquired of
$1^5 »8^7 -22, and in addition assets (much of same
liquid) many times that amount.°
The words "in addition" could mean that the Tax Court
literally meant for the balance in the surplus account
to be added to the balance of the asset accounts.

Yet,

the words "in addition" constitute a transitional phrase
and could have been used to indicate merely that the
assets are another factor to be considered.

Neverthe

less, several paragraphs later the former construction

8<n46,262 P-H Memo TC.
^Ibid., p. 903.
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clearly appears as follows:
If the reasonable needs of petitioner's business
had required an expenditure for new equipment, expan
sion or installation of additional facilities, no
reason was shown why, In addition to the $145,000
surplus theretofore acquired, all or a substantial
part of its large nonoperating assets could not have
been used for this purpose.10
Although the cases presented above indicate a
shallow comprehension of the nature of earnings, some
courts have made laudable attempts to understand the
nature of earnings.

Particularly noteworthy is this

comment by the Fourth Circuit in Smoot Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Comm.t
Thus, the size of the accumulated earnings and profits
or surplus is not the crucial factor* rather, it is
the reasonableness and nature of the surplus. Part
of the surplus may be justifiably earmarked in the
form of reserves, for specific, necessary business
needs. Again, to the extent the surplus has been
translated into plant expansion, increased receivables,
enlarged Inventories, or other assets related to its
business, the corporation may accumulate surplus
with impunity . . . . Where, on the other hand, the
accumulation of surplus is reflected in liquid
assets in excess of the immediate or reasonably
forseeable business needs of the corporation, there
is a strong indication that the purpose of the
accumulation is to prevent the imposition of income
taxes upon dividends which would b&ve been distri
buted to the shareholders . . . .
This statement represents a recognition that earnings can
only be expressed in the form of assets.

Unfortunately,

the decision provides no instructions as to how the
earnings can be related to specific assets.

This Court

10Ibid.
U 5 AFTR 2d 626 , 630 (4 Cir. 1?60). The ellipses
represent the omission of the authorities cited.
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just assumes that excess liquid assets are evidence of
excess accumulated earnings.
The Second Circuit has realized that the retained
earnings account does not represent a source of funds
for making payments.

This Court has learned the relation

ship of retained earnings to specific assets.
Regulator Corp. v. Comm.

12

In Electric

the Court said*

As a practical matter, a retained earnings account
may embody a cross-section of the assets of the
corporation. See Paton & Dixon, Essentials of
Accounting 652-53» 667-68, (1958). Particularly is
this true where, as here, the corporations £sic3
growth has been financed through its own earnings
rather than through additional shareholder invest
ment or borrowing.1-*
The practical impossibility of tracing retained earnings
to specific assets creates a dilemma for the courts.

If

a corporation has assets that are not needed or used in
the business, as well as assets that are needed, how may
one determine the extent to which earnings, versus paidin capital, have provided for either group of assets in
order to assess the accumulated earnings tax?

Is the

assumption that excess liquid assets should be matched
with accumulated earnings consistent with accounting con
cepts?

The answer to this query is presented after

the

nature of earnings, depreciation, working capital, and
appropriation of earnings have been examined.

12lk AFTR 2d 5 ^ 7
^ Ibid., p. 5^50-

(2 Cir. 196^).

The Nature of Depreciation
The preceding examination of the nature of earnings
revealed that the chief difficulty for the courts is a
lack of understanding of the relationship of earnings to
the liquid assets— especially the cash account.

Interest

ingly, the chief difficulty in understanding the nature
of depreciation is in understanding its relationship to
the liquid assets.

The interesting point is that earnings

and depreciation share a common obstacle to understanding
although their conceptual natures are completely different.
The treatment of depreciation as a deduction on the income
statement in determining the earnings for a period seems
to be adequately understood by the courts.

The lack of

comprehension seems to be primarily limited to its effect
upon the asset and equity accounts on the balance sheet.
In fairness to all concerned parties, the account
ing profession must bear at least a small part of the
blame for the confusion about depreciation.

For an inde

terminable number of years the balance sheet account, re
lated to the depreciation charges on the income statement,
had the word "reserve" associated with the word "deprecia
tion” in its title.

An example of this title would be

"Reserve for Depreciation."

The unfortunate thing about

the use of the word "reserve" in the account title was
that "reserve" was also being used in the title of
four other different types of accounts.
of "reserves" used were*

The five types

12?

1.

To value asset accounts,

2.

To disclose an estimated liability,

3*

To recognize a contingent liability,
To distribute equitably certain costs and ex
penses , and

5*

To disclose the extent earnings have been
retained.

The treatment of the effect of depreciation upon the
balance sheet falls within the first category listed.
The modern terminology for this account is "Accumulated
ih,
Depreciation."
The use of the word "reserves" is
discouraged, but if it is used at all it should be limited
to the fifth category.

The preferred title for usage in

this last category would be "Appropriation of Retained
Earnings for
The word "reserve" has a general meaning in which
it refers to "money or its equivalent kept in hand or set
16
apart usually to meet liabilities."
Perhaps this mean
ing was partially responsible for this improper statementi
Petitioner had theretofore made depreciation reserve
of $152,299 on its transmitter which could have been

1

Welscfa, Zlatkovich, and White, Intermediate
Accounting (3d ed.; Homewood, 111.1 Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1972), pp. 825-27.
^Committee on Terminology, AICPA, "Review and
Resume," Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1 (New Yorki
AICPA, 1961), p. 27.
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. (Spring
field, Mass.": G. & C. Merriam Co., 1970), p. 29^.

128
used in buying and installing a new transmitter if it
Viflrt desired t
n
r?r»
had
to
do an.-**'
so. '
The erroneous application of the general meaning of reserve
can be seen more clearly in this expressioni
A corporation is not required to use, as operating
capital, the funds set aside for depreciation reserve
but rather it should be permitted to save and accumu
late earnings and profits and retain them in some
form of liquid assets in an amount equal to the
reserve for depreciation.
Besides the impression that accumulated depreciation re
presents a cache of cash, the idea that the taxpayer
"should be permitted" to set aside liquid assets equal to
the accumulated depreciation is especially interesting.
How did such an idea occur?

What implications does it

have for the present context?
A clue to answering both questions is found in
Mohawk Paper Mills, Inc. v. U.S.19
Mohawk did not set aside as permitted by law a
separate depreciation reserve but carried this deduc
tion under 'working capital*.
Thus, working capital
had to finance its daily operations as well as its
additions to fixed assets.20
The first sentence in the quotation reveals that the
answer to the first question posed is to be found some-

•^Southland Industries. Inc.. <846,262
<846,26 P-H Memo
TC, p. 900.
18
Churchhill Construction Co. v. U.5
17 AFTR
2d 045, 04a (1965J.
1918 AFTR 2d 6111 (DC, N.Y*i 1966).
20Ibid., p. 6116.
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where in the law.

The statement probably arises out of

the Court's interpretation of the provision permitting a
deduction of depreciation for tax purposes.

The second

sentence is an example of reasoning from an erroneous
premise.

Hopefully, an understanding of the topics pre

sented in following subdivisions will enable one with a
limited knowledge of accounting to appreciate the effect
of depreciation upon working capital.
The preceding quotations regarding depreciation
show relatively obvious errors.

As a judge's understand

ing of the matter increases, it becomes more difficult
to ferret out the degree of understanding that he pos
sesses.

This is one reason that the quotation below is

longer than usual.

Another reason for the length is that

the quotation is a part of the charge to the jury in The
21
Donruss Co. v* U.S.
which was given to guide the jury
in making its decision on the ultimate section 531 issue
of "purpose."
This concept of allowing a taxpayer a deduction over
a period of time on the cost of the equipment is
called depreciation.
Under the concept of deprecia
tion, * * . a taxpayer is permitted to use any bene
fits therefrom in any manner he desires.
During the Donruss Company's years ending January
31, I960 and January 31, 1961 it, as the Court under
stands from the proof, claimed and was allowed by way
of depreciation aggregate amounts of $137,634.98 and
$150,437.74, respectively, these amounts were not
included in the plaintiff corporation's accumulations
of earnings and profits. These benefits, when claimed
by the taxpayer, may be utilized by the taxpayer for

2115 AFTR 2d 896 (DC, Tenn. I965).
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replacement of plant equipment or diversification pur
poses, among other things.
As of the end of January, 19^1 the Donruss Company,
it is contended by the defendant, could expect to re
cover similar depreciation deductions for future years
in amounts in excess of $120,000 per year. Such
deductions, as I say, could be utilized for replace
ment of equipment or other purpose of the corporate
taxpayer.
So, it is necessary that you understand . . . that
each tax year in question The Donruss Company was
allowed deductions as depreciation on equipment it
owned and was free to take advantage of same as it saw
fit in the operation of its business. The purpose
of the depreciation allowance, to further explain, is
to afford the owner of a wasting asset used in any
trade or business, a means of recouping, tax-free, his
investment in that property. *
Several observations are made.

The Court has not used the

words "cash" or "liquid assets" in reference to deprecia
tion.

This is some indication that the Court was aware

of the false assumption that "cash" equals "depreciation."
The specific words used in several references to depre
ciation were "benefits" and "deductions."

These words

seem appropriate in the sense that they are general
enough to allow the reader to either draw from his know
ledge the proper interpretation, or assume the Court
understands the nature of depreciation.
not stand a close scrutiny.

Such a ploy will

For example, "deductions"

cannot be used "for replacement of equipment."

This idea

is expressed twice, and it is construed as revealing a
mistaken belief that depreciation does directly relate to
cash or liquid assets, or that the Court has a shallow

22Ibid.. pp. 902-0 3.
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understanding of depreciation.

Finally, the Court recog

nized that the purpose of the depreciation deduction is
to permit a qualified taxpayer to recover his investment
free of taxes.

Although the tax-free recovery of invest

ment results under the law, it is not the conceptual
23
basis in accounting for the depreciation deduction. J
The Steele*s Mills v. Robertson

oh

case is one in

which the facts seem to have had a direct bearing upon
the Court's manner of expressing the pertinent accounting
concepts.

Briefly, the relevant facts for present pur

poses arei

The plaintiff spent over $110,000 on plant

and equipment during 1938, the taxable year in dispute.
During 1938, the expenditures permitted for section 531
needs were greater than earnings plus depreciation charges.
For a ten year period, 1932-41, the plaintiff expended
over $900,000 for plant and equipment.

Finally, there

had been no significant increase in the plaintiff's
quick assets since 1923*

Thus the Court's findings of

fact appear adequate to support its decision for the
plaintiff.

However, the Court's reasoning expressed in

its other findings is subject to question.

The Court

stated*

2-^See, Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory
(Homewood, 111.* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 306335 for a presentation of the various accounting concepts
of depreciation.
2Zf32 AFTR 1734 (DC, N.C. I 1943).
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■ . . that it was in accordance with sound business
practice and a reasonable need of the business . . .
to withhold from distribution to its shareholders
assets in cash . . . to equal its reserve for depre
ciation for the purpose of having the funds readily
available withj-which to replace machinery and other
items
Later the Court reaffirmed this view and said*
If the corporation is forced to use the funds set
aside for reserve* EsicJ for depreciation for operating
capital* there will be no assurance that it will have
funds to replace . . . machinery* and while . . .
the corporation has been able to operate successfully
by using its reserve for depreciation as operating
capital, the court does not think it should be foreed
to do this, and that it should be allowed to carry
. . . liquid assets to equal its reserve for depre
ciation . . . .2°
The unanswerable question is whether this Court would
also sanction an accumulation of liquid assets equal to
accumulated depreciation in a situation in which there .
was no reasonably anticipated need to replace plant and
equipment assets.

In such a case it would appear that

the answer should be "no."
The courts have had an irksome task in disposing
of the fact that replacement cost is greater than either
original cost or accumulated depreciation. The Tax Court
27
in Metal Office Furniture Co. ( made the accumulated de
preciation equals liquid assets error in stating, "The

25Ibid.. p. 1735.
26Ibid.. p. 1736.
27ll52,313 P-H Memo TC.
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amount of the depreciation reserves would have been in
adequate to replace the depreciating facilities because
? ft
costs had increased."
This mistake is somewhat under
standable because in this case the Court apparently felt
the taxpayer had a need to fund the accumulating depre
ciation.

However, there is a significant difference in

that need as perceived in Steele»s Mills and as perceived
in Metal Office.

In the former case the impression re

ceived was that the company had an ongoing relatively
pressing need to replace old equipment.

In the latter

case the taxpayer expressed the need to fund accumulated
depreciation in addition to needs including normal expan
sion and a new division.

The Court*s attitude in Metal

Office was to accept all needs claimed, noting that
"eventually" the taxpayer*s plants would have to be re
placed.
The mistakes are compounded in Battlestein
Investment C o .29

District Court in Battlestein

relied on a passage from Smoot^0 to support its reasoning.
However, the passage on which the Court relied misinter
prets the meaning of appropriation.

The confusion is com

pounded by the fact that the Battlestein trial court fails

28Ibid.. p. 953.
2923 AFTR 2d 69-784-.
^°5 AFTR 2d 626.
This passage will be analyzed
in depth under the subsequent heading "The Nature of
Appropriations."

to distinguish between "appropriations of surplus" and
"depreciation allowances.'*

It appears that the Court

is assuming that these are identical items.

Finally,

total confusion reigns on this topic as the Court appar
ently misconstrues the nature of accumulated depreciation
The Court found that the taxpayer had definite and speci
fic plans to replace certain fixtures.

In a specific

interpretation of the aforementioned passage in Smoot
and a deduction thereon, the Court saidt
The authorities hold that a taxpayer is not entitled
to duplicate the depreciation allowance with accumu
lated earnings for the purpose of replacing assets
. . . .
Thus, the only justifiable accumulation in
this instance would be the difference between the
total amount of depreciation recoverable and the
higher replacement cost . . . . Finally, assuming
that the price of fixtures has risen, the $137#558
which the taxpayer had in working capital at the
close of the 1$62 fiscal year was certainly more than
enopgh to cover the spread between original and
replacement cost.-*1
A logical inference from this statement is that the Court
has fallen into the trap that accumulated depreciation
is equal to cash.
The proper method for evaluating accumulated
depreciation and its relation to the replacement of
assets is covered in Revenue Ruling 67-6^.

Two cases-^

have partially quoted that Revenue Ruling.

The same

3123 AFTR 2d 69-?8*f, 787.
•^The Dahlem Foundation, Inc. v. U.S.. 22 AFTR
2d 5962, 5969 (6 Cir. 19681T Battlestein Investment Co.
v. U.S., 2? AFTR 2d 71-713. 716 ( 5 C i r . l 9 7 1 ) .
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paragraphs were quoted in both cases.

The material quoted

wast
Although the reserve for depreciation itself may
be considered and given appropriate weight as a part
of the facts and circumstances in considering the
reasonable.needs of the business, the concept that a
noncash deduction for depreciation based on historic
costs requires the setting aside for an indefinite
period a cash fund adjusted for economic fluctuation
in order to provide for total replacement of plant
assets is not within the meaning of the term 'reason
able needs of the business.'
Accordingly, a corporation may not include a fund
equal to its depreciation reserves escalated for the
economic factor of increased replacement costs in
justifying the reasonable needs of its business pur
suant to section 537 of the Code. However, the
reserve for depreciation itself may be considered
and given appropriate weight as a part of the facts
and circumstances in each case.33
In this writer's opinion the two cases show that the
effectiveness of this Ruling has been severly restricted
by granting that "the reserve for depreciation itself
may be considered and given appropriate weight . . . ."
Conceptually, there is no difference in the economic
significance between the need to expend funds to expand
the business and the need to expend funds to replace
assets— both needs refer to the future.

The original

cost of assets currently held is irrelevant in making a
decision to replace those assets.

Therefore the accumu

lated depreciation upon those assets is irrelevant, too.
The acknowledgement that "accumulated depreciation" is a
mere valuation account is consistent with economic
reality.

Since there is no conceptual difference between

^Rev. Rul* 6?-64, 1967-1 CB 150.
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expansion and replacement, then the tax principles which
apply to expansion should apply to replacement.

The

Revenue Ruling recognizes the substance of this view.
In the paragraph immediately preceding the above quotation
this position is stated as follows*
Section 537 of the Code provides that the tern
"reasonable needs of the business? includes the rea
sonably anticipated needs of the business.
Section
1.537-1(10 of the Income Tax Regulations provides
that in order for a corporation to justify an accumu
lation of earnings and profits for reasonably anti
cipated future needs, there must be an indication
that the future needs of the business require such
accumulation, and the corporation must have specific,
definite, and feasible plans for the use of such
accumulation. Where the future needs of the business
are uncertain or vague, where the plans for the
future use of an accumulation are
not specific,
definite, and feasible, or where execution of such a
plan is postponed indefinitely, an accumulation cannot
be justified on the grounds of reasonably anticipated
needs of the business.
These regulations express the
legislative intent as stated in Senate Report 1622,
83d Congress, 2d Session, 69, and House report 1337,
83d Congress, 2d Session, A172-A173*-*
In the light of economic reality no weight should be given
to accumulated depreciation.

The failure of this*Ruling

to unequivocally express this proper view of accumulated
depreciation may be expected to impede understanding of
this important aspect in determining the reasonable needs
of a business.

As noted, two cases have already quoted

the misleading passages, rather than the correct one.
The Nature of Working Capital
The courts have erred in assuming that retained

^Ibid.
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earnings and accumulated depreciation were directly related
to liquid assets.
ing capital.

That mistake cannot be made with work

Working capital is defined as the excess

of current assets over current liabilities.
posed of liquid assets.

It is com

Since working capital is merely

a matter of arithmetical computation, then its nature is
determined by the nature of current assets and current
liabilities.

The most common errors involve the relation

ship between current assets and current liabilities#

The

courts have been inclined to express this relationship
in "rules of thumb" without always making a careful
analysis of the applicability of those rules based upon
the current ratio, acid-test ratio, or one year's operating
expenses.
The Tax Court reviewed a number of cases in John
'iC

P. Scripps Newspapers-^ for various applications and
views of rules of thumb.

The Tax Court particularly

noted the use of the current ratio as an indication of
reasonable accumulations.

Also, the Court observed the

use of a rule that accumulations to cover operating
expenses for one year are reasonable.

However, this rule

has been qualified by a judicial awareness that different
businesses have different requirements.

Therefore, this

rule "should not be given any greater weight than a

3 5 ^ TC

^3

(1965).
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36
rule of administrative convenience."^
The danger in relying upon this rule of thumb was
the cause for reversal and remand in McNally Pittsburg
37
Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S.
The District Court submitted
instructions to the jury that approved the annual figure.,
for cost of goods sold as a part of the current operating
needs for a year.

Under this assumption no funds were

available to pay dividends.

The government showed a sub

stantial amount of funds available to pay dividends by
excluding the annual cost of goods sold from current
operating needs.

The case was remanded in part because

of the potential effect of a possible credit under section
535 upon the decision.38
The advent of the general credit provision of ■
section 535 has increased the necessity for a more accurate
measurement of working capital needs than rules of thumb
can provide.

The rules of thumb are expedient, but they

essentially represent a static analysis of the dynamic
needs of business.

Perhaps the first court to give ade

quate notice of this difference between the techniques of
analysis and the nature of business was the Fourth Circuit

36Ibid.f p. 4-71.
3715 AFTR 2d
1578 (DC. Kans. 1963).
38Ibid., p. k86.

(10 Cir. 1965), reversing 11 AFTR
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in Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Comm.^9

In that case

the Court said*
Working capital needs of businesses vary* being
dependent upon the nature of the business, Its
credit policies, the amounts of inventories and
rate of turnover, the amount of accounts receivable
and the collection rate thereof, the availability
of credit to the business, and similar relevant
factors.^0
A new approach for evaluating the working capital
needs of the business was adopted by the Tax Court in a
memorandum decision, Bardahl Mfg. Corp.

The company’s

operating cycle was used to evaluate its need for
working capital.

In this regard the Court statedi

Manufacturing’s operating cycle, consisting of
the period of time required to convert cash into
raw materials, raw materials into an inventory of
marketable Bardahl products, the inventory into
sales and accounts receivable, and the period
required to collect the outstanding accounts,
averaged approximately b.2 months during the k
years here in question.
Petitioner required working capital as of the
end of each of the years in question at least in
an amount sufficient to cover its reasonable anti
cipate^ costs of operation for a single operating
cycle. ^
After the Tax Court adopted the operating cycle approach,

3950 AFTR 1612 (2 Cir. 1957).
^°Ibid., p. 1622.
hi .
^■L'jj65.200 P-H Memo TC.
Ilo

,

Ibid.. p. 65-1130.
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43

three circuit courts ^ and four district courts
adopted it.

44 also

However, the operating cycle approach con

tains its own problems in evaluating working capital needs.
Several arei
1.

Should an average cycle, or a peak cycle,

2.

How should the peaks of various cycles be treated
when they fall within different months?

3-

How should the

4.

be used?

credit cycle be evaluated?

Should the decimal expression of the cycle be
applied to all other expenses as well as to the
cost of goods sold?

A discussion of these problems and others and a comparison
of the differences between the cases in applying the
operating cycle has been made by Joseph H. Trethewey.

Ilc:

He has also developed a financial comparison of the
various approaches based upon the same hypothetical data.
In his example the working capital needs as shown by the
different approaches range from $172,041 to $675*050.^
When the possibility exists that the upper limit

43
^Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Comm.. 17 AFTR 2d
518 (1 Cir. 1966); Shaw-Walker Co. v. CominT, 21 AFTR 2d
655 (6 Cir. 1968); Bahan Textile Machinery v. U.S.. 29
AFTR 72-418 (4 Cir. 1972).
44
Schenuit Rubber Co. v. U.S., 22 AFTR 2d 5794
{DC, M d . ; 1966); New England Wooden Ware Corp. v. U.S..
22 AFTR 2d 5465 (DC. Mass.; 1968); Eberle Tanning Co.~"v.
U.S., 29 AFTR 2d 72-1153 (DC, Pa.* 1971) 1 Amer. Trading"
& Production Corp. v. U.S., 29 AFTR 2d 72-1301 (DC, M d .j
1972).
•^Joseph H. Trethewey, "Accumulated Earnings Tax
Working Capital," Tax Management #187-2nd (1971).
^ Ibid., p. B-17, 18, and 19.
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of working capital needs can be four times the size of the
lower limit, then it is questionable that the operating
cycle approach is superior to the old rules of thumb.

The

answer could be "yes'1 if the trial judge has a sufficient
knowledge of accounting to permit him to properly weigh
operating cycle presentations.

Otherwise, the working

capital needs would probably be decided by unknown consi
derations as in Schenuit Rubber Co. v. U.S.^
Schenuit Rubber is an example of the type of di
lemma that judges might face.

The taxpayer called the

resident partner of one of the "big eight" accounting firms
as an expert witness.

This expert used an operating cycle

approach and found working capital requirements for the end
of fiscal 1961 at $2,939,288 and for fiscal 1962 at
$3 ,206,156.

The government countered with a professor from

a prestigious university's school of business.

This expert

criticized the operating cycle approach used by the tax
payer’s witness for ignoring the cycle of current liabi
lities.

The professor used a different operating cycle

approach that showed working capital needs as $1,532,12*1and $1,159,280 for 1961 and 1962, respectively.

The

difference in the experts* calculations is roughly
$ 1 ,500,000 for 1961 and $2,000,000 for 1962.
The Court stated, "In making its analysis and

/f722 AFTR 2d 579^.
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findings the Court has been guided by the following prin48
ciples . . .
The principles set forth by the Court
were merely other judicial observations to the effect
that every case is different and must be evaluated with
a good business judgment without relying wholly upon a
cursory view of a company’s accounts.

Then, without ex

plaining the analysis used in arriving at a decision,
the Court said*
All factors considered, the Court finds that
the amount of working capital taxpayer reasonably
needed for current operations as of April 30, 19&1
was $2,250,000.
The similar needs as of April
30, 1962 were $2,000,000.^9
The working capital needs as determined by the Court are
approximately midway between the positions taken by the
experts.

Whether this decision was made in a comprehen

sive understanding of accounting concepts, or in a n at
tempt to split the difference in a manner reminiscent of
the wisdom of Solomon, cannot be ascertained,
A distinctive approach is presented in Electric
Regulator Corp. v. Comm.'*0 by the Second Circuit.

The

Tax Court had rejected a claimed need for a working capi
tal reserve in cash of $430,000.

The Tax Court noticed

that the cash balance at the end of the company’s fiscal

48

Ibid., p. 5802.

^9Ibid., p. 5803.
5014 AFTR 2d 5447.
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year, October 31, 1957, was about $821,000, and that for
fiscal years 1957 and 1958 the average monthly cash bal
ances were $^79,600 and $354,700, respectively.

The Tax

Court's evaluation was that "based on all the evidence,
petitioner's anticipated working capital requirements
could be amply cared for by its accumulations from prior
years plus the cash-generating transactions of its going
b u s i n e s s . T h e Second Circuit concluded that the cash
available was not adequate to pay the dividend that the
Tax Court held should have been paid.

The attack upon the

Tax Court's position on this issue was supported in two
ways.

First, the Second Circuit observed that the actual

cash balance had fallen to $190,000 on April 30, 1958.
Second, the Second Circuit calculated "net cash available"
at $320,000 before deducting needs for cash in the coming
year.

Significantly, the "net cash available" was deter

mined in this manner:
Cash available, October 31, 1957, after
payment of current liabilities. . . . . $231,000
89.000
Net income, fiscal 1958 ...................
Net cash available.
.............$320,000^
The addition of "net income, fiscal 1958," determined by
an accrual system of a c c o u n t i n g , i n arriving at "net
Cl
Electric Regulator Corporation, 40 TC 757, 76667 (1963).------------------------------52l4 AFTR 2d 5447, 5451.
^340 TC 757.

144cash available" represents a touch of irony.

The irony

is that shortly before this calculation the Second Circuit
specifically pointed out that retained earnings does not
KIl
necessarily represent liquid funds.
The First Circuit has correctly summed up the pro
per approach to be taken in evaluating working capital
needs.

The explanation in Apollo Industries. Inc. v.

Comm.

is:

Business decisions are not made on the basis of
information collected at arbitrary dates.
They
take into account the timing of needs and availa
bility of resources. And so should judicial at
tempts to deal justly with these decisions. But
to ascertain such needs and the resources available,
we are required to go behind the simple balance
sheet presentation of assets and liabilities.
The Court's idea of fulfilling this statement is an oper
ating cycle approach similar to the one followed in Bardahl Manufacturing.

Although operating cycle approaches

consider the duration of time that assets will be in a
noncash form, they do not consider the timing of needs
and the availability of liquid assets.

The calculation of

available cash in Slectric Regulator is subject to the
same criticism.

In regard to timing, the operating cycle

approaches and the Electric Regulator approach can hardly
be considered superior to the old rules of thumb.

AFTR 2d 5447, 5450.
7 AFTR 2d 518 (1 Cir. 1966).
56Ibid., pp. 521-22.
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A belief in the operating cycle approach as a tool
of management is not limited to the courts.

For example,

Stephen S. Ziegler has expressed concern that the precision
desired from operating cycles for management purposes may
be greater than the precision deisred for section 531
cases.

Consequently, he suggests some leeway before as

sessing the accumulated earnings tax against a corpo
ration.^

The courts are aware of the need for some lee

way to protect businesses from undue governmental inter
ference.

The Second Cirucit has expressed its awareness

of the need in this fashion:
Although Section 102 should be rigorously applied
to make it impossible for individuals to abuse the
corporate form for the purpose of lowering their
individual tax rates, the Commissioner may not use
Section 102 as a device to enable him to look over
the shoulder of the corporate manager and assess a
penalty any time the Commissioner believes that a
corporation has not been generous in its dividend
policy or has temporarily invested its surplus
in a manner not entirely acceptable to the Commis
sioner. 58
Ziegler's plea for a margin of freedom for taxpayers in
this area of taxation is commendable, but his faith in the
precision of the operating cycle is misplaced.
Astute management practices call for budgets for
effective planning and control.

Budgets are particularly

"^Stephen S. Ziegler, "The 'New* Accumulated Earn
ings Tax: A Survey of Recent Developments,V Tax Law Re
view, 22:77,102 (1966).
58Gsell & Co.. Inc. v. Comm., 8 AFTR 2d 5507, 55H12 (2 Cir. 1961).
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applicable when a matter as crucial as timing is involved.-^
However, two caveats are necessary with respect to evalu
ating working capital needs through a budgeting approach
for tax purposes.

Since management is able to control

the timing of needs to a degree, a judge must determine
whether good business judgment, or good tax judgment, is
responsible for the timing in a given case.

On the other

hand, a judge must not be misled by the hindsight that
liquid assets were not used for working capital as bud
geted.

The solution to both of these potential problems

is an adequate margin for error in which management can
operate.

Thus, if a reasonable leeway is provided for

managements, then the taxpayer should not feel pressed to
manipulate the timing to protect reasonable accumulations
from the tax.

However, if a court determines that timing

has been manipulated in order to shield accumulations, then
the amount of leeway should be appropriately reduced.

Yet,

a reduction should not be made to the extent that the tax
would be applicable to accumulations represented in
transactions that would occur.
The Mature of an Appropriation
of Retained Earnings
The preceding topics have shown the misunderstanding

<o
-"Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accountingi A Manage
rial Emphasis (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jerseyt Prentice-Hali, Inc., 1972). See Chapter 5. Budgeting in Gener
al » Profit Planning.
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of earnings, depreciation, and working capital.

As a

special classification of retained earnings, an appropria
tion may be misinterpreted in the same ways that earnings
have been misconstrued.

Thus, the basic pitfall in under

standing the concept of "appropriation'! is that it nece
ssarily has a direct relationship to cash or other liquid
assets.

This error was apparently made by the district

60
court in World Publishing Co. v. United States.

The taxpayer decided to build an addition on an
adjacent lot.

A new press and related equipment were

needed for the planned building.

The Court noted the cor

poration's practice of "paying for such improvements out
of its earnings"

and that the company "had begun accumu-

lating a fund for that purpose."
that in December of 1939 " . . .

6?

Also, the Court noted

a resolution to set aside

a fund for the purpose was passed." v

In regard to a simi

lar director's meeting in December of 1941 the Court saidi
Accordingly, a resolution was passed to withhold
dividends and to set aside $ 150,000 for the pur
chasing of the press and accessory equipment, and
$100,000 for the press building, bringing the ear
marked accumulations for expansion to $500,000.°4
Whether these references are to a fund of cash, to an
appropriation of retained earnings, or to both cannot be

6°35 AFTR 1671 (DC, Okla.j 1947).

6lIbid., p. 1675*

62Ibid.

63Ibid.

6^Ibid., p. 1676.
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ascertained.

Unfortunately, the actual resolution was

not quoted.

However, in a footnote given for this latter

meeting, several paragraphs of the minutes of the meeting
were quoted.
president.

The quotation relates the comments of the
Therein the president seems to urge an appro

priation of retained earnings of $500,000 while he appears
to suggest, less strongly, that in connection with the
appropriation the problem of conserving cash be considered.
Subsequent statements of the Court are particularly en
lightening.^
The book value of stocks, bonds, and cash less
liabilities at December 31, 1941, was about $427,000.
market value of the same was not available.

The

However, on

the same date for 1942 and 1943 the comparable figures
given were market values of approximately $496,000 and
$646,000, respectively.

The Court's conclusion was that

these amounts were convincing that adequate assets were
available for the planned expansion.

Immediately, this

view was followed by a citation of the retained earnings
balances for the three years in the approximate amounts
of $563#000, $643,000, and $740,000, respectively.

Then

the Court emphasized that the beginning balance of retained
earnings for 1942 was greater than the cost estimate of the
improvements at the end of 1 9 4 2 . ^

65Ibid.

This emphasis given

66Ibid.. p. 1677.
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by the Court provides a basis for the inference that it
has erred by assuming that earnings represent liquid as
sets.

Finally, the Court's misunderstanding seems clear

as it relates funds in the treasury to profits and accu
mulations of earnings in this fashioni
The determination of the question in the instant
case depends chiefly upon the sufficiency of the funds
for the expansion plan in the corporate treasury
before adding the profits of 1942 and 1943* and the
immediancy of the need for any funds, or more speci
fically, for the 1942 and 1943 additions to the
accumulations« {
Thus a logical extension of this improper construction
seems to be that an appropriation of retained earnings
automatically provides a.fund of liquid assets.
This case was affirmed
Circuit.

68

upon appeal to the Tenth

Significantly, Judge Phillips dissented.

He

properly compared liquid assets, net of the dividends that
the Commissioner claimed should have been paid, to the
estimated cost of expansion.

Those assets were inade

quate for the expansion, leaving nothing for working capi
tal needs at the end of 1942.
the earnings for 1943*

Increases in costs offset

Judge Phillips observed the strong

reliance given to the comparison of retained earnings to
the cost estimates and stated his conviction that the Dis
trict Court had thereby erred.

Also, he disagreed with

67Ibid.. p. 1679.
6837 AFTR 150 (10 Cir. 1948).
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the trial court's reliance on the indefiniteness of
the time for implementation of the proposed improvements.^9
Arguably, the District Court used this last point only to
buttress its findings on the adequacy of accumulations.
The two appeals taken to the Fourth Circuit in
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corn, v. Comm.70 are notable for their
sagacious treatment of accounting principles and concepts.
However, even these excellent opinions contain a misinter
pretation of accounting.

In the earlier discussion of

depreciation, reference was made to a misinterpretation by
the Court in Smoot.

That statement is as followst

Replacement of assets which are fully depreciated or
depleted requires available cash but does not require
a second appropriation of surplus.
It is only when
rehabilitation plans involve replacement of old
equipment with equipment costing more than the
original, or when additional equipment is required,
that appropriation of surplus.is justified.71
The sentences apparently represent an unclear appreciation
of the nature of an appropriation as it relates to depre
ciation and replacement of asBets.

This point is rela

tively insignificant in this case as the Court properly
concentrated upon a comparison of liquid assets to needs
in evaluating the reasonableness of accumulations.

Yet,

as explained in the preceding topic on depreciation, this

69Ibid.. pp. 15^-57•
7°50 AFTR 1612 (4 Cir. 1957) ( 5 AFTR 2d 626 (4*
Cir. I960).
715 AFTR 2d 626, 633*
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point of misunderstanding became the basis for further
misconstruction.
An Accounting Rationale
Since earnings cannot be directly traced to speci
fic assets, then assumptions must be formulated in order
to relate earnings to specific assets.

In Smoot the

Fourth Circuit took the position that earnings could be
accumulated to the degree that they were translated into
assets related to the business.

This case also presented

the view that liquid assets greater than reasonably fore
seeable business needs strongly indicate an improper accumulation of earnings.

72

Of course, the assumption implied

in this view is that earnings should be matched first with
excess liquid assets.
The' taxpayer sought to overcome this assumption by
substituting a contrary assumption in the appeal of Battlestein Investment Co. v. U.S.^

The taxpayer's assumption

was also based upon the Smoot language that earnings could
be accumulated without limitation to the degree the earn
ings were translated into assets needed for the business.
The taxpayer’s assumption is that accumulated earnings
should be matched against the cost of depreciable assets,
first, as if paid for out of assets provided by the profit

72

Ibid., p. 630,

7327 AFTR 2d 71-713 (5 Cir. 1971).
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element of operations.

The Court correctly recognized an

implicit premise in the taxpayer’s position that a corpo
ration has the right to retain liquid assets equal to the
74
accumulated depreciation.r

Perhaps the following part of

the taxpayer's brief will enable one to understand the
dilemma of a Court having a limited knowledge of accounting!
With respect to the year January 31> 1962, which
dollars paid the $50,000 debt principal, the earnings
of $44,92? or the depreciation cash flow of $46,477?
Obviously if earnings were used to pay this debt,
the earnings have been reasonably used and Taxpayer
cannot be penalized under Section 531*
We submit that as a matter of law the principal
of debt incurred to purchase plant and equipment
assets must be viewed as having been paid first by
the dollars produced by earnings, not depreciation
cash flow as the court below assumed.75
The Fifth Circuit did not accept the taxpayer's arguments,
and the taxpayer lost upon the appeal.
Under the

going concern concept all depreciable

assetB must be replaced ultimately.

Thus the idea of ac

cumulating liquid assets equal to the accumulated depre
ciation in order to provide for the future replacement of
depreciable assets has some appeal.

However, many depre

ciable assets have a useful life of several decades.

If

a business grows, assets will be needed for expansion.
Given that assets provided by recovery of depreciation
charges and by earnings are each sufficient to support a

7**Ibid.. p. 71-715.
7^Ibid., p. 71-716 {see footnote 4).

company's expansion, the source of the dollars used is
irrelevant considering the "business as an entity.

There

fore the only significance of the above question posed to
the Fifth Circuit results from tax considerations.

If

the remaining useful life of a given asset extends beyond
the reasonably foreseeable needs of the business, then
assets representing a recovery of the investment in that
asset through depreciation charges should be assumed to be
those used for expansion.

The rationale is that all tax

payers should not be expected to subsidize the expansion
of a particular taxpayer's business while that taxpayer
withdraws his investment from active duty in his business
under the pretense of awaiting the occurrence of an evant
that is at best a mere possibility.

This rationale is

supported by an awareness that an asset having a long life
is often not specifically replaced at the end of its life
because it has been replaced gradually by the expansion
that occurred.

Consequently, the position taken by the

courts to match accumulated earnings to the excess of
liquid assets over the reasonably foreseeable needs of the
business is sound.
SUMMARY
The nature of earnings, the nature of depreciation,
and the nature of an appropriation of retained earnings
have all been misunderstood by the courts in varying
degrees.

The most pervasive misunderstanding of these
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concepts has been the relationship of each to cash or
liquid assets.

The cases presented in this chapter have

shown that one aspect of a concept may be understood
while another aspect of the same concept is misconstrued.
The nature of working capital has also been con
fusing to some courts.

The basic misinterpretation of

this concept has been a failure to appreciate the differ
ence between a static measurement of working capital at
a moment of time and the dynamic changes in working capital
during a period of time.

A suggestion was presented for

a better analysis of working capital needs.
The approach by some courts to evaluating the
reasonableness of accumulations by comparing liquid
assets to reasonably foreseeable business needs was ex
amined.

A contrary approach was presented.

Finally,

a rationale to support the judicial approach on this issue
was presented.

The rationale is that all taxpayers should

not be expected to subsidize the expansion of a particu
lar taxpayer's business while that taxpayer withdraws his
investment from active duty in his business under the
pretense of awaiting the occurrence of an event that is at
befit a mere possibility.

CHAPTER V

AN INVESTIGATION OF FINAL DETERMINATIONS
CLASSIFIED BY JURISDICTIONS
The preceding three chapters have shown the great
difference in factors that often arise in accumulated
earnings tax cases.

In addition to these broad factors

there are numerous smaller factors, such as loans to stock
holders and redemptions of stock, that might be present
in varying degrees in any given case.

Consequently, a

specific case is a composite of elements taken from an
infinite number of possibilities.

Therefore, care must

be Oxercised in drawing conclusions or making suggestions
based upon the decisions in the accumulated earnings tax
cases.

This chapter presents four tables in which the

final determinations are classified in different ways in
order to obtain several views of the decisions.
FINAL DETERMINATIONS IN THE TRIAL COURTS
Chapter II presented a sketch of the legislative
history involving the accumulated earnings tax.

Several

changes were noted which could have had some discernible
effect in the administration of the tax.

The tax rate went

from 25 percent in the 1921 Act to 50 percent in the 1924
Act.

The 50 percent rate was in effect until it was
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reduced to graduated rates of 25 and 35 percent in the
193^ Act.

A 100 percent increase in this tax rate is an

indication of a substantial increase in the harshness of
the tax with a possible increase in the reluctance of
judges to impose the tax.

Of course the harshness of the

tax is interdependent with the personal income tax rates
and the point in the graduation of personal tax rates of
the stockholders of a corporation.

Too much significance,

therefore, must not be placed upon the change in the
accumulated earnings tax rates.

Another potentially

significant change was the change from the "prima facie
evidence of purpose" provision to the "evidence determina
tive of purpose" provision in the 1938 Act.

However, it

is questionable whether or not the human mind can apply
the difference in these two rules with any reliable degree
of precision, even if a significant difference is per
ceived.

Finally, the relatively extensive changes incor

porated into the 195^ Code offered the greatest potential
for change in the administration of the tax.
Table 2 presents the final determinations of
accumulated earnings tax incidents classified by trial
court jurisdictions and revenue acts.

The various revenue

acts have been grouped for classification in a manner com
patible with the preceding discussion of potentially
significant changes.
subdivided in Table 2.

The trial court jurisdictions are
The Board of Tax Appeals and Tax

Court incidents are separated into those resulting from
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memorandum decisions and those resulting from full court
decisions.

The district court incidents are separated

into those resulting from jury trials and those resulting
from nonjury trials.

The number of incidents arising out

of the Court of Claims is too insignificant to consider.
Table 2

shows that prior to the Revenue Act of

1938 the 5^ incidents

are almost evenly divided between

the taxpayer and the government at 25 and 2 9 , respectively.
However, the 5^ incidents are quite unevenly divided
between the trial courts.

Only five of these incidents

arose in the district courts, and only one of the five
was a jury trial.

A comparison of the incidents arising

under the column headed 1939-,38 to the earlier incidents
reveals several interesting results.
increase in the rate of incidents.

One result is an
The total number in

the 1939- f38 group is 121 with 6? for the taxpayer and 5*4for the government.
Appeals and Tax

The number arising from Board of Tax

Court decisions remained rather evenly

divided between the taxpayer and
51. respectively.

the government at 5*4- and

The most noticeable change seems to be

the increase in the district court incidents.

Perhaps

significantly, the distribution of the final determinations
is disproportionate between the taxpayer and the government
at 13 and 3» respectively.

The 13 incidents in favor of

the taxpayer include the 5 incidents rendered by juries.
These results may be compared with the results
under the 195^ classification.

Because of the important

Table 2

Final Determinations of Accumulated Earnings Tax Incidents^Classified by Trial Court Jurisdictions & Revenue Acts

Incidents Determined in Favor of Taxpayer (T) & Government (G)
Arising Under Revenue Acts for the Years :
Trial Court
Full BTA4 & TC5 Incidents
Memo. BTA & TC Incidents
Sub--total

T
10
27
37

1954
G
9
14
23

4
4

District Courts:
Nonjury Incidents
Jury Incidents
Subtotal

19
14
33

19
4
23

1
1
2

Total Incidents

70

46

6

^As defined in CHAPTER I.
number thereof.

S'
-

1939- '38
T
G
14
16
40
35
54
57

1936- '34
T
G
2
2
3
A
6
5

T
0
0
0

G
3
0
3

1921

1

1
0
1

1
0
J.

1
0
_1

0
1
1

0
0
0

7

6

17

20

1

3

1
0

11

3
0
_3

67

54

8
5

1932- '24
G
T
18
15
1
1
16
19

Court of Claims incidents omitted due to the insignificance of the

2
In a very few incidents the time period involved years covered by Revenue Acts in adjoining
columns. Such incidents are classified in the column representing the older applicable Revenue Act.
3

S denotes cases in which the decision was split between the taxpayer and government due to
the section 535(c) credit.

4

Board of Tax Appeals.

■’Tax Court.

departure from previous statutes of the general credit
provision of section 535(c), a heading in addition to
those provided for the taxpayer and government is provided.
The additional heading represents decisions which were
split between the taxpayer and the government by the
application of section 535(c).

The total incidents

under the 195^ classification are 122.

This number in

cludes only six decisions classified as "split.H

The

remaining 116 incidents show 70 in favor of the taxpayer
and

in favor of the government.

In contrast to the

1939-*38 column, the 195^ column might represent the
beginning of a trend in favor of the taxpayer in Tax
Court cases.

The 195^- column reveals 37 incidents for

the taxpayer and 23 for the government arising from the
Tax Court.

The incidents arising out of memorandum

decisions account for almost all of this difference as
the incidents arising from a full review are 10 for the
taxpayer and 9 for the government.

The district court

incidents are similarly divided with 33 in favor of the
taxpayer and 23 in favor of the government.

All of this

difference arises out of the jury trials as the nonjury
incidents are evenly divided at 19 each for the parties.
The indication of a possible bias in favor of
taxpayers in jury trials is strengthened by a continua
tion of the trend shown in the 1939-*38 column.

Whether

or not the bias is real, the change in the dispersion of
incidents between trial court jurisdictions is some
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indication that taxpayers believe that it exists.

This

suggestion is made as a logical inference from the obser
vation that the total incidents for the 195^ column and
the 1939-*38 column are almost the same at 122 and 121,
respectively, while the proportion of district court
incidents increased with an attendant decline in the pro
portion of Tax Court incidents.
FINAL DETERMINATIONS IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
Since appeals from the Tax Court and the district
courts go to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals,
an examination of the results of the appeals from all of
the incidents provides an additional basis for evaluating
the incidents.

Table 3 separately presents the appeals

taken by the taxpayer and the government from the Board
of Tax Appeals and Tax Court incidents to various Circuit
Courts of Appeals.

This table reveals a total of 72

appeals, with 69 taken by the taxpayer and 3 taken by the
government.

This division of the appeals is in striking

contrast to the relatively even division of incidents
between the taxpayer and the government as shown by Table
2.

The taxpayer was able to obtain a reversal 15 out of

69 times, for a rate of 21.7 percent.

The government did

not win any of its three appeals.
In Table k the appeals taken upon the district
court incidents are presented.
peals taken is 21.

The total number of ap

Of this number, 15 were taken by the

TABLE 3
The Number of Incidents Appealed^ and Reversals^ Obtained by the Taxpayers and
the Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Originally Before the
Board of Tax Appeals^ and the Tax Court^ Since the Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
2nd

1st

9th

10th

Total

Number of Appeals by
Taxpayers

8

20

5

4

9

3

3

8

6

3

69

Reversals Obtained

4

4

2

2

1

1

0

0

1

0

15

0%

0%

0%

21.7%

Percentage Reversed

50.0%

20.0%

40.0%

50.0%

11.1%

33.3%

16.7%

Number of Appeals by
the Government

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

3

Reversals Obtained

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Percentage Reversed

-

0%

-

0%

-

-

V*

0%

-

0%

^Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted.
M a s e s classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed
outright.
Memorandum decisions are included.

taxpayer and 6 taken by the government.

The taxpayer

obtained three reversals for a rate of 20 percent.

This

rate is quite close to the 21.7 percent reversal rate for
taxpayers shown in Table 3*

However, the appeals by the

government indicate some significant differences, although
the absolute numbers are small.

In contrast to the re

sults presented in Table 3» Table 4 shows that the number
of government appeals doubled for a total of six, while
the total number of appeals decreased to 30 percent of the
total appeals presented in Table 3»

This increase in

appeals by the government may be interpreted as indicating
a bias in favor of taxpayers in the district courts.

When

one considers that four reversals were obtained upon the
six appeals taken by the government, the suggested bias
becomes more credible.

Table 5 is a compilation of Table

3 and Table 4, and it is presented to give an overview of
the appeals.
The idea of judicial bias is somewhat repugnant
to ideals of justice.
suggested.

However, a deliberate bias is not

Instead, the suggested bias is believed to

be a subconscious one that is expressed in the attitude
of a judge,* or jury member, as he views any given issue.
For example, the different interpretations of the sub-

See Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict and Consensus in
the United States Courts of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Re
view. 1968, p. 461 and other studies cited therein.

Table 4
The Number of Incidents Appealed’
*- and Reversals^ Obtained by Taxpayers and the
Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Originally Before the
District Courts Since the Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921

1st

2nd

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
3rd
5th
6th
7th
8th
4th

9th

10th

Total

Number of Appeals by
0
Taxpayers

2

0

2

4

2

1

1

2

1

15

Reversals Obtained

0

0

0

0

2

1

0

0

0

0

3

Percentage Reversed

-

0%

-

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

20%

Number of Appeals by
the Government 0

1

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

3

6

Reversals Obtained

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3

4

Percentage Reversed

-

0%

-

-

-

-

-

-

50.0%

50.0%

50.0%

100,0%

66.7%

^Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted*

2

Cases classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed

outright,

Table 5
The Number of Incidents Appealed^ and R e v e r s a l s ^ Obtained by Taxpayers
and the Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Since the
Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921

1st

2nd

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th

9th

10th

Total

Number of Appeals by
Taxpayers

8

22

5

6

13

5

4

9

8

4

84

Reversals Obtained

4

4

2

2

3

2

0

0

1

0

18

0%

0%

0%

21.4%

Percentage Reversed

50.0%

18.2%

40.0%

33.3%

23.1%

40,0%

12.5%

Number of Appeals by
the Government

0

2

0

0

1

2

0

0

1

3

9

Reversals Obtained

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3

4

Percentage Reversed

-

0%

-

-

0%

**

m

0%

50.0%

100.0%

Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted.

2
Cases classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed
outright.

44.4%
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stantive rules of law presented in CHAPTER II are believed
to be the result of judicial attitudes which are based upon
subconscious values of the individual judges.

The effect

of a probable bias must be considered in an evaluation of
equity.
SUMMARY
This chapter has presented four tables in order
to draw conclusions and inferences from the final deter
minations in the accumulated earnings tax cases.

Table 2

showed that the number of accumulated earnings tax inci
dents began to increase with the Revenue Act of 1938*
The results of jury trials indicated a probable bias in
favor of taxpayers.

An examination of the appeals taken,

as presented in the subsequent tables, tends to support
the suggestion of bias.

Furthermore, the reversals ob

tained tend to corroborate the bias suggested.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter contains a summary and conclusions
based upon the results of this study.

The conclusions con

tain an ohjective and subjective evaluation of equity as
revealed in the cases investigated.

In addition to an eval

uation of equity as it has existed, an evaluation of the
future prospects of equity is presented.

Finally, recom

mendations are made in the light of past proposals and re
lated criticisms and the results of this study.
SUMMARY
This study was introduced with a presentation of
various aspects of the problem, definitions of some terms
limited to this study, a review of the relevant literature,
and a statement of the methodology to be used in this study.
CHAPTER II presented a brief legislative history of the ac
cumulated earnings tax and the judicial development of two
substantive rules of law.

CHAPTER III examined the devel

opment of a procedural rule of law, the burden of proof
under section 53^» and its relationship to section 535CHAPTER IV presented some applications of accounting con
cepts in determining the reasonable needs of the business.
CHAPTER V investigated the final determinations as clas-
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sified in different ways.

Each of these chapters is sum

marized in the following discussion.
Introduction to the Study
The primary purpose of this study was to make an
evaluation of equity in the judicial administration of the
accumulated earnings tax cases.

Specific objectives were

to examine these cases in order to determine the charac
teristics of conflicting decisions, to determine the ju
dicial basis for such decisions, to evaluate equity in
those cases, and to evaluate future prospects for equity.
Proposals for tax reform are constantly being presented.
This study should contribute some evidence in weighing pro
posals for judicial reform in the federal tax area.

The

study was limited to three broad topics involving two
substantive rules of law, a procedural rule of law, and
applications of accounting concepts.

In addition, an in

vestigation of the final determinations was presented.
Three terms were specifically defined for this study.
arei

They

equity, reasonable classification, and incident.
The review of the literature began with a presen

tation of the Traynor and Surrey proposals for judicial
reform.

They made three significant suggestions which were

as followst
(1)

To transfer the original jurisdiction of the Dis
trict Courts and the Court of Claims to the Board
of Tax Appeals, thus giving the Board exclusive
original jurisdiction in all income, estate, and
gift tax cases*
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(2)

To decentralize the Board of Tax Appeals) and

(3)

To create a single Court of Tax Appeals and limit
appeals to this Court with appeal from the Court
of Tax1Appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.

The views of various critics of these proposals were given.
However, six years after the Traynor and Surrey proposal,
Professor Griswold revived the controversy.

Griswold

limited his efforts to supporting a single Court of Tax Ap
peals although he suggested refinements to the related
proposal by Traynor and Surrey.

Professor Griswold was

concerned about the long time period during which the cono
flicting decisions remained unsettled.
Critics of Gris
wold's proposal concentrated their attention upon the as
pect of time, rather than the fact of conflict.

Madeline
.v*

Remmlein conducted a study of conflict cases in order to
evaluate the time period in which a conflict might go un
resolved.

Remmlein interpreted the data to indicate a fal

lacy in the charge that conflicting circuit court decisions
delayed settlement of tax controversies.-^

A second study**"

^R. J. Traynor, "Administrative and Judicial Pro
cedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes— A Cri
ticism and a Proposal," Columbia Law Review. 38:1392,
1425-28, 1938.
2
Ervin N. Griswold, "The Need for a Court of Tax
Appeals," Harvard Law Review, 57:1153* 1944.
^Madeline Remmlein, "Tax Controversies," George
Washington Law Review, 13*416, 1944-45.
4
Madeline Remmlein, "A Time Study of Certain Tax
Controversies," George Washington Law Review, 16:238,
1947-48.

by Remmlein for a time period contiguous to the time
period of her first study supported the prior study, but
it did indicate a possible trend toward a greater total
elapsed time until settlement of a case.

In spite of the

Remmlein studies, Judge Walter Pope concluded that the
weakness at the circuit level, noted by Traynor and Gris
wold, was still in existence.

Judge Pope believed that

the strongest objections were based upon the process for
appointing judges to a Court of Tax Appeals, and he set
forth a plan which he hoped would avoid the objections
he perceived.^

Professor Lowndes reviewed all of the fed

eral income, estate, and gift tax cases going to the
Supreme Court since ratification of the Sixteenth Amend
ment through the 1959 term.

He classified these cases into

the three categories of criminal cases, constitutional
cases, and construction cases.

Lowndes concluded that

the Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction of cases in
the first two categories.

However, cases involving the

construction of statutes, which is a preponderance of the
cases, should be within the jurisdiction of a Court of
Tax Appeals.^

Finally, Professor Del Cotto conducted a

e
■'Walter L. Pope, "A Court of Tax Appealsi A Call
for Reexamination," American Bar Association Journal, 39:
275-76, 1953*
^Charles L. B. Lowndes, "Federal Taxation and
the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Review, pp. 222-226,
-----------------257, I960.
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study similar to those made by Remmlein.

Del Cotto*s study

followed the first Remmlein study by 16 years.

He found

that the time required to settle conflict cases had in
creased since Remmlein*s study.

Professor Del Cotto be

lieved that the time period in which tax questions remained
in doubt was far too long.'7
The basic methodology of the studies reviewed
was an analysis of conflicting cases from the Supreme
Court down to the circuit courts.

In contrast to this

methodology, the present study examined cases at the trial
court level for conflicting decisions on each one of three
broad topics previously set forth.

Analysis of these

conflicts proceeded from the trial court up to the Supreme
Court in applicable cases.

This analytical approach

provides some Insight for the existence of conflicts that
have not reached the appellate level.

Such conflicts

would go undetected by the approaches taken in the other
studies*

A n objective comparison of important conflicting

issues permits judicial attitudes to be ascertained for
an evaluation of equity.
Two Substantive Rules of Law
The basic statutory provision for the accumulated
earnings tax throughout its existence is that it will be
levied against a corporation if that corporation has been

'Louis A. Del Cotto, "The Need for a Court of Tax
Appealsi An Argument and a Study," Buffalo Law Review.
12:5, 1962-63.
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formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding income
taxes upon its stockholders*

The term "purpose" has

been interpreted in several different ways during a period
of almost four decades*

In the order of decreasing

favorableness to the taxpayer, the interpretations are:
1.

The "sole" or "express" purpose test,

2.

The "primary" or "dominant" purpose test,

3*

The "one of the determining purposes" test, and
The "a," "any," or "one of the purposes" test,
compatible with the "complete absence of purpose"
test.

The Supreme Court settled the conflict among these inter
pretations in favor of the fourth construction in Donruss
in 1969*
Another substantive rule of law governs the rela
tionship of the reasonable needs of the business to the
purpose.

The fact that earnings had been accumulated be

yond the reasonable needs of the business was "prima
facie" evidence of the prohibited purpose prior to the
Revenue Act of 1938*

Beginning with the 1938 Act the

same fact became "determinative" of the prohibited pur
pose.

Under either of these provisions the relationship

between the reasonable needs of the business and the pur
pose is subject to interpretations that yield eight
possible paths to a final determination in an accumulated
earnings tax case.
in Table 1.

In CHAPTER II these paths were presented
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Section 53^ and Section 535
Section 53^ provides for a shift in the burden
of proof from the taxpayer to the Commissioner under
certain conditions.

Early critics charged that the Tax

Court's treatment of this section had frustrated the in
tent of Congress.

The Second Circuit duly noted the Con

gressional intent for adopting the provision and the Tax
Court's failure to determine the section 53^ issue in
Gsell.

This Court of Appeals admonished the Tax Court

of the necessity for making a determination of the section
53^ issue, especially in close cases.

A second round of

criticism developed as writers became aware of the potential
impact of the general credit provision of section 535(c)
upon section 53^*

Critics suggested that the burden of

proof should extend to section 535 so that the Commissioner
would have the burden of proving the extent of the rea
sonableness of accumulations in appropriate cases.
The cases since Gsell reveal a trend in determining
the burden of persuasion element of the burden of proof.
The burden of producing evidence has received relatively
less attention.

Arguably, the cases appealed since Gsell

provide a suggestion that further development has been
impeded by the preoccupation of the courts in determining
boundaries for the reasonable needs of the business and
the proper application of accounting concepts.

An analysis of the
opinions of
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comments of the critics and the

the courts led to a restricted theory that

regardless of the Tax Court’s treatment of a section 53^
issue, the final result of an appellate decision will be
unaffected-

However, this theory does not negate the need

for the Tax Court to determine the section

53^ issue.

Finally, a proposal was tendered to accomodate the various
factions.

The proposal calls for a full interplay between

sections 53^ and 535*

The essential features require that

an adequate section 53^ statement include a dollar amount
for estimated needs, that such a statement will shift both
elements of the burden of proof to the Commissioner, and
that' the burden of producing evidence will shift back to
the taxpayer upon the Commissioner's presentation of evi
dence disproving the amount of the need claimed in the
section 53^ statement.
Applications of Accounting Concepts
The accumulated earnings tax cases were examined
for the judicial treatment of basic accounting concepts.
The nature of earnings, the nature of depreciation, and the
nature of an appropriation of retained earnings have all
been misunderstood in varying degrees.

The most pervasive

misunderstanding of these three concepts has been the rela
tionship of each to cash or liquid assets.

The cases pre

sented revealed that one aspect of a particular concept
may be understood, while another aspect of the same concept
is misconstrued.

The nature of working capital has also

17*

been confusing to some courts.

The basic misinterpre

tation of this concept has been a failure to appreciate
the difference between a static measurement of working
capital at a moment of time and the dynamic changes in
working capital during a period of time.

A suggestion

was made for a better analysis of working capital needs.
The courts’ approach to evaluating the reasonableness of
accumulations by comparing liquid assets to reasonably
foreseeable business needs was examined.

Although a con

trary approach was presented, a rationale to support the
judicial approach on this issue was presented.
An Investigation of Final Determinations
The final determinations in the accumulated earnings
tax cases have been classified in different ways in order
to obtain several views of the decisions.

Table 2 showed

that the number of accumulated earnings tax incidents be
gan to increase with the Revenue Act of 1938*

The results

of jury trials indicated a probable bias in favor of tax
payers.

An examination of the appeals taken, as presented

in the subsequent tables, tends to support the suggestion
of bias.

Furthermore the reversals obtained tend to

corroborate the bias suggested.
CONCLUSIONS
Evaluation of Past Equity
An objective evaluation of equity requires that
the constraints imposed by the definitions of equity and
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reasonable classification be satisfied.

These constraints

can seldom be satisfied in a comparison of different cases.
However, the constraints may be satisfied by isolating
identical issues in cases which would not otherwise be
comparable.

An evaluation of equity must proceed by deduc

tion from an objective comparison of the judicial treatment
of identical issues.

As one step to this end the develop

ment of two substantive rules of law was examined.
During a period of almost four decades, four dis
tinctly different interpretations of the prohibited pur
pose were used by the courts.

The application of the

accumulated earnings tax is predicated upon the existence
of the proscribed purpose.

Thus the interpretation of

purpose is the most important issue to be determined.

With

four different interpretations of purpose in use, inequi
table treatment of taxpayers is a highly probable result.
Inequitable results do not necessarily follow from the
existence of different constructions of statutory pro
visions because other factors can be such that the same
result would occur regardless of the interpretation
utilized.

For example, if the facts of a case were to be

such that the express purpose test would result in a
decision for the Commissioner, the one of the purposes
test would be in favor of the Commissioner, too.

Therefore,

the existence of equity in these cases has been partially
a matter of chance.
A most significant factor affecting the probability

of equity has been the relationship of the reasonable needs
of the business to the purpose because the statutory pro
visions have provided that accumulations in excess of
those needs were either prima facie evidence of the pur
pose, or were evidence determinative of the purpose.

Pre

viously, eight paths were presented to show the possible
ways to reach a final decision assuming only one definition
of purpose.

Two of these paths treat the reasonableness

of the accumulations as determinative of the final decision
without consideration of the purpose.
require a determination of purpose.

Thus six paths
Since four interpreta

tions of purpose have existed, each of the six paths can
be reproduced for each interpretation.

Therefore, twenty-

four paths involving purpose, plus two paths involving
only the reasonableness of accumulations, gives a total
of twenty-six possible paths.

Considering this large

number of possible paths to a final decision, the proba
bility of equity for past years is quite low.
The operation of the burden of proof under section
53^ presents a different aspect of the cases for evalua
tion because it involves a procedural rule of. law.

Inequity

has resulted from the Tax Court's failure to make a
determination of the section 53^ issue in all appropriate
cases.

The magnitude of the inequity is substantially

less than in the instance of the substantive rules of law
discussed above.

The reasons for the smaller magnitude

of inequity under the section 53^ issue are:

(1) the
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provisions of section 53^ were incorporated into the law
for the first time in the 195^ Code, (2) section 53^
applies only to cases coming before the Tax Court, and
(3) the Tax Court has been increasingly making section 53^
determinations.
A determination of the reasonable needs of the
business has required the application of such basic
accounting concepts as earnings, depreciation, working
capital, and appropriation of earnings.

The dilemma pre

sented to a judge attempting to determine the reasonable
ness of accumulations is as follows:

Reasonable needs of

the business must be satisfied out of the assets of a
corporation, but accumulations are measured as equities
which must also be satisfied out of the assets.

The

confusion over the accounting relationships has been
apparent in the cases in which the courts have explained
the application of accounting concepts.

Of course in

most cases accounting concepts have not been explained,
and this writer had initially assumed that accounting
concepts were properly applied in those cases.

However,

the misunderstanding of accounting evidenced by so many
explanations of these concepts has eliminated the assump
tion of proper application by the courts.

The judicial

awareness of the need to assume a relationship between
liquid assets and accumulated earnings in the i960 Smoot
case was a significant improvement.

Overall the courts'

treatment of accounting concepts is considered to be an
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additional indication of a lack of equity, or at least
further evidence that equity is a matter of chance in the
accumulated earnings tax cases.
The investigation of final determinations enables
the evaluation based upon a comparison of identical issues
to be placed in perspective.

Different interpretations

of any given issue almost inevitably means that one inter
pretation will be favorable to one party while a different
interpretation will be less favorable to that party.

The

different interpretations are believed to result from
different judicial attitudes toward the government and the
taxpayer.

The increasing percentage of cases taken to the

district courts by taxpayers indicates that taxpayers
believe they will receive more favorable treatment in the
district courts than in the Tax Court.

The final deter

minations of incidents decided by jury trials seems to
support this apparent difference in attitudes.

The pattern

of appeals suggests that both the Commissioner and tax
payers sense the difference in attitudes among the forums.
The reversals obtained corroborate the suggestion of
bias.

Thus the conclusion is made that in the past equity

has been mostly a matter of random chance, rather than
the inexorable process of justice.
Evaluation of Future Equity
The prospects for future equity must be based
upon the most recent developments.

The developments will

be considered in the topical order followed to this point.

The 1969 Supreme Court decision in Donruss finally elimi
nated all interpretations of purpose except for the "one
of the purposes" test.

However the relationship between

purpose and the reasonable needs of the business has not
been settled.

Specifically, a whole new series of con

flicting decisions involving the relationship of purpose
to the general credit provision of section 535(c) is
predicted.

Additional conflicting interpretations on the

interaction of section 53^ with section 535 are expected.
Furthermore, misinterpretations of accounting concepts are
expected to continue.

If section 535 increases in impor

tance, which seems probable, the application of accounting
concepts will play a more important role in determining
equity in the accumulated earnings tax cases.

The adop

tion of an assumption for relating liquid assets to
retained earnings was an improvement, but the courts’
poor ability to evaluate working capital needs through an
operating cycle analysis is disheartening.

Thus on the

whole only a small improvement may be expected.

However,

statutory changes could completely alter this outlook at
any time.
Recommendations
Equity in the judicial administration of the
accumulated earnings tax cases is not the natural product
of justice as it should be.

No individual judge or court

can be singled out as being responsible for the lack of
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equity.

The judicial system for federal tax cases must

bear the blame.

Several suggestions made by previous

writers were presented in a review of the literature.
Several of those views will be examined in the light of
this study.
Most of the critical comments concerning the
judicial system in tax cases have emphasized the length
of time that uncertainty prevails until conflicts are
settled.

After the controversy over the Traynor and

Surrey proposals subsided, the time and uncertainty argu
ments centered upon the need for a single court to hear
all tax appeals.

The analysis in CHAPTER III of the

case development of section 53^- since the Second Circuit's
Gsell case is relevant to a determination of this need.
The Tax Court decisions showed a substantial change in
policy toward making section 53^ determinations in about 50
percent of the cases examined.

More importantly, the

appeals taken disclosed that in all appeals taken to the
Second Circuit the section 53^ issue had been decided, but
the appeals taken upon cases in which that issue had not
been resolved went to other circuit courts.

This disclo

sure is not startling, but it emphasizes the effect that
a Court of Tax Appeals could have in reducing the time
and uncertainty that attends conflicting decisions.

This

study also supports the position of Professor Lowndes
that there is no reason to have the Supreme Court exercise
jurisdiction in construction cases.

So as noted earlier
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the Supreme Court's decision in Donruss settled only the
issue involving the construction of purpose while leaving
the relationship of purpose to the reasonable needs of
the business unresolved.

Furthermore, this writer feels

that the results achieved by the Supreme Court in National
Grocery Co. and Chicago Stock Yards Co* were no better
than could have been achieved by a Court of Tax Appeals.
For example, in Chicago Stock Yards (19^3) the Supreme
Court passed an opportunity to adopt a construction of
purpose only to face that task in Donruss (1969).

Thus

a single Court of Tax Appeals is recommended.
In addition to this recommendation, another
recommendation initially made by Traynor and Surrey is
hereby endorsed.

The other recommendation is to grant

the Tax Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all
income, estate, and gift tax cases.

Although a Court of

Tax Appeals would substantially reduce the uncertainty
in tax cases, this writer believes that there would still
be.too much leeway at the trial court level for judges
to interpret tax law within the framework of their per
sonal attitudes until precedents could be set by the
Court of Tax Appeals.

The operation of the Tax Court in

which full court decisions are rendered, as well as
memorandum decisions, provides a vehicle for the cry
stallization of judicial viewpoints that is missing under
the present system.

Furthermore, the need for specialists

in tax matters is quite evident from the applications of

basic accounting concepts presented in CHAPTER IV. A
program to appoint such specialists to all of the district
courts is not feasible.

Thus a single court for the

trial of federal tax cases as well as a single court for
tax appeals is recommended.
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